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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a remarkable development in
landlord-tenant law, particularly in the residential area. Courts
and legislatures which had ignored the problems in this field for
years began to take an active interest.' Illustrative of this develop-
ment is the fact that the Nebraska Supreme Court has recently
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
B.A. 1964, Harvard University; J.D. 1967, Harvard University; LL.M.
1974, Harvard University.
1. See Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 26 VAmw. L. Rmr. 689 (1973).
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reversed two hoary landlord-tenant rules. The first was that the
landlord did not have to mitigate damages if the tenant abandoned
the leasehold during the term; now he must.2 The second rule was
that a landlord could peaceably enter and take possession of the
tenant's property if the lease so provided and if the tenant was
in arrears in his rent payments; now he cannot.3
In 1974, the Nebraska Legislature passed the Nebraska Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act ("NRLTA") .4 It was modeled
after the Uniform Law Commissioner's Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act ("URLTA"), 5 and is an attempt at coherent
reform.
The purpose of this article will be to examine the NRLTA's
effect on prior Nebraska law, and to suggest possible interpretations
of ambiguous sections. The Nebraska and common law backgrounds
are given where they seem appropriate. Section IA examines
certain interpretive problems and Section IB examines NRLTA
coverage; Section II focuses on landlord-tenant agreements; Section
III studies landlord obligations and tenant remedies; Section IV dis-
cusses tenant obligations and landlord remedies; Section V analyzes
problems related to jurisdiction and the summary repossession pro-
visions; and Section VI presents a brief conclusion.
In all the areas discussed, the article will examine instances in
which the NRLTA differs from the URLTA and will show that in
many instances the Nebraska modifications destroy the sense and
coherency of the URLTA. What was a well-developed model
scheme has been changed to create an interpreter's nightmare. In
a few other instances, it will be shown that the Nebraska changes
improve the URLTA, and these modifications will also be discussed.
Generally, if there is a lesson to be learned, it is that a state
legislature should tamper with well-developed model legislation
only with caution.8
2. Bernstein v. Seglin, 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969).
3. Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974).
4. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to 49 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
5. Uiaoimu RESIENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT. [hereinafter cited
as URLTA.]
6. Admittedly, this is a limited conclusion. It would also be possible to
suggest a more political conclusion. The outline of such an argument
would be that prior Nebraska law greatly favored the landlord; that
the URLTA would have provided the tenant with a more balanced law;
and that the NRLTA provides the tenant with more than he had before
but not with as much as he would have had under the URLTA. The
lesson to be learned could be that the Nebraska Legislature was too
greatly influenced by the landlords! lobby. The author does not ex-
ilicitly draw this conclusion. The balance of power favors the tenant
more now than it did before. It could thus be equally well argued
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A. Interpretation
Before beginning the detailed examination of the NRLTA,
several more general interpretive problems should be exposed. The
NRLTA explicitly provides that it should be liberally construed:
(a) to simplify, clarify, modernize and revise the law governing the
rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlord
and tenant; (b) to encourage landlord and tenant to maintain and
improve the quality of housing; and (c) to make uniform the law
among those states which enact it7
These statutory commands should be given substantial weight;
however, applying these principles in context may be difficult. For
example, the last purpose-to enhance uniformity-may suggest
controversial interpretations and in particular instances, it will not
be followed. In many cases, problems in applying it will arise in
situations in which the Nebraska Legislature explicitly amended the
close facsimile of the URLTA which was introduced to the 1974
Legislature. At the least, this shows that there may have been
some purpose in changing the URLTA. It may indicate an "intent"
to reject the URLTA in the specific instance. If this "intent" were
clearly reflected in the statutory language, it will be adopted. But
if the statutory language were ambiguous, the interpreter will have
to guess at legislative "intent." The legislative history will be
informative, but the statutory mandate to construe the statute in
a way to make the law uniform with other states' laws will usually
be more persuasive. The manifest intent of the NRLTA, as wit-
nessed by the title of the Act,s is to introduce a wave of the future
in which all jurisdictions will have adopted their own URLTA. The
URLTA will, therefore, be taken as the standard of uniformity.
Another controversial problem of interpretation will arise when
there is a gap in the NRLTA's coverage of a situation. It is arguable
that existing Nebraska law should apply and that what the statute
does not change, it leaves. This principle will, of course, be given
some weight, particularly in instances in which there is reported
legislative intent to adopt the existing Nebraska rule. But the
NRLTA explicitly provides that "[t] his act [is] a general act
that the Nebraska Legislature was too greatly influenced by the ten-
ants' lobby.
The author's approach is to avoid a political interpretation of this
compromise. Instead, the focus will be on the form of the compromise
which was made.
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1402 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1401 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The NRLTA is to be
cited as the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. In this
article, however, the Nebraska legislation will be referred to as the
NRLTA to distinguish it from the unchanged Uniform Act.
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intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter."'9 This implies
-that the gaps should be filled with an eye to the statutory policies
of the NRLTA. This implication should be followed. In some cases
interpretations will be submitted which change existing Nebraska
law, not because the NRLTA explicitly so dictates, but because the
changes are appropriate policy extensions of the NRLTA.
A final, additional and controversial interpretive principle must
be exposed. The NRLTA divides duties and obligations from
remedies. Will a remedy be inferred if it is not explicitly deline-
ated? Will it be inferred if the Nebraska Legislature deleted it
from the proposed URLTA facsimile? A specific statutory com-
mand implies that the remedy should be inferred. 10 This principle
will usually beadopted, with the only exception being those circum-
stances in which the legislative "intent" is clear with respect to the
reason why there is no remedy. All remedies shall, of course, be
interpreted so as to give appropriate damages, and all aggrieved
parties will have a duty to mitigate."
In conclusion, the following interpretive principles will be pre-
sumed to be applicable. First, the law will be construed to make
it consistent with the URLTA. Second, the NRLTA will be
interpreted to speak implicitly to "gap" situations not explicitly
covered. Third, appropriate remedies will be inferred to enforce
duties and obligations. At appropriate points in this article, other
interpretive problems will be highlighted.
B. Coverage
Sections 76-1407 and 76-1408 define the coverage of the
NRLTA.12 Section 76-1407 affirmatively provides that the NRLTA
applies to lease arrangements for dwelling units within Nebraska.
In other words, the NRLTA applies to Nebraska residential tenan-
cies. Section 76-1408 negatively provides that certain of these
residential arrangements will not be covered. These include inci-
dental institutional or fraternal residential arrangements; purchase
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1404 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The official comment
to section 1.104 of the URLTA indicates that the provisions of the Act
should be particularly resistant to implied repeal. This is because it
is "carefully integrated and intended as a uniform codification" of an
"entire 'field' of law."
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1405 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). This section provides
that "any right or obligation.., is enforceable by action unless the
provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect."
11. NEB. Rgv. STAT. § 76-1405 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
12. Hereinafter, all references to sections of the NRLTA will be made by
using section numbers only. Section 76-1410 defines many terms used
in the NRLTA. Rather than discussing these terms separately, they
will be explained when relevant.
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arrangements; transient and managerial relationships; condomin-
ium or cooperative residences; and occupancies related to premises
rented primarily for agricultural purposes. The NRLTA also
excludes residential arrangements if the term is in excess of five
years.13  The NRLTA became operative on July 1, 1975. However,
all rental agreements entered into, extended or renewed after July
12, 1974 are covered.'4
Definitional coverage-type sections, such as this one, raise many
issues. What institutions are similar to those which provide
medical, geriatric, educational counseling or religious services? 15
What does it mean to be a "transient?"'8 What amount of agricul-
ture implies that premises were rented "primarily" for agricultural
purposes?' Despite these many issues, the broad contours are
clear.
The NRLTA covers short-term (i.e., less than five years) resi-
dential arrangements; it does not apply to commercial, agricultural
or long-term residential relationships. The important question is:
Does this division make sense. It certainly does. It recognizes that
the agricultural, commercial and residential situations are func-
tionally different. Persons enter the various relationships with
different goals; they bring vastly different resources to the arrange-
ments.
The NRLTA was the response to a landlord-tenant law that has
been largely a product of a medieval and agrarian past. Its rules
were developed in response to the unique problems of that period.
As society became increasingly more commercial and urban, ten-
sions developed between the rule of law and the needs of society.
13. Section 1.202 of the URLTA did not include this exclusion. There is
no reported legislative history with respect to it. Apparently, it was
believed that such long-term leases were different in kind or that long-
term tenants were not in need of NRLTA protection. The NRLTA
would have been more coherent if long-term residential tenancies were
not excluded.
14. Section 76-1448 provides that the NRLTA applies to all rental agree-
ments entered into, extended or renewed after July 1, 1975. Section
76-1449 provides that it will not apply to transactions entered into, re-
newed or extended before July 12, 1974. The inference, therefore, is
that the NRLTA does apply to transactions entered into, renewed or
extended after July 12, 1974, although not until the operative date of
the statute. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that L.B. 7, 84th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1975), would have amended section 76-1449 to provide
that the NRLTA would not apply to transactions entered into, extended
or renewed between July 12, 1974 and July 1, 1975. This bill was not
adopted.
15. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1408(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
16. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 76-1408(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
17. NEB. RaV. STAT. § 76-1408(7) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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In an urban and commercial setting, the old agrarian rules made
little sense.18
Regardless of how dated the law might be, certain landlords and
tenants can agree, in their lease, to write- their own private law.
Usually, this occurs in commercial situations in which both the
landlord and the tenant have the economic muscle and the practical
know-how to shape the law to their needs. The urban residential
tenant is left, however, in need of urgent help. Unlike the agrarian
tenant, the law is totally out of step with his needs. Unlike the
businessman, for whom the law is archaic, but who has the means
to shape it to his needs, the residential tenant does not have the
necessary power to bargain the law away. The NRLTA rightfully
fills the gap. It leaves the agrarian tenant with his common law
and the businessman with his bargained law. It fashions a new
law where it is most crucially needed, in the area of urban
residential tenancies.
There may still be a need for reform in other landlord-tenant
areas: the commercial tenant may not find an agrarian set of rules
very useful and he may not, in fact, be able to fashion a law to
suit his needs; even an agrarian tenant may not find a medieval
set of rules useful today. But reform must begin somewhere. The
day in which one set of rules could cover such functionally different
areas has passed; experiment and reform are needed everywhere.
Nevertheless, the simple fact is that it makes sense to reform first
that area which most needs modernizing.
18. The most infamous hangover from the common law was the rule that
if demised premises were destroyed during the term, the tenant re-
mained liable for the rent. The rationale for this was that the tenant
could be relieved of a rent obligation only if the subject matter of the
lease were destroyed, and land was considered to be the subject mat-
ter. Whatever sense this made in a more agrarian age, it was singu-
larly inappropriate in a residential or commercial setting. The tenant
did not lease for the land; he truly leased the building. Nebraska re-jected the "fire rule" as early as 1897, Wattles v. South Omaha Ice &
Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897), and permitted the tenant
to terminate the lease if casualty or natural disaster substantially de-
stroyed the premises.
Section 76-1429 clarifies and extends this position. The tenant may
vacate the premises and notify the landlord in writing within fourteen
days after the premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or casualty
such that the enjoyment of the premises is substantially impaired, in
which case termination is deemed to have occurred on the day of va-
cating. No definition of substantially impaired is given. The URLTA
draftsmen hint that it may mean that the premises are untenantable
or unfit for occupancy. URLTA § 4.106, Comment. In the alternative,
the tenant can stay, if this is physically possible, paying only a pro-
portionate part of the rent. In such a case, the landlord, who finds
it impracticable to repair, must apparently continue to rent the prem-
ises-at the reduced rent-to the tenant.
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IT. AGREEMENTS
In Nebraska, as at common law, any agreements (usually con-
tained in a lease) between the landlord and the tenant were the
heart of their relationship. What the parties had agreed to defined
-their rights and duties. 19 If a lease clause were ambiguous, the
Nebraska courts tried to determine the parties' intent in order to
interpret the lease.20  They rarely found a lease clause to be void
as against public policy.21 Landlord-tenant law was a part of the
unregulated private domain in which individuals could theoretically
bargain and agree as they chose.22
Although contractual modes of interpretation were used in de-
termining intent,23 leases were generally conceptualized as con-
veyances. For example, if the tenant abandoned the premises dur-
ing the term, the landlord did not have to mitigate damages. He
could wait until the term was over and sue for the due rent.24 The
theory underlying this procedure was that the landlord had con-
veyed property to the tenant, and he did not have to accept its
surrender. Concomitantly, lease clauses were generally considered
to be independent of each other. This meant that if the landlord
breached any of his duties, the tenant could not legitimately breach
any of his. Often this issue was focused on in a landlord reposses-
sion action. The landlord might sue for repossession based on non-
payment of rent.25 The tenant would try to defend by raising the
landlord's breach. The courts denied the tenant such a right,26 the
underlying theory being that summary repossession was a quick
remedy and that lease clauses were independent.27
19. Johnson v. City of Lincoln, 174 Neb. 837, 120 N.W.2d 297 (1963).
20. See Clough v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Neb. 136, 264 N.W. 170 (1936);
Farley v. McKeegan, 48 Neb. 237, 67 N.W. 161 (1896); Steen v. Scheel,
46 Neb. 252, 64 N.W. 957 (1895).
21. Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974), is one ex-
ception. It held a landlord's contractual right of entry void.
22. Obviously, because of the unfair bargaining positions, the theory was
often inconsistent with what was done in practice. This is one of the
reasons why there was a need for a new law.
23. "A lease is a species of contract .... " 174 Neb. at 846, 120 N.W.2d
at 303.
24. Prucha v. Coufal, 91 Neb. 724, 136 N.W. 1019 (1912); Merrill v. Willis,
51 Neb. 162, 70 N.W. 914 (1897); Hayward Bros. v. Ramge, 33 Neb.
836, 51 N.W. 229 (1892). All the above were apparently overruled in
Bernstein v. Seglin, 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 174 (1969).
25. By statute possession was conditioned on payment of rent. Thus, pos-
session and rent were dependent obligations. N~s. REv. STAT. § 24-569
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
26. Stover v. Hazelbaker, 42 Neb. 393, 60 N.W. 597 (1894). But see
McJunkin v. Waldo, 95 Neb. 235, 145 N.W. 337 (1914).
27. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971).
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The NRLTA has clearly rejected both these concepts. Leases
are called rental agreements and are considered to be contracts,
and covenants are dependent. The Comment to section 1.102 of the
URLTA provides:
Existing landlord-tenant law in the United States, save as mod-
ified by statute or judicial interpretation, is a product of English
common law developed within an agricultural society at a time
when doctrines of promissory contract were unrecognized. Thus,
the landlord-tenant relationship was viewed as conveyance of a
lease-hold estate and the covenants of the parties generally inde-
pendent. These doctrines are inappropriate to modern urban con-
ditions and inexpressive of the vital interests of the parties and the
public which the law must protect.
This Act recognizes the modem tendency to treat performance
of certain obligations of the parties as interdependent.
Several sections of the URLTA focus directly on this consensual
aspect of landlord-tenant law. The effect is (a) to prescribe the
parameters of the rental agreement, implying certain clauses and
prohibiting other clauses, and requiring that no part of it be uncon-
scionable; (b) to permit settlement of disputes and to require that
they too not be unconscionable; and (c) to account for certain other
agreements. The URLTA carefully regulates an area of the law
that had once been left to private ordering. In so doing, it radically
alters the pre-existing lease law; but the alteration is coherent.
The NRLTA, however, includes only portions of the URLTA, and
its cut-and-paste approach invites confusion and ambiguity.
A. Rental Agreements
The NRLTA lease is called the rental agreement. It includes
all agreements, written and oral, between a landlord and tenant,
as well as validly adopted rules and regulations. 28 It may include
additional covenants unless to do so is expressly prohibited in the
NRLTA. 29 The text below will focus first on what can be implied
in the rental agreement and second on what cannot be included
init.
An initial question that arises is: What if the parties drew up
a lease, but one of them fails to sign it. Is the lease nevertheless
valid? In Nebraska, it was valid if the parties acted upon it and
if rent were paid and accepted pursuant to it, although the arrange-
ment could not be for longer than one year.30 This was consistent
28. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1410(11) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
29. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1414(1) (Curn. Supp. 1974).
30. Where an agreement for the lease of a piece of real estate is
reduced to writing, and bears the signatures of the lessees but
not that of the lessor, and possession taken under such agree-
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with the Nebraska law of oral leases; such leases were valid, as
agreed to, for a period not in excess of one year.31 Section 1.402
of the URLTA would have restated this position 3 2 The NRLTA
has no similar provision. What then is the relationship between
the landlord and the tenant in the circumstances described above?
The brief reported legislative history indicates that some legislators
believed it should be a tenancy at will. The history also indicates
that the legislators were not aware of the then existing law.33
Under such circumstances, the impact of "legislative history" is
minimized. A preferable interpretation would be that the pre-
existing law continues; coincidentally, this would bring about a
result roughly equivalent to that provided for by section 1.402 of
the URLTA. This would assure both landlords and tenants that
when they rely on an agreement, written or oral, their legitimate
expectations will be enforced. The mere technical defect of a miss-
ing signature should not vitiate the arrangement. This is particu-
larly appropriate in that it would be anamolous to uphold an oral
rental agreement-as the NRLTA does3 4 -but not a written, ac-
cepted and acted upon rental agreement, which is only defective
in its lack of signature.
ment by said lessees, and the payment of rent made by them,
and by said lessor accepted, and said lease, had it been prop-
erly executed, would have been for the term of one year,
though payments of rent under such agreement are to be made
monthly, held, that said lease is valid as an oral lease for one
year, and said lessees are thereby made tenants for one year.
Nicholls v. Barnes, 39 Neb. 103, 57 N.W. 990 (1894) (Syllabus of the
Court, headnote 1).
31. Alloway v. Aiken, 146 Neb. 714, 21 N.W.2d 495 (1946).
32. (a) If the landlord does not sign and deliver a written rental
agreement signed and delivered to him by the tenant, accept-
ance of rent without reservation by the landlord gives the
rental agreement the same effect as if it had been signed and
delivered by the landlord.
(b) If the tenant does not sign and deliver a written rental
agreement signed and delivered to him by the landlord, ac-
ceptance of possession and payment of rent without reserva-
tion gives the rental agreement the same effect as if it had
been signed and delivered by the tenant.
(c) If a rental agreement given effect by the operation of this
section provides for a term longer than one year, it is effective
for only one year.
URLTA § 1.402.
33. Senator Goodrich explained the deletion of section 1.402 of the URLTA,
as follows: "The second [amendment] corrects the provision in the
bill where if I were a tenant, for example, I can take a lease to the
landlord, and whether he signs it or not. If he accepts my rent he
automatically accepts the lease even if he didn't sign it." UNiCAMIAL
TRANscRIPTs,, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 4946 (January 30, 1974) (remarks of
Sen. Goodrich).
34. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1410 (11) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Nebraska law before the NRLTA would -also have "filled in"
most of the non-express terms in an "incomplete" lease. If the lease
were indefinite as to rent, the fair rental value was deemed to be
the rent.3 5 The rent was considered to be due at the demised
premises; 36 it was payable at the end of the term,37 unless a time
was prescribed in the lease; and it was not apportionable.38 There-
fore, if the tenant were to vacate early, the landlord had to wait
until the due date before he could demand rent. In all cases, the
landlord had to demand the rent before the tenant was considered
to be in default.39 If the agreement did not prescribe a definite
term, the tenancy was considered one at will 4 0  In this case, no
explicit time period was required before either party could give the
other notice of termination.
Section 76-1414 modifies some of this law.41 It provides that
in the absence of an express agreement the rent will be the fair
rental value for use and occupancy. The payment must be at the
dwelling unit. This restates existing Nebraska law and avoids the
problem of a landlord being "unavailable" when the rent is due.
Rent is payable, without demand, at the beginning of a month term,
and it is uniformly apportionable day-by-day. Unless a period is
explicitly agreed to, the tenancy shall be from month-to-month,
unless rent is paid weekly by a roomer, and then it will be from
week-to-week.
These provisions change the Nebraska rule and the changes are
desirable. Demand is unnecessary because the termination and
eviction provisions provide the tenant with adequate protection.
35. Ryan v. Nelson, 177 Neb. 130, 128 N.W.2d 592 (1964); Beacom v. Daley,
164 Neb. 120, 81 N.W.2d 907 (1957).
36. House v. Lewis, 108 Neb. 257, 187 N.W. 784 (1922).
37. First Nat'l Bank v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 191 Neb. 249, 214 N.W.2d 483
(1974).
38. Bishop Cafeteria Co. v. Ford, 177 Neb. 600, 129 N.W.2d 581 (1964).
39. Cannon v. Wilbur, 30 Neb. 777, 47 N.W. 85 (1890). The three day no-
tice-to-quit would have served as the needed demand.
40. Sage v. Shaul, 159 Neb. 543, 67 N.W.2d 921 (1955).
41. (2) In absence of agreement, the tenant shall pay as rent
the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling
unit.
(3) Rent shall be payable without demand or notice at the
time and place agreed upon by the parties. Unless otherwise
agreed, rent is payable at the dwelling unit and periodic rent
is payable at the beginning of any term of one month or less
and otherwise in equal monthly installments at the beginning
of each month. Unless otherwise agreed, rent shall be uni-
formly apportionable from day-to-day.
(4) Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the
tenancy shall be week-to-week in case of a roomer who pays
weekly rent, and in all other cases month-to-month.
NEB. uv. STAT. §§ 76-1414(2)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Apportionable rent ties in well with the requirement of mitigation;
and the fact that a tenant will usually be considered a month-to-
month tenant will assure him at least a thirty day notice before the
lease can be terminated.
Having determined the status of the agreement when it is miss-
ing a signature or an express term and having determined what
can be implied to remedy these defects, it is now necessary to
examine the status of a rental agreement which includes too
much.42 Section 76-1415 explicitly provides that a rental agreement
may not include clauses in which the tenant (1) agrees to waive
or to forego rights or remedies; (2) authorizes any person to confess
judgment; (3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or (4)
agrees to the exculpation or limitation of the landlord's liability.
Any clause which provides for any of these is unenforceable, and
if the landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing any
of them, then the tenant may recover actual damages and reason-
able attorney's fees. Section 1.403 of the IJRLTA would have
additionally penalized the landlord who deliberately included pro-
hibited clauses in his rental agreement. 43 The reason for this is
42. In addition to the unenforceable rental agreement clauses that are dis-
cussed in the text, under given circumstances, otherwise legitimate
clauses may also be void. A court, either in its own motion or on any
party's motion, may vitiate an "unconscionable" rental agreement.
NEE. Pzv. STAT. § 76-1412 (Cum. Supp. 1974). This capability is ex-
tremely important in the housing area, for tenants often face a short
supply of homes and frequently are in urgent need of shelter. They
are, therefore, in a weak bargaining position. Moreover, leases and
rental agreements are long and tedious documents, often written in lan-
guage too technical to understand or in print too small to read. Ten-
ants are not always capable of protecting themselves from oppression.
On the other hand, the standard is beneficially protean enough to cover
both existing, and also unforseeable, conditions and agreements. But is
the phrase "unconscionable" too amorphous to provide guidance to pri-
vate parties? How can they be certain that they have made a valid,
and enforceable agreement? The draftsmen's test that "in light of the
background and setting of the market, the conditions of the particular
parties to the rental agreement ... are so one-sided as to be unscion-
able. .... " provides little certain guidance. See URLTA § 1.303, Com-
ment. Analogies and cases in the commercial world will be more help-
ful. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). For example, one important factor should be whether the
parties have had a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract.
See Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform
Act,16 Amz. L. REV. 79 (1974). Over a period of time, cases and com-
ments will supply the minimal level of certainty as to what is "uncon-
scionable." Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALS L.J.
757 (1969).
43. (b) A provision prohibited by subsection (a) included in a
rental agreement is unenforceable. If a landlord deliberately
uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by him
614 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 4 (1975)
that the mere inclusion of unenforceable clauses can greatly
prejudice the tenant's true rights. The parties to an agreement
often look to the words of the agreement to determine their respec-
tive duties; therefore, a tenant might do something stated in the
lease which he could not have been legally obligated to do. More-
over, the mere misapprehension of the actual state of legal rights
might encourage an unwarranted settlement. This possibility may
be a probability under the NRLTA because settlements may not
be subject to "unconscionability" standards. The consequences of
the "softer" NRLTA approach will be that landlords may be
tempted to include unenforceable clauses in their leases since they
may have little to lose by doing so.44
to be prohibited, the tenant may recover in addition to his ac-
tual damages an amount up to [3J months' periodic rent and
reasonable attorney's fees.
UIRLTA § 1.403 (b) (emphasis added).
44. As will be indicated, the Nebraska Legislature deleted many of the
penalty provisions from the URLTA. This may make the enforcement
of the NRLTA difficult, and it will be argued, in several instances, that
the NRLTA would have been better without these deletions. The prob-
lem with including punitive damage provisions in the statute is that
they may be unconstitutional if the recovery goes to an individual.
NEB. CONsT. art. VII, § 5; Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d
684 (1960). See also Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88(1881) and Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878) which held that it may
be unconstitutional simply to provide for punitive damages.
Two important questions must be answered. First, are the damage
awards of the URLTA truly punitive, or are they more in the nature
of liquidated damages?
It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to provide
for liquidated damages in favor of a private person, although
in form a penalty, if the amount provided bears a reasonable
relation to the actual damages which might be sustained and
which damages are not susceptible of measurement by or-
dinary pecuniary standards.
170 Neb. 926, 931, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (1960). The answer is difficult,
but it is at least arguable that certain URLTA provisions are more in
the nature of liquidated damages and, therefore, could have been in-
cluded in the NRLTA. For example, it will be very difficult to deter-
mine the damages associated with the inclusion of unenforceable
clauses in leases. The URLTA provision for three months' rent as
damages may be a liquidated damages clause, even though the URLTA
provides for it only in cases of deliberate landlord inclusion. URLTA
§ 1.403(b). See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Second, as will be noted, the rendering of attorney's fees has both
a compensatory and punitive edge. Additionally, the practice serves
as an incentive to bring suit. Could these awards be unconstitutional?
The answer should be no, because it is not a question of a private party
getting a "wind-fall", but rather a question of who pays the "costs"
of litigation. Moreover, when a "penalty" also has a legitimate com-
pensatory function the Nebraska Supreme Court has upheld it. See
Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 937, 104 N.W.2d 684, 692 (1960).
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The NRLTA apportions the rights and remedies between the
parties. The landlord may agree to do, or to forego doing, some-
thing extra for the tenant. The tenant, on the other hand, may
not waive any of his rights or remedies. The NELTA is premised
on the belief that the landlord does not need the protection of the
law. Usually, it will be he, or a landlords' group, who has drafted
the rental agreement, and thus there is little risk that he will not
know the content of a small-print adhesion clause. Moreover, it
is believed that the landlord will generally be in a better economic
bargaining position than the tenant, and, therefore, there is little
risk that he will agree to an obligation out of economic necessity.
The opposites of both these arguments apply to the tenant.
Section 76-1415, a key to the entire legislation, prevents the tenant
from entering an agreement to his detriment.
The practice of including confessions of judgment clauses in
leases has not been used frequently in Nebraska landlord-tenant
law. 4 5 When they have been used, they have been construed nar-
rowly.4 6 The unfairness inherent in them is obvious. A tenant
could forfeit his entire case without having received notice or hear-
ing. For poor debtors, or tenants, such clauses are most obnoxious,
because these individuals may not be in a strong enough bargain-
ing position to resist their inclusion in the rental agreement. The
United States Supreme Court has held such clauses unconstitu-
tional as applied to a large class of poor consumers. In so doing,
the Court emphasized the unfair bargaining posture of the poor
consumers and the lack of due process in the judgment.47  The
situation is analogous to that found in many residential landlord-
tenant cases in which tenants are often poor. Thus the use of
such clauses may have been unconstitutional in Nebraska; at
any rate, it is now prohibited by section 76-1415. s
A tenant may not agree to pay the landlord's attorney's fees.49
45. Such clauses were legal in Nebraska. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-906-
07 (Reissue 1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1309 (Reissue 1968). NEB.
RErv. STAT. § 8-447 (Reissue 1974) explicitly prohibits them in some
situations, thus raising the inference that they are appropriate else-
where. See generally Thornhill v. Hargreaves, 76 Neb. 582, 107 N.W.
847 (1906).
46. Wiley v. Neal, 24 Neb. 141, 37 N.W. 926 (1888). See also Custer County
v. Chicago .B. & Q.R.R., 62 Neb. 657, 87 N.W. 341 (1901).
47. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). But see D.H. Overmeyer Co.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
48. Of course, the tenant can still proceed under the general provisions of
sections 25-906 and 25-907 to confess judgment. But, he is prohibited,
as noted, from authorizing the confession of judgment in the rental
agreement.
49. Although it is not free from doubt, it does seem that at least in cases
for money damages, Nebraska will not permit one party to agree to pay
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Litigation is to be discouraged, and the prize of paid attorney's fees
may encourage gambling litigation. Attorney's fees may only be
awarded to effectuate certain specified legislative policies.50 Pay-
ment of fees is a particularly important device, for it will encourage
lawyers to take cases which they otherwise might not have con-
sidered. Whether this policy becomes an actuality will depend on
the amount of the fee awards. It may be psychologically difficult
for a judge to award $100 in attorney's fees for a $50 damage deposit
suit. But if a lawyer is not fairly paid for the value of his time,
he will not take these cases and the policy of the NRLTA will be
vitiated.
Section 76-1414(1) (c) provides that the "tenant" may not agree
"to pay the tenant's attorney's fees." This is sloppy drafting.51 The
the attorney's fees of another. Dow v. Updike Bros., 11 Neb. 95, 7 N.W.
857 (1881). However, NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-823 (Reissue 1974) prohibits
agreements for payment of attorney's fees in certain kinds of transac-
tions, and this raises the inference that they are otherwise permissible.
50. The recovery of reasonable attorney's fees may be instrumental in the
enforcement of the NRLTA. Lonnquist & Healey, "A Prospectus on
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act in Nebraska," 8
CnIGHToN L. REv. 336, 363 (1975). Section 76-1415 (1) (c) prohibits the
parties from contracting to pay each other's attorney's fees. The only
time that such payment is allowed is when the NRLTA authorizes it.
The purpose of these sections are (1) to encourage a case to be liti-
gated even if the stakes, are small and (2) to discourage particularly
offensive activity. It is this latter punitive purpose which seems to pre-
dominate. Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded if (1) a land-
lord deliberately uses an unenforceable clause, section 76-1415 (2); (2)
a landlord fails to return a security deposit, which is a particularly
heinous act, section 76-1416(3); (3) a landlord willfully fails to com-
ply with the rental agreement or section 76-1425(2); (4) a per-
son willfully and not in good faith fails to deliver possession, sec-
tion 76-1426(2); (5) the landlord deliberately or negligently fails to
supply certain essential services, again a particularly important com-
mitment, section 76-1427(1) (c); (6) a tenant raises a counterclaim or
a defense without merit and not in good faith, section 76-1428 (1) ; (7)
a landlord unlawfully or willfully and wrongfully excludes the tenant
or diminishes services, section 76-1430; (8) a tenant willfully fails to
comply with the rental agreement or the NRLTA, section 76-1431(3);
(9)a tenant willfully fails to give a notice of an extended absence
when he has agreed to give such a notice, section 76-1432(1); (10) a
tenant willfully and not in good faith holds over, section 76-1437(3);
(11) a tenant refuses lawful access, again a serious violation, section
76-1438(1); and (12) a landlord enters unlawfully or in an unreason-
able manner, or harasses the tenant, again an important violation, sec-
tion 76-1438 (2).
51. "No rental agreement may provide that the tenant ... agrees to pay
the landlord's or tenant's attorney's fees." NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1415
(1) (c) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The italicized words were added to the
URLTA by the Nebraska Legislature.
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apparent thrust of this amendment to the URLTA was to prevent
landlords from agreeing to pay the tenant's attorney's fees. In spite
of the awkwardness of the language the intent is that neither the
landlord nor the tenant should be able to shift the burden of paying
the other's attorney's fees by private agreement.
A final protection for the tenant is that he may not exculpate
or limit the landlord's liability that occurs due to active and action-
able negligence. The clause raises two distinct problems. First,
can the tenant exculpate the landlord from inactive negligence?
Arguably, the negative inference is that he can. This interpretation
is suggested by the fact that the NRLTA is different from the
URLTA which prohibited the inclusion of any exculpatory clause.5 2
The second issue concerns the definition of active negligence. What
is it? It may be argued that this reincarnates the difference
between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Thus, if a landlord has no
duty to repair, but does so anyway, and does it negligently, he
would be liable and would not be able to exculpate himself in a
rental agreement. On the other hand, if he had an express agree-
ment to repair, and he did nothing, he would still be liable in tort,
but he would be able to exculpate himself.53 It is unclear why
the legislature would permit exculpatory clauses for one kind of
negligence and not another; therefore, it is preferable to interpret
"active" negligence as "any" negligence. In a sense, this always
must be the case, because the active-inactive distinction is highly
artificial. In other words, the inference that the agreement could
include an exculpation clause for inactive negligence is rejected. A
tenant may not agree to indemnify the landlord for any negli-
gence.54 This interpretation would make the NRLTA consistent
with the URLTA, and thus promote uniformity.
B. Settlement Agreements
In addition to the rental agreement, the NRLTA provides for
two other types of agreements between a landlord and a tenant:
52. No rental agreement may provide that the tenant...
(d) Agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of
the landlord arising due to active and actionable negligence of
the landlord or to indemnify the landlord for that liability
arising due to active and actionable negligence or the costs
connected therewith.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1415 (1) (d) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
Section 1.403 (4) of the IJRLTA simply provided for no exculpation for
any liability arising under law.
53. This distinction has been articulated in one landlord-tenant case. Kuz-
miak v. Brookchester Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955).
54. "Actionable," of course, means the type of negligence which would
support a suit. Thus the use of the word is inherently redundant.
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"settlement" agreements and "contracting-out" agreements. 55
Any claim may be settled. The NRLTA appears to permit the
landlord to use all his economic muscle to get an advantageous
settlement, because there is no express limitation with respect to
settlements either in conscience or at law. First, there is arguably
no good faith requirement with respect to settlements. Whereas
the IJRLTA permitted settlements of either a claim or a right only
if it was disputed in good faith, the NRLTA does not include the
good faith proviso.56 Second, the URLTA provided that settle-
ments would be vitiated if unconscionable; the NRLTA does not
include this proviso either.5 7
There are several rational explanations for the NRLTA's posi-
tion distinguishing settlements from rental agreements by not
requiring a good faith or unconscionability limitation on the former.
First, the adhesion character of settlements is minimal. In a
normal lease situation, a party may not know to what he is agreeing
because the clause is hidden in small-print. The settlement agree-
ment, however, does not have this defect. Although the bargaining
positions may be one-sided, the parties will at least know what they
are bargaining about. Second, it is unlikely that the bargaining
position of the parties will be as unequal as it is in the initial leasing
situation. If the tenant has a claim, he will have some clout. More-
over, he will often be in the dwelling unit. As a result, he is in
a.much better position to extract from the landlord an agreement
that is fair. Third, the Nebraska legislative policy may have been
designed to reduce litigation. Settlements are an effective means
of doing this. If each settlement agreement were subject to chal-
lenge with respect to the landlord's lack of good faith or its uncon-
sionability, settlements would be agreed to reluctantly. In many
cases there would be no agreement to any settlement. This result
55. See discussion in Section II, C, infra.
56. "A claim or right arising under this Act or on a rental agreement, if
disputed in good faith, may be settled by agreement." URLTA § 1.106.
The italicized portions were delected from Nm. REv. STAT. § 76-1406
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
57. If the court, as a matter of law, finds...
(a) a settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego
a claim or right under this Act or under a rental agreement
was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to en-
force the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement
without the unconscionable provision or limit the application
of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable re-
sult.
URLTA § 1.303 (a) (2). This paragraph was excised from Nm. Rv.
STAT. § 76-1412 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Of course, one could read the "good faith" clause of section 76-1411
as implying the same thing as the "unconscionability" clause. If this
were done, the NRLTA would be consistent with the URLTA.
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would be undesirable for tenants as well as landlords, for often
they will need fast remedial relief, and if a landlord has no incen-
tive to settle, he will not.
One major risk in removing the good faith and unconscionability
limitation on settlements is that a settlement may become a sub-
terfuge for an unenforceable rental agreement or contracting-out
agreement. For instance, the tenant may have a damage claim for
$150 because the landlord has breached his obligation to keep all
common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition. The
landlord and tenant may settle this claim by the landlord's pay-
ing the tenant $5, and the tenant promising to keep the common
areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition in the future.
This settlement agreement would be between the landlord and the
tenant, and it would be with respect to the conditions of the
premises.58  Could such a "settlement" agreement be vitiated be-
cause it was either not made in good faith or it was unconscion-
able when made? The answer is probably yes, because such an
arrangement is more properly conceived of as a rental agreement.
The Nebraska draftsmen apparently intended a difference be-
tween a rental agreement, a contracting-out agreement, and a
settlement agreement. In the first two cases, they emphasized good
faith and conscionability; in the latter, they emphasized certainty
and finality. To determine whether an agreement is one or the
other, all alleged settlements which could also be rental agreements
or contracting-out agreements should be deemed such. This will
prevent landlords from using the "settlement" agreement as a
means of avoiding compliance with the NRLTA. Thus, if the settle-
ment relates to the terms and conditions concerning the use and
occupancy of the premises, as the agreement about the common
areas, illustrated above, it might be a rental agreement and it
should be subject to the NRLTA rules with respect to rental agree-
ments.59 On the other hand, if it were a pure money settlement,
one unrelated to any continuing concern with the use and occu-
pancy of the premises, then it would not be a rental agreement
or a contracting-out agreement. In the case above, if the tenant
simply released his $150 claim for $5 and that was to be the end
of the matter, then this would be a pure money settlement. The
court would not be entitled to review it with respect to the land-
lord's good faith or its unconscionability. 9 Pure money settle-
58. If this clause were part of the rental agreement, it would be void. If
it were a separate "contracting-out" agreement, it would be valid only
if made in good faith and supported by adequate consideration. See
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
59. NEB. RLv. STAT. § 76-1410(11) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
60. Section 76-1411 provides that every duty and every act that must be
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ments would thus be encouraged, and litigation would hopefully
be reduced.
C. Contracting-out Agreements
Landlords are given certain duties and responsibilities under the
NRLTA. In three situations, they may "contract-out" these obliga-
tions to persons living on the demised premises. This may be to
the advantage of the landlord; it also may be to the advantage of
tenants, for it permits them to pay with "sweat-rent." 61 The first
situation in which contracting-out is permitted deals with managers
whose occupancy is conditioned on their employment, and who, as
tenants, are excluded from NRLTA coverage.6 2  The second in-
stance deals with tenants of single family homes who may agree
to perform certain landlord responsibilities if the transaction (1)
is in writing; (2) is for good consideration; (3) is entered into in
good faith; and (4) is not for the purpose of evading the landlord's
obligations. 63 The third includes tenants in multiple dwellings who
may agree to perform certain landlord duties if the agreement (1)
is in a signed separate writing; (2) is for adequate consideration;
(3) is entered in good faith; and (4) is not for the purpose of evad-
ing the landlord's obligations. 64 One important difference between
these latter two situations is that the "contracting-out" agreement
in the third case must be in a separate writing and, therefore, may
not be a part of the rental agreement. This assures that the tenant
in a multi-unit building knows to what he is agreeing. The
separate writing should impress on him the importance of his
undertaking.
In addition to these three situations illustrating how a landlord
can contract-out his obligations, the NRLTA also states that a land-
performed as a condition to the exercise of a right or remedy must be
done in good faith. This section should provide the court the means
of introducing concepts of equity and fairness in the application of this
statute to particular instances.
61. Lonnquist & Healey, supra note 50, at 355.
62. NEB. Ruv. STAT. § 76-1408(5) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
63. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that the
tenant may agree to perform the landlord's subsection (e) and (f) ob-
ligations (e.g., garbage disposal and water and heat supply) as well
as specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations and remodeling.
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that the ten-
ant may agree to perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, altera-
tions or remodeling. Regardless of what contracting-out arrangements
are made with individual tenants, the landlord will not be relieved of
his duties and obligations to other tenants. Nxm. REv. STAT. § 76-
1419(3) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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lord may employ a tenant to perform his obligations.0 l5 This last
provision is unique to the NRLTA and the draftsmen probably in-
tended it to restate the other "contracting-out" situations and not
to add another exception to the statutory scheme, which generally
prohibits contracting-out.66
What is the landlord's remedy if the tenant should breach his
section 76-1419 contracting-out obligations? He is certainly entitled
to normal contract damage relief. But is he entitled to terminate
the tenancy? Under the URLTA, the answer was clearly no.67
Section 4.201 of the URLTA68 explicitly permitted termination only
in the case of specified breaches of the rental agreement or of speci-
fied noncompliance with the URLTA counterpart to section 76-1419
of the NRLTA. Moreover, section 2.104(e) of the URLTA69 pro-
vided that the multi-unit tenant's performance of the contracting-
out agreement could be interpreted neither as a condition of a land-
65. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
66. [This] deals with a tenant working with the landlord. If, for
example, you have a tenant that you want to hire to maintain,
say the hallways or you want to hire this tenant to cut the
grass it says in essence that you shall agree with your tenant
in a separate written statement to the affect that this is not
an amendment to the lease itself. This is a separate agree-
ment.
NEB. LEG. JouR. 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 5320 (February 11, 1974) (remarks
of Sen. Goodrich).
67. ABA Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee
Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL
PROPrTY PROBATE & TRusr 104, 112 (1973). This provision has been
criticized because it was unfair to require the landlord to continue to
provide housing services after the tenant had broken his agreement.
68. (a) Except as provided in this Act, if there is a material
noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a
noncompliance with Section 3.101 materially affecting health
and safety, the landlord may deliver a written notice to the
tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the
breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a
date not less than [30] days after receipt of the notice. If the
breach is not remedied in [14] days, the rental agreement shall
terminate as provided in the notice subject to the following.
If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of dam-
ages or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the
breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agree-
ment shall not terminate. If substantially the same act or
omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of which no-
tice was given recurs within [6] months, the landlord may
terminate the rental agreement upon at least [14] days' writ-
ten notice specifying the breach and the date of termination
of the rental agreement.
URLTA § 4.201 (a).
69. "The landlord may not treat performance of the separate agreement
described in subsection (d) as a condition to any obligation or perform-
ance of any rental agreement." URLTA § 2.104(e). This provision
was deleted in the NRLTA.
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lord's performing his obligation nor as a condition of the tenant's
continued occupancy. Both these sections are different in the
NRLTA. A landlord can terminate the tenancy for a breach of a
separate agreement 70 and section 2.104(e) of the URLTA is deleted
from section 76-1419. Thus, if a tenant does not comply with a con-
tracting-out agreement, his estate can be terminated. This raises the
stakes considerably. But does this, by definition, exclude the
tenant from all NRLTA protection?
Section 76-1408(5) excludes a manager from the coverage of the
act. A manager is defined as an "employee ... whose right to
occupy is conditional upon employment .. .. "71 Thus, a "Catch-22"
circle is provided. If the landlord employs a tenant to do work,
and if the landlord can terminate the lease for the tenant's failure
to do work properly, the relationship is excluded from the hegem-
ony of the NRLTA. On the other hand, if the landlord cannot
terminate the tenancy for breach, the amendment to section
76-143172 and the deletion from section 76-141973 mentioned above
are of little purpose. To break the circle, the section 76-1408(5)
exclusion from NRLTA coverage should be limited to one who only
exchanges work for his right to occupy the dwelling unit and who
makes no additional rent payment. This would conform to the facts
of many situations.' In other cases, any person who paid some
money for the premises, with the rest being "sweat-rent," would
be a tenant covered by the NRLTA. His tenancy could be termi-
nated for failure to comply with the separate agreement, but in
all other aspects he would be afforded the protection of the NRLTA.
III. LANDLORD OBLIGATIONS AND TENANT
REMEDIES
This section examines the important landlord obligations which
are: to return the security deposit; to disclose, or to have disclosed,
his identity; to deliver possession; and to maintain the premises.
Concurrently, the relevant tenant remedies available should the
landlord fail to comply with his obligations are explained.
A. Duty to Return Security Deposit
It is customary for a landlord to demand a security deposit from
70. "[I]f there is a [tenant] noncompliance ... with the rental agree-
ment or any separate agreement, the landlord ... [may terminate]
.... " NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1431(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The itali-
cized words were added to the URLTA. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1431 (1)
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
71. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1408(5) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
72. See note 70, supra.
73. See note 69, supra.
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a residential tenant. At the end of the term, the landlord is obli-
gated-barring no tenant breaches or noncompliances--to return
the deposit to the tenant. Thus, section 76-1416, which provides
for this, is properly categorized as a landlord's obligation.
There are several good reasons why a landlord might require
a security deposit. The tenant-caused damage may be slight, and
not worth a lawsuit. The tenant may be judgment proof. The
tenant may even have disappeared and, therefore, be unavailable
for suit. The landlord protects himself against these contingencies
by covering, i.e., by getting money into his hands ahead of time.
Tenants resent the exaction; many view the deposit as extortion
which they will never be able to get back. As a practical, and a
legal matter, when there has been a dispute over ultimate disposi-
tion of the deposit, the odds have greatly favored the landlord's
keeping the money.
Since there is little Nebraska law on the subject, the three major
common law problems with respect to the tenant security deposit
should be examined. They are: how to identify it; what the land-
lord can do with it during the term; and the rules with respect to
disposing of it after the term
74
First, it is necessary to identify what type of payments are to
be considered security deposits. Tenant payments are categorized
as (1) the advance payment of rent; (2) consideration for granting
the lease; (3) liquidated damages; or (4) a deposit to secure pay-
ment of rent (also termed an advance) or to secure fulfillment of
all lease covenants and obligations.75 If the payment is categor-
ized as (1) or (3), the landlord can keep the entire amount in the
event of tenant default. If it is categorized as (2), the landlord
keeps it as a part of the consideration. If the payment is a true
security deposit, category (4), the landlord can only use it to cover
his actual damages in the event of a tenant default. To determine
in which category the payment falls, the courts guess the intent
of the parties, often emphasizing the language of the lease. The
common law sets no maximum amount for a security deposit; this
is left to be bargained for by the parties.
The second problem is the manner in which the deposit can be
used by the landlord while he holds it. The courts categorize the
74. See generally Kalish, Residential Tenant Security Deposits: A Legisla-
tive Proposal, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 569. This article discusses not only
a statutory solution to the problems discussed herein, but also the com-
mon law of security deposits.
75. 2 R. Pow=L, TEE LAw oF REAL PRoPRTY 231(2) (perm. ed. rev.
1974).
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deposit as a trust, a pledge, or a debt.7 6 This is based partially
on the supposed intent of the parties and on a predisposition of
the courts of a particular jurisdiction to conceptualize the deposit
in one way or another.77 Once the deposit is characterized, certain
legal consequences follow. If the deposit is considered a debt, then
the landlord can use the money and commingle it as he chooses.
If the deposit is considered a trust, then the landlord is obligated
to keep it separate and to hold it for the benefit of the tenant.
In the case of a pledge, which is the probable categorization of a
deposit in Nebraska, the landlord does not have to pay interest on
the deposit. The landlord probably can commingle the funds with
other funds, although he cannot use the money in a way contrary
to the interests of the tenant. If there is a dispute over the deposit
between a creditor of the landlord and the tenant, the tenant has
priority, for he has retained title to the money. The obligation to
return the deposit runs with the pledge. This means that if the
landlord transfers his reversion, he will remain responsible for the
obligation; but if he assigns the deposit, the successor landlord will
become obligated and the original landlord will be relieved.7
The third important question focuses on the disposition of the
deposit. In all circumstances, the landlord can use the deposit to
cover the damages resulting from breaches of obligations designated
in the lease. In other words, what can be covered by the deposit
is contractually determined; if the parties choose, the deposit can
be used to cover the most insignificant covenant. The landlord is
to return the remainder. If he does not do so, he may be liable
for conversion. This result is probable if the deposit is conceptual-
ized as being a trust or a pledge. However, regardless of the con-
ceptualization, the tenant is at a disadvantage in making sure that
the money is used properly. The tenant will rarely know what
is being done with "his" money; therefore, as a practical matter,
he will not have the facts to complain of a misuse. Moreover, if
the landlord should return only part of the deposit, the tenant will
have the burden of proof as to whether the landlord has withheld
the remainder wrongfully. This can be an insurmountable burden.
76. See Kalish, supra note 74, at 571-73.
77. The one Nebraska case close to the problem does state that the tenant
retains title to the property. This would imply a pledge relationship.
The delivery of possession of personal property by a lessee to
the lessor to be held and managed as security for delinquent
rent until paid does not operate to transfer the title to said
property, but is in the nature of a pledge. ...
Krug Park Amusement Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins., 129 Neb.
239, 240, 261 N.W. 364, 365 (1935) (headnote 2).
78. See Kalish, supra note 74, at 571-72.
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Coupling this with the cost of a suit means that a tenant's action
for the return of the deposit is unlikely.
Section 76-1416 changes existing Nebraska law. Section
76-1416 (1) 7 provides that the language of the rental agreement is
not critical in determining whether or not a payment is to be con-
sidered a deposit. A functional security deposit, however denom-
inated, will be covered by the section. This will force the courts
to examine the substance of the arrangement, not its form, and
if the deposit either secures, or is intended to secure, a tenant obli-
gation, it will fall under this section. The amount of the security
deposit is limited to one month's rent, plus twenty-five percent of a
month's rent as a pet deposit.80 This floating limitation of one
month's rent should satisfy most landlords, for as the rent goes up,
so may the security deposit. This statutory maximum is critical
and may eliminate many practical problems for the tenant's total
loss in a dispute will never be excessive.
The NRLTA apparently conceptualizes a security deposit and
prepaid rent as being different entities,81 and, therefore, there is
no maximum on the amount of prepaid rent that can be required.
This should not vitiate the force of the statutory maximum on se-
curity deposits, for prepaid rent cannot be used to cover tenant-
caused damages, and the unused portions of the prepaid rent must
be returned to the tenant on termination.8 2 Public housing author-
79. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1416 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
80. Section 2.101 of the URLTA did not provide for a pet deposit.
81. This conclusion is premised on the statutory language which uses the
words "prepaid rent" and "security" and which provides that only the
"security" may not exceed one month's rent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-
1416 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
82. It would be incredible if prepaid rent could be used to cover the cost
of physical damage to the premises. Since there is no maximum on
the amount of prepaid rent which may be collected, such an interpreta-
tion would vitiate the maximum security deposit limitation. Neverthe-
less, it is arguable that prepaid rent can cover the cost of physical dam-
ages.
Upon termination of the tenancy property or money held by
the landlord as prepaid rent and security may be applied to
the payment of rent and the amount of damages which the
landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant's noncompliance
with the rental agreement or section 76-1421.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1416(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
If the underlined words are emphasized, the incredible result follows.
Further support for this conclusion that such a result is incredible rests
in the language of section 2.101 of the URLTA, which emphasizes that
only "security may be applied to . . . the amount of damages which
the landlord has suffered .... " To avoid this result, section 76-1416
(2) should be interpreted to mean that prepaid rent only can be ap-
plied to the payment of rent and the security deposit to the amount
of damages.
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ities are exempted from this section. Since they collect so little
rent, to limit them to a tenant's deposit equal to one month's rent
would, as a practical matter, deprive them of all security protec-
tion.83
While section 76-1416 explicitly provides for the amount of the
deposit, it says nothing explicitly about the landlord's responsibility
in the use and management of the deposit nor about interest pay-
ments. The URLTA draftsmen and the NRLTA draftsmen took
an ambiguous middle-way.8 4 It is possible to interpret this as im-
plying that the individual states were to decide each problem as
it arose. In Nebraska, the courts would probably resolve particular
problems by deducing obligations from the concept of the deposit-
as-pledge. It is preferable, however, to apply the interpretive prin-
ciple of exclusio unis alterius; what the landlord is not prohibited
from doing, or directed to do, he is free to do, as he chooses. Thus,
he may use and commingle the deposit, since he is not prohibited
from doing either; he need not pay interest, for he is not directed
to do so.8 5 And as a corollary to the above, the tenant is just a
general creditor as to the funds. This interpretation simplifies and
clarifies the law; there is no uncertainty as to what the courts will
conceptualize the deposit as being, and there is no confusion as to
83. Well, it isn't a question of the United States government living
with the bill. We can live with the bill, but for instance, you
have a clause in here that says that we should have one
month's rent as security deposit. Now, we have tenants who
pay five dollars a month, as I pointed out, and that is no se-
curity deposit. We don't have tenants that have financial re-
sponsibilities so we are going to increase the operating losses
of the authority which, if you gentlemen read the papers, you
know from Washington there is a pressure and a reduction of
subsidies which we won't be able to continue the service for
long.
Hearings on Nebraska Residential Landlord Tenant Act Before the Ju-
diciary Committee, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. 66 (February 7, 1973) (remarks
of Mr. Beber).
84. URLTA § 2.101, Comment.
85. Additional weight is given to this argument by the actions of the 1975
Nebraska Legislature's Urban Affairs Committee. On March 19, 1975,
it recommended an additional subsection 6 to section 76-1416, which
would have provided for the separate handling of deposit funds in par-
ticular cases.
(6) All security deposits received by a landlord renting or
leasing more than four rental units on and after the effective
date of this act, as described in subsection (1) of this section,
shall be held by the landlord in a separate account in a
licensed financial institution located in this state. Such
account shall be designated as a security deposit trust
account.
UNcAmmtA TRASCPIPTs, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. 954 (March 19, 1975).
The bill was not adopted.
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what follows from a particular conceptualization. Moreover, such
a construction will avoid the difficulties inherent in supervising the
management of deposit funds.8 6 Finally, this interpretation-if fol-
lowed consistently in the various states which adopt the URLTA-is
the only one which promises any hope of uniformity.
The NRLTA stance on the issue of who, among successive land-
lords, should be obligated to return the deposit is complicated. Sec-
tion 76-1416(5) provides that the landlord who holds the reversion
at the termination of the tenancy (even though he may not have
received an assignment of the deposit) is obligated to return both
the prepaid rent and the security deposit to the tenant, when to
do so is appropriate.8 7 The successor landlord, rather than the
tenant, bears the risk of an absconding landlord. This is desirable
since he will at least know that the original landlord is transfer-
ring the reversion, and if it is rental property he should suspect
the existence of deposit obligations.
Section 76-1420 (1), like the URLTA, provides that the original
landlord also remains liable to the tenant for the deposit and for
the prepaid rent. A reason for this is that the tenant, in giving
a deposit, conceivably could have relied on the individual landlord's
financial integrity. However, the reliance is unlikely, since few
residential tenants check on the financial solvency of the landlord.
Moreover, such a continuing obligation for the original landlord
poses a problem since it may inhibit the alienability of realty.
88
The NRLTA adds to its URLTA counterpart a provision whereby
the original landlord can wash his hands of a continuing obliga-
tion.8 9 Section 76-1420 (1) permits such a result if the original land-
86. Difficulties in administration and accounting of security de-
posits have led some authorities to advocate their abolition
(see Interim Report Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to
Residential Tenancies, Ontario Law Reform Commission
[1968] pgs. 21 and 28). The Uniform Act preserves the secu-
rity deposit but limits the amount and prescribes penalties for
its misuse.
URLTA § 2.101, Comment.
87. Although there are no Nebraska cases directly on point, a transferee
of the reversion must comply with an option to sell, Jamson v. Poulos,
184 Neb. 480, 168 N.W.2d 526 (1969), and apparently with other obliga-
tions, at least in circumstances in which the transferee has notice of
the lease arrangement. Friedlander v. Ryder, 30 Neb. 783, 47 N.W. 83
(1890).
88. See ABA Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Commit-
tee on Leases, supra note 67, at 113, which criticized the URLTA's posi-
tion that the original landlord could never relieve himself of the se-
curity and prepaid rent obligation.
89. Unless otherwise agreed, a landlord, who conveys premises
that include a dwelling unit subject to a rental agreement in
a good faith sale to a bona fide purchaser, is relieved of liabil-
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lord assigns the deposit or the prepaid rent to a bona fide purchaser
with written notice to the tenant, so that the tenant will now know
who is obligated to him. This provision may be advantageous to
the tenant. To simply make the successor landlord liable for the
deposit, whether he knew about it or not, may result in certain
landlords, who did not know of the deposit obligations, refusing
to return the deposit. The clear assignment of the funds means
that the successor landlord will not feel duped when called on to
return the deposit.
Upon termination of the tenancy, by any means and by either
party, the landlord must return the deposit less any amount which
he has used.9 0 The landlord can cover rent which is due by the
prepaid rent, and can cover other damages by the security deposit.
The landlord must also deliver a written itemization of the amounts
withheld to the tenant. The effects of this provision will in part
turn on what "itemization" means. It is suggested that it means
a full and detailed accounting; this interpretation will serve to help
the tenant decide if the landlord's claim was legitimate; and it will
also serve as a prophylactic, for it will encourage the landlord to
operate properly in the first instance. The landlord must return
that portion of the deposit which he is going to return within four-
teen days of demand by the tenant and a notification by the tenant
of his new address. The demand requirement is unfortunate for
it may serve as a trap for an unwary tenant who forgets to make
the demand.9 1
ity under the rental agreement and sections 24-568 and 76-1401
to 76-1449 as to events occurring subsequent to written notice
to the tenant of the conveyance, but he remains liable to the
tenant for any property and money to which the tenant is en-
titled under section 76-1416, except that assignment of any se-
curity deposits or prepaid rents to a bona fide purchaser with
written notice to the tenant shall serve to relieve the conveying
landlord of any further liability under section 76-1416.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1420(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
Inter alia, the italicized words are not in the URLTA equivalent statute.
90. The landlord is obligated to return the security deposit and prepaid
rent pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1416(2), 76-1420(1), 76-
1425 (4) (termination based on landlord's noncompliance), 76-1426 (2)
(landlord failure to deliver possession), 76-1429 (2) (termination due
to fire) and 76-1430 (termination due to landlord's unlawful ouster)
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
91. It appears obvious that the tenant must have vacated the premises be-
fore he is entitled to the return of his deposit, otherwise a holdover
tenant could demand the deposit return before he vacated. Section
2.101 (b) of the URLTA explicitly provided that the tenant was entitled
to a deposit return only after "delivery of possession." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-1416 (Cum. Supp. 1974) does not include this provision. Never-
theless, the section should be interpreted to allow the tenant to demand
the deposit only after he has left. Support for this argument is found
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Section 76-1416(2) provides that the landlord can cover rent pay-
ments which are due with prepaid rent and that he can cover the
amount of damages caused by the tenant's noncompliance with the
rental agreement or with section 76-1421 with the security deposit.
The URLTA counterpart to this section provided that the landlord
could only use the security deposit to cover damages resulting from
noncompliance with the section 76-1421 counterpart.92  This limited
the landlord's use of the security deposit to only important acts
of noncompliance. The Nebraska Legislature added the phrase "for
noncompliance with the rental agreement"; therefore, the landlord
can cover any breaches of the agreement with the security deposit.
This may result in the landlord "finding" a breach so as to be able
to hold at least part of the deposit.9 3 He risks little by such effort,
and he may gain the deposit.
If the landlord fails to return the deposit or to send the itemiza-
tion notice, the tenant can of course sue for any provable damages.
The URLTA section further provided that if the landlord should
fail to return the deposit as prescribed, the tenant could sue also
for punitive or liquidated damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
This was an important provision, for it gave the tenant an incentive
to sue to collect a wrongfully withheld deposit.9 4 It also forced
in the language which requires the tenant to designate where the de-
posit should be sent.
92. Upon termination of the tenancy property or money held
by the landlord as prepaid rent and security may be applied
to the payment of rent and the amount of damages which the
landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant's noncompliance
with the rental agreement or section 76-1421. The balance, if
any, and a written itemization shall be delivered or mailed to
the tenant within fourteen days after demand and designation
of the location where payment may be made or mailed.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1416(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
Inter alia, the italicized words were added in the Nebraska statute.
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1416 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that neither
the landlord nor the tenant is precluded from bringing a suit to recover
damages. Therefore, the issue is not one of ultimate compensation, but
rather of what the security deposit may be used for.
94. (c) If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (b) or
if he fails to return any prepaid rent required to be paid to
the tenants under this Act the tenant may recover the pro-
perty and money due him together with damages in an
amount equal to [twice] the amount wrongfully withheld and
reasonable attorney's fees.
IJRLTA § 2.101 (c).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1416(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that "[if the
landlord fails to comply with subsection (2) the tenant may recover
the property and money due him and reasonable attorney's fees."
It should be noted that the inference of both sections is that there
may be no damages merely because the landlord failed to send the
written itemization.
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the landlord into thinking twice before withholding a deposit. Sec-
tion 76-1416(3) does not include the extra damages provision; the
tenant is only entitled to recover the wrongfully withheld money
and reasonable attorney's fees. The result will be that landlords
in Nebraska will risk less in withholding deposits and tenants will
have less reason to sue for small amounts. The NRLTA strictures
are thus more likely to go unheeded.9 5
B. Duty to Disclose Identity
One of the major problems in Nebraska has been that tenants
often have to deal with an anonymous or absentee landlord. The
tenant rents from an agent, and often pays his rent to the agent.
If a dispute arises, or if a demand is made, the tenant knows only
the agent, and often the agent will disclaim any responsibility with
respect to the problem.
Section 76-1417 is designed to "smoke out" the landlord.9 6 It
provides that either the landlord or any person authorized to
enter into a rental agreement on his behalf shall disclose to the
tenant the name and address of the person authorized to manage
the premises and of the owner or person authorized to act for the
95. The Urban Affairs Committee of the 1975 Nebraska Legislature recog-
nized this; it provided an amendment as follows:
(7) Any person who violates the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars and not more than five thousand dollars.
NEB. LEG. JOUs., 84th Leg., 1st Sess. 954-55 (March 19, 1975). The bill
was not adopted.
96. (1) The landlord or any person authorized to enter into a
rental agreement on his behalf shall disclose to the tenant in
writing at or before the commencement of the tenancy the
name and address of:(a) The person authorized to manage the premises; and
(b) An owner of the premises or a person authorized to act
for and on behalf of the owner for the purpose of service of
process and for the purpose of receiving and receipting for no-
tices and demands.(2) The information required to be furnished by this sec-
tion shall be kept current and this section extends to and is
enforceable against any successor landlord, owner, or manager.
(3) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) be-
comes an agent of each person who is a landlord for the pur-
pose of:(a) Service of process and receiving and receipting for no-
tices and demands; and
(b) Performing the obligations of the landlord under sec-
tions 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 and under the rental agree-
ment and expending or making available for the purpose all
rent collected from the premises.
NEs. REv. STAT. § 76-1417 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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owner for purposes of service and of receiving demands. This infor-
mation must be kept current.
The URLTA draftsmen identified the "person authorized to
enter into a rental agreement" with the "person collecting the
rent".97 If the disclosure obligations were not complied with, this
person was deemed responsible for certain landlord duties. The
Nebraska statute does not clearly reflect this identity. The person
authorized to enter into the rental agreement may not be the person
authorized to collect the rent. This may present problems, for if
the information is not disclosed, and the person authorized to enter
into the rental agreement is absent, there may be no one under
the statute responsible for the landlord's duties. To resolve this,
it is submitted that the statute be interpreted as the URLTA drafts-
men hoped it would be.98
If the person responsible for disclosing this information about
the manager and owner fails to do so, he is deemed to be the agent
of the landlord for the purpose of (1) receiving service; (2) re-
ceiving and receipting for notices and demands; and (3) performing
the obligations of the landlord under the NRLTA and the rental
agreement. Thus, the needed names and addresses should be
flushed out, for few landlords will want to be in a situation in
which an agent can receive service for them and few agents will
want to be liable for the landlord's obligations.99
One inherent ambiguity relates to the potential extent of the
agent's liability. Section 76-1410(5) provides that "a manager who
fails to disclose as required by section 76-1417" is, by definition, a
landlord. One would infer that the manager would then be respon-
sible as a landlord. 00 However, section 76-1417 provides that the
97. URLTA § 2.102, Comment.
98. It is also possible that a truly 'Machiavellian" landlord could instruct
his agent-manager not to disclose who he is, and then fire him. The
manager would be relieved of any future obligations he might have
when he is terminated and after written notice of such termination is
given to the tenant. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1420 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Admittedly, once a new manager is appointed, he becomes responsible
if he does not disclose who the landlord is. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-
1417 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). But the landlord may not appoint another.
Of course, the tenant could argue that the person designated to collect
rent becomes the surrogate landlord, but as indicated, it is not neces-
sary that this person also be the person "authorized to enter into the
rental agreement" on the landlord's behalf.
99. The owner will have an interest in disclosure, for without disclosure
there could be legal service on this created agent, thus increasing the
chance of default judgments.
100. "In the absence of such disclosure the person collecting the rent shall
be deemed to have the authority to accept notices and service and to
provide for the necessary maintenance and repairs." URLTA § 2.102,
Comment.
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manager who fails to disclose only becomes the agent of the land-
lord for the purpose of performing the obligations of the landlord
and "expending or making available for the purpose all rent col-
lected from the premises."'u 0 The difference may be important, for
this phase seems to limit the agent's exposure. If, for example, rent
were $200 and damages resulting from a breach of the rental agree-
ment were $1,000, the "landlord" would be liable for the damages.
The "agent of the landlord" would also be liable, but not necessarily
for the complete amount; he would apparently be liable, pursuant to
the section quoted above, only to the "extent of making available
for the purpose all rent collected;" this rent may be only $200. The
emphasis is on using the collected rent to perform the obligations.
In other words, the agent is seen as a rent conduit. This puts a
reasonable ceiling on his liability, but it does not eliminate his per-
sonal risk.
The failure to disclose may be a pecadillo, and it seems unreason-
able to expose such a wrong-doer to a sky-is-the-limit liability.
Moreover, by limiting the agent's exposure in this way, the tenant
is not unduly injured. He still has his rights against the landlord
and he is in the same position with respect to exercising them as
he is under existing law. The agent's personal risk lies in the fact
that if the dgent does not have the rent collected or if he has al-
ready passed it on to the undisclosed landlord, he is still liable to
use an equivalent amount to perform the obligations. This threat
should induce disclosure. The compromise reached satisfied many
interests.
C. Duty to Deliver Possession
A frequent problem in landlord-tenant relations is that the
demised premises are not ready for occupancy on the agreed upon
date. Often a prior tenant is holding-over on a prior term. Com-
mon law jurisdictions differ with respect to whether there is an
implied warranty on the part of the landlord to deliver actual
possession. The American rule is that there is no such implied war-
ranty; the landlord only conveys the right to possession. The En-
101. (3) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) be-
comes an agent of each person who is a landlord for the pur-
pose of:(a) Service of process and receiving and receipting for no-
tices and demands; and(b) Performing the obligations of the landlord under sec-
tions 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 and under the rental agree-
ment and expending or making available for the purpose all
rent collected from the premises.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1417(3) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
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glish rule is that there is an obligation to deliver actual possession.
Nebraska has adopted the English rule.10 2 If the landlord fails to
deliver possession, the second tenant can rescind the lease.10 3 He
can also recover damages (e.g., the rental value of the premises
less the reserved rent), plus special damages if they are certain and
provable. 04 The landlord can, of course, sue the hold-over tenant
for possession and for damages; the second tenant could also sue
the "trespassing" occupier for possession.10 5
Section 76-1418 provides that the landlord shall deliver posses-
sion to the new tenant. 0 6 In spite of some arguments that this
may mean legal possession or only the right to possession,' 7 this
provision restates the English rule. 0 8 "Possession" means actual
possession and not the legal right to possession. The last
sentence of section 76-1418, which is not found in the URLTA
counterpart section, provides that the landlord who makes reason-
able efforts to "obtain" possession will not be liable to the tenant.
This must refer to actual possession. Section 76-1426, the corre-
sponding remedial section, permits the tenant to abate the rent
if he does not receive possession; this too must refer to actual
possession.
The first sentence of section 76-1418 provides that the premises
must be delivered "in compliance with the rental agreement and
section 76-1419." This is an important "sleeper" clause for it may
permit the tenant to use section 76-1426 remedies in situations in
which the landlord does not comply at the commencement of the
term with section 76-1419, which requires the landlord to keep the
premises fit. 08 These remedies will be in addition to the normal
remedies associated with section 76-1419.109 For example, if the
landlord knowingly delivers premises which do not substantially
comply with the requirements of the applicable minimum housing
codes materially affecting health and safety, section 76-1419(1)
would have been violated. Section 76-1425 provides that in such
102. Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 355, 111 N.W. 359 (1907).
103. Canaday v. Krueger, 156 Neb. 287, 56 N.W.2d 123 (1952); Poulos v.
Skregas, 110 Neb. 296, 193 N.W. 703 (1923).
104. 76 Neb. 355, 111 N.W. 359 (1907).
105. Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943).
106. The analysis of this section will focus on the holdover problem. There
will be few interpretive problems if it is the landlord who is occupying
the dwelling when it is to be delivered to the tenant.
107. Comment, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New
Hope for the Beleaguered Tenant?, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 546, 556
(1974).
108. Davis, URLTA, Kansas and the Common Law, 21 Ka. L. REv. 387,
400 (1973).
109. See notes 151-65 and accompanying text infra.
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a situation, the tenant may terminate the tenancy, sue for damages
or bring an action for injunction. It does not provide that the
tenant may abate rent payment. Section 76-1426, however, provides
that the tenant will be able to abate rent until possession is de-
livered and that he may demand "performance of the rental agree-
ment" by the landlord. 110
Can the tenant move into the dwelling, refuse to pay any rent,
and demand landlord compliance? The answer may be yes if
"possession" in section 76-1418 means possession "in compliance
with ... section 76-1419."'. Admittedly, some would consider
such an interpretation extreme, but it has much to say for it. It
would impose an obligation on the landlord to deliver suitable
premises at the commencement of the term, and if he does not so
comply, the tenant will have an important weapon (e.g., rent abate-
ment) to compel compliance. This may serve all parties benefi-
cially.
The landlord may bring an action for possession against any per-
son wrongfully in possession and he may recover section 76-1437(3)
damages. Section 76-1437(3) provides damages in the amount of
three months' periodic rent or of threefold the actual damages,
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's fees. These puni-
tive damages are appropriate as a method of assuring that hold-
over tenants, for example, move out when they should.112 But
section 76-1437(3) only permits these punitive damages if the
tenant's hold-over is willful and not in good faith. Is the landlord's
action for punitive damages pursuant to section 76-1418 (presuming
he can maintain such an action) limited in this same way?
Apparently it is, for section 76-1418 calls for the damages "pro-
vided" in section 76-1437(3), and they are only provided for if the
hold-over tenant is acting willfully and not in good faith. More-
over, the tenant's parallel recovery section provides for these puni-
tive damages only if the wrong done is willful and not in good
faith.113 It would be absurd to limit the real aggrieved party, i.e.,
110. If the landlord fails to deliver possession of the dwelling unit
to the tenant as provided in section 76-1418, rent abates until
possession is delivered and the tenant shall: . . .
(2) Demand performance of the rental agreement by the
landlord....
NEs. Rnv. STAT. § 76-1426 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
111. NEB. R~v. STAr. § 76-1418 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
112. It is difficult to construe this provision in any other way than as puni-
tive. Its constitutionality is therefore in doubt.
113. If a person's failure to deliver possession is willful and not
in good faith, an aggrieved person may recover from that per-
son an amount not more than three months' periodic rent or
threefold the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is
greater, and reasonable attorney's fees.
NE. Rbv. STAT. § 76-1426(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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the tenant, while not equally restricting the landlord. As indicated,
the aggrieved tenant may also sue the "trespassing" occupier. This
is reasonable for he is the one entitled to possession.
The final sentence in section 76-1418 is not in the URLTA
counterpart section.114 It provides that if the landlord uses reason-
able efforts to obtain possession, he shall not be liable for an ac-
tion under this section. As a practical manner, this clause may
relieve the landlord of the obligation he had under the first
sentence. What had appeared to be an obligation which would pro-
vide tenants with assurance that they would get the premises, is
watered down to give them this assurance only if the landlord is
at fault. This is a mid-way position between the American and
English rule, and it modifies existing Nebraska law.
What "reasonable efforts" means is uncertain. Of course, it will
depend on the facts of each particular case. Nevertheless, at a mini-
mum, it should require the landlord to pursue judicial remedies
against the hold-over. The fact that section 76-1418 states that the
landlord "may" bring such action does not infer that he need not
in some cases. For example, if the landlord does not deliver
possession on the due date, the potential tenant may elect to termi-
nate. If he does so, the landlord may, or may not, institute an
action against the hold-over. But where the new tenant wants
possession, it is reasonable to require the landlord to institute, at
a minimum, a repossession suit. This is consistent with the
NRLTA's preference for the judicial resolution of problems.
The meaning of "not be liable for an action" also needs inter-
pretation. Section 76-1426, the tenant's remedial section, begins:
"If the landlord fails to deliver possession of the dwelling unit to
the tenant, as provided in section 76-1418, rent abates until posses-
sion is delivered." The tenant then has the alternative remedies
of termination or a damage suit. Is it possible that if the landlord
uses reasonable efforts to obtain possession the remedies provided
in this section are inoperative and the tenant without possession
will be liable for rent? The answer must be no. The section
76-1418 words "not be liable.for an action" imply that the landlord
114. At the commencement of the term the landlord shall deliverpossession of the premises to the tenant in compliance with the
rental agreement and section 76-1419. The landlord may bring
an action for possession against any person wrongfully in pos-
session and may recover the damages provided in subsection(3) of section 76-1437. If the landlord makes reasonable ef-forts to obtain possession of the premises, he shall not be liablefor an action under this section.
N s. Rnv. STAT. § 76-1418 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The emphasized sen-
tence was not in the URLTA counterpart.
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will be saved money in those cases in which he tries his best. The
implication is not that the tenant will remain liable for rent even
though he was not given actual possession. The appropriate resolu-
tion is to allow rent to abate when actual possession is not delivered,
regardless of the landlord's efforts to deliver possession. The land-
lord who makes a reasonable effort will only be relieved of a suit
for damages.
Even if the landlord does not use any efforts to gain possession,
he may still not be liable to the tenant for damages. This is one
of the most puzzling interpretation problems in the NRLTA. Sec-
tion 76-1426 (2) does not explicitly provide that the tenant can sue
the landlord for damages, while the URLTA provided that he
could. The NRLTA provides only for suit against a person in
possession and this would not be the landlord in a hold-over
case. 1 5 One inference is that in hold-over cases there cannot
be a suit against the landlord, regardless of whether the land-
lord makes reasonable efforts or not to deliver possession. How-
ever, section 76-1405 provides that every right can be enforced by
an action. The tenant does have a right to actual possession, at
least in cases in which the landlord does not use his best efforts
to rid the premises of the wrongdoer. Therefore, if the first sen-
tence of section 76-1418 is to have any meaning beyond a require-
ment that the landlord not personally withhold actual possession
from the tenant, it is appropriate that the tenant be allowed to
sue the landlord for damages if he does not use reasonable efforts
to get possession."16 This is not only in line with the existing
Nebraska law which allows the preferred "English rule," but it is
also the best way to effectuate uniformity in the landlord-tenant
law.
D. Duty to Maintain
In Nebraska, the rule of "caveat tenant" prevailed; a landlord
did not impliedly warrant that the premises were fit and habitable
at the commencement of the term. The tenant took the conveyance
115. If the landlord fails to deliver possession of the dwelling unit to the
tenant as provided in section 76-1418, rent abates until possession is
delivered and the tenant shall:
(2) Demand performance of the rental agreement by the
landlord and, if the tenant elects, maintain an action for pos-
session of the dwelling unit against [the landlord or] any
person wrongfully in possession or wrongfully withholding
possession and recover the damages sustained by him.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1426 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The bracketed words
were deleted from the URLTA counterpart, and the underlined words
were added. Of course, it is possible to interpret the person "wrong-
fully withholding possession" as the landlord, but this seems counter-
intuitive.
116. NEB. REw. STAT. § 76-1405 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
LANDLORD TENANT
"as iS. ' 1 1 7 A fortiori, the landlord did not impliedly agree to repair
and to maintain the premises during the term.1 8 The agrarian
justification for this rule once made sense. The leased property
was the land, and the tenant could determine for himself the con-
dition of the property by inspection. The tenant was believed to
be equipped to make the repairs if necessary. Moreover, during
the term, the landlord was not in possession and, therefore, would
not necessarily know what repairs were needed. Even if he should
know, he could not infringe on the tenant's private domain to make
the repairs.
The Nebraska courts fashioned a few exceptions to this harsh
general rule. 19 The landlord did have to disclose the existence of
latent and defective conditions at the beginning of the term of
which he actually knew.120  He was responsible for maintaining
common areas in a reasonable fashion and for inspecting for prob-
lems as a reasonably prudent person would. 21 The landlord was
also responsible for maintenance and repair if a statute or ordinance
required him to keep the premises safe. 22  Finally, he was re-
sponsible if he had promised or covenanted to maintain and re-
pair the premises. 23  In all these situations, if the tenant were
injured as a result of the landlord's noncompliance, and if the
tenant were not culpable himself (e.g., if he were not contributorily
negligent), the tenant could recover personal injury damages.
However, these were the narrow exceptions to the general Nebraska
rules of "caveat tenant" and "no duty to maintain."
117. Roan v. Bruckner, 180 Neb. 399, 143 N.W.2d 108 (1966); Wright v. Bar-
clay, 151 Neb. 94, 36 N.W.2d 645 (1949); Roberts v. Rogers, 129 Neb.
298, 261 N.W. 354 (1935).
118. See Roan v. Bruckner, 180 Neb. 399, 143 N.W.2d 108 (1966); Sipprell
v. Merner Motors, 164 Neb. 447, 82 N.W.2d 648 (1957); Quist v. Duda,
159 Neb. 393, 67 N.W.2d 481 (1954); Bartholomew v. Skelly Oil Co.,
144 Neb. 51, 12 N.W.2d 122 (1943); Roberts v. Rogers, 129 Neb. 298,
261 N.W. 354 (1935); Daggett v. Panebianco, 106 Neb. 572, 184 N.W.
177 (1921); Young v. Rohrbougb, 88 Neb. 101, 129 N.W. 167 (1910);
Murphy v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 57 Neb. 519, 77 N.W. 1102
(1899); and Turner v. Townsend, 42 Neb. 376, 60 N.W. 587 (1894).
119. For example, if the landlord attempted to make repairs even where he
was not obligated to do so, he would be culpable for negligence. See
Carlon v. City Say. Bank, 82 Neb. 582, 118 N.W. 334 (1908).
120. Rankin v. Elizabeth Kountze Real Estate Co., 101 Neb. 174, 162 N.W.
531 (1917); Davis v. Manning, 98 Neb. 707, 154 N.W. 239 (1915).
121. Smith v. Rigguto, 133 Neb. 655, 276 N.W. 406 (1937); Blotckey v. Gahm,
108 Neb. 275, 187 N.W. 640 (1922).
122. Tralle v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 217 N.W. 952
(1928); Weitz v. United States Trust Co., 143 Neb. 703, 10 N.W.2d 632
(1943); Winterson v. Pantel Realty Co., 135 Neb. 472, 282 N.W. 393
(1938).
123. Zuroski v. Estate of Strickland, 176 Neb. 633, 126 N.W.2d 888 (1964);
Fried v. Burhmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935).
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In the last fifteen years, several courts and legislatures have
clearly reversed the general rule, finding it inappropriate in the
modern, urban residential setting.12 4  Landlords are charged with
a duty to provide habitable premises at the commencement of the
term and to repair and to maintain the premises during the term.
This development is salutory, for it recognizes the realities of life.
Tenants expect a package of residential services, and today's land-
lords are clearly more able than today's transient tenants to pro-
vide them. The precise parameters of the new obligation vary. In
some cases, the local housing code provisions relating to health and
safety define the obligation. In other cases, substantial compliance
with such codes define the obligation. In some instances, the im-
posed standards of habitability are worked out completely inde-
pendently of any particular local code obligations, while in other
cases such code standards at least inform the courts with respect
to the articulation of a standard. 125 Neither the Nebraska courts
nor the Nebraska Legislature had imposed such a general obligation
on the landlord.
Section 76-1419 is the heart of the NRLTA, and it dramatically
changes existing law. It is also very different from its URLTA
counterpart. The Nebraska result is an unclear and undesirable
compromise between existing law and the URLTA.126
124. One of the first of these cases is Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961).
125. For a treatment of the parameters of the landlord's obligation see, De-
velopments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated
Bibliography, supra note 1.
126. At this point, it is instructive to examine the liability of landlords after
the reversion is conveyed. Statutorily imposed obligations present few
common law problems. The first landlord, or the successor landlord,
is responsible depending on the relevant statutory language. In other
words, who is a "landlord" for the purpose of the particular statute?
Section 76-1410 (5) defines landlord as "owner, lessor, a sublessor." It
is arguable that once a landlord has conveyed the reversion he is no
longer an owner or lessor, and, therefore, is no longer responsible.
However, section 76-1420 (1) provides certain specified ways in which
this first landlord can relieve himself of liability by transfer. There-
fore, the negative inference is that if the first landlord does not comply
with these rules, he will remain an owner or a lessor for the duration
of the tenancy.
The question of landlord covenants is more complicated. In Ne-
braska, as at common law, a landlord who conveyed the reversion re-
mained responsible for any promise he had made to the tenant. Only
rarely would the courts find an implied assignment of the obligation.
The tenant had "bargained" for this landlord's promise, and it was be-
lieved unfair to allow the landlords to switch. This was particularly
true in that the first landlord could protect himself by extracting an
indemnification letter from the successor landlord or by providing in
the original lease that he would not remain liable to the tenant if the
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The first part of the URLTA counterpart to this section imposed
a duty on the landlord, enforceable by the tenant, to comply with
applicable housing codes materially affecting health and safety.127
Section 76-1419 (1) (a)12 8 follows the form of the URLTA, 29 but its
language is different in several significant respects.
First, the Nebraska landlord need only "substantially" comply
with the code. This is consistent with some case law;1 3 0 neverthe-
less, it is ambiguous in terms of the meaning of "substantially" and
will work to the ultimate disadvantage of both landlords and
tenants for several reasons. Tenants will not know when they can
property was transferred. The successor landlord was nevertheless
primarily responsible if the covenant, such as a duty to repair, ran with
the land. In some jurisdictions, the successor landlord also had to have
notice of the obligation, but in Nebraska such actual knowledge was
unnecessary. Apparently, if the successor landlord had knowledge of
the tenancy, then he was charged with knowledge of the tenant's rights,
and therefore obligated. Friedlander v. Rider, 30 Neb. 783, 47 N.W.
83 (1890). See also Jamson v. Poulos, 184 Neb. 480, 168 N.W.2d 526
(1969).
Section 76-1420(1) delineates under what conditions the first land-
lord is relieved of liability under the rental agreement and the NRLTA.
The section provides that a landlord who conveys the premises in a
good faith sale to a bona fide purchaser is relieved of liability for
events occurring after he gives written notice of the transfer to the ten-
ants. The provision encourages the alienability of land, for landlords
will be able to wash their hands completely of all the indicia of'owner-
ship (e.g., their responsibilities). Ia this the only method of transfer
by which a landlord can be relieved of an obligation? What if there
is a gift, or a devise? These may be legitimate transfers and not ones
designed to evade legitimate obligations; nevertheless, the section hints,
by negative inference, that the landlord will remain liable under these
conditions. The section insists that only the landlord with whom the
tenant has had any dealings remains responsible, except in a very nar-
row set of legitimate transfers. To prevent any abuses, some otherwise
legitimate transfers (e.g., gifts) will not relieve a landlord of his duty.
In other words, section 76-1420 provides a limited safe-harbor. If the
landlord wants more protection, he can include the necessary clause
in his lease or he can extract the necessary indemnification letter.
Regardless of whether the prior landlord remains a landlord or not,
the transferee, by definition, will become the landlord, and thus re-
sponsible for the landlord's duties. This will assure the tenant that
there will always be at least one person responsible to him.
127. URLTA § 2.104(a) (1).
128. "The landlord shall substantially comply, after written or actual notice,
with the requirements of the applicable minimum housing codes mate-
rially affecting health and safety." NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419(1) (a)
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
129. "A landlord shall comply with the requirements of applicable building
and housing codes materially affecting health and safety." URLTA §
2.104(a) (1).
130. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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take remedial steps and landlords will not know with certainty
when they have complied with the provisions of the NRLTA.
A second way in which the NRLTA differs from the URLTA is
that the landlord is only obligated to comply after written or actual
notice. The URLTA did not require such notice. The landlord was
simply obligated to comply with the applicable code. The Nebraska
Legislature first amended the proposed bill to add that the landlord
must substantially comply only after written notice; this implied
a procedure of notification from the tenant.131 This amendment
was further amended on the floor of the legislature so as to pro-
vide that if the landlord had actual notice of the noncompliance
he would be responsible. 1 32  This at least relieved the tenant of
the responsibility of activating the statutory provision, but it still
may temporarily relieve the landlord of many obligations which
the URLTA would have imposed on him immediately. Moreover,
since notice is generally defined as a situation in which the landlord
has reason to know that a defect exists, the use of "actual" vitiates
its constructive force. 33 The landlord apparently has no duty to
find out about defects, but once he knows of them, he must comply
with the applicable code. It would have been preferable for the
131. And it says in essence that the bill provides that if, for
example, there is a defect in the apartment or the house that
does not bring the house up to minimum standards that the
tenant shall give notice, written notice to the landlord to the
affect that defect does exist. This is designed so that the
landlord doesn't have to go in there any more frequently
than the tenant wants him to go in there for periodic inspec-
tions. If the tenant . . . if there is a defect in there the land-
does not know about then the tenant puts the landlord on
notice in writing, and then the landlord is liable for that
problem.
UNICAMERAL TRANSCRIPTS, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 3320 (February 11, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. Goodrich).
132. SENATOR CHAMBERS: It seems to me that compliance, re-
quired compliance by the landlord with the minimum code is
on a written notice by the tenant of the condition of the prem-
ises that do not meet the minimum code is that correct?
SENATOR GOODRICH: This is true. And what we are try-
ing to make sure of is that the landlord isn't pestering the ten-
ant with inspections.
SENATOR CHAMBERS: Well, suppose the landlord had ac-
tual notice but not as a result of that what the tenant wrote?
If it's a defect which can clearly be seen. Will the landlord
not be liable for that defect until he receives written notice
from the tenant.
UNICAMERAL TRANSCRIPTS, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 5321-22 (February 11,
1974) (remarks of Senators Goodrich and Chambers).
133. Section 76-1413 provides that a person has notice of a fact if, inter alia,
"from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in ques-
tion he has reason to know that it exists." Thus, notice means what
has traditionally been termed constructive or inquiry notice.
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Nebraska Legislature to have required simple compliance with a
code. This would have placed upon the landlord the obligation of
inspecting his property, as most housing codes require.
A third difference is that section 76-1419 (1) (a) provides that the
landlord need only comply with the applicable minimum housing
codes materially affecting health and safety. What is the minimum
housing code? It is defined as those parts of housing codes "deal-
ing specifically with health and minimum standards of fitness for
habitation."' 3 4 There is no recorded legislative history with respect
to this definition. It is possible that the drafters misread court de-
cisions which found minimum standards of habitability to be de-
fined by the housing code.135 For these courts, however, the mini-
mum standard was the housing code, and to speak of a minimum
code is nonsensical. For example, if a housing code has a given
fitness standard, is a lesser standard the minimum standard of fit-
ness? If a code should require window screens, it does not make
sense to say that at a minimum only some of the windows need
screens. The best definition of minimum housing code is to incor-
porate all those housing code standards specifically (and perhaps
inherent in this word "specifically" is a directive that the standard
be written very clearly) related to health and safety, or related
to fitness for habitation. These are by definition minimum. Thus,
"minimum housing code" should be interpreted to mean "housing
code."
Section 76-1419(1) (b) provides that the landlord make the re-
pairs and do whatever is necessary to put and to keep the premises
in a fit and habitable condition.136 This is a statutory version of the
implied warranty of habitability adopted in several other states.137
Its parameters are not defined in the act, and the URLTA version
was designed to allow for case by case judicial development. Thus,
the warranty could be defined by the housing code (thus repeating
the thrust of the prior section) or it could expand beyond any par-
134. "Minimum housing code shall be limited to those laws, resolutions
... or portions thereof, dealing specifically with health and minimum
standards of fitness for habitation." NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1410(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1974). This language was not in the URLTA.
135. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
136. "The landlord shall make all repairs and do whatever is necessary,
after written or actual notice, to put and keep the premises in a fit
and habitable condition." NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419(1) (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1974).
Compare the URLTA -section. "A landlord shall make all repairs
and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit
and habitable condition." URLTA § 2.104(a) (2).
137. See Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, supra note 1.
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ticular code. Such judicial development has been circumscribed in
the NRLTA. The penultimate sentence of section 76-1419(1) pro-
vides that if there should be a minimum housing code applicable
to the premises, then the duty of the landlord under section
76-1419(1) (a) is his maximum duty. Thus, the warranty of habit-
ability cannot impose a greater duty on the landlord than the local
code. This directly reverses the original URLTA counterpart.1 38
A locality can now discourage the judicial development of a war-
ranty of habitability. By adopting a minimum housing code, the
locality can assure itself that no landlord in its community will
be responsible for a greater obligation. In view of the enormous
power often exercised by landlord interest groups in local govern-
ment, this may be troublesome. At the very least, the implied war-
ranty of habitability will mean different things in different parts
of Nebraska. Thus, the NRLTA position not only discourages uni-
formity among the states, it discourages uniformity within the
state.
As in the prior subsection, the Nebraska landlord is only obli-
gated to perform his duty after written or actual notice. The
URLTA counterpart section would simply have imposed a duty to
keep the premises fit. Although, this requirement of written or ac-
tual notice poses the same problems discussed above, it is perhaps
more justified here. The landlord's obligations under a judicially
developed warranty will never have the precision of a code; there-
fore, the landlord is more in need of notice of noncompliance.
Sections 76-1419(1) (c) through 76-1419(1) (f) provide that the
landlord keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe
condition, an obligation the landlord had at common law; that the
landlord maintain certain essential services, such as electrical and
plumbing services, garbage services, and water and heat services;
that the landlord provide and maintain garbage removal equipment;
and that the landlord supply water and heat in certain circum-
stances.139 None of these are surprising obligations and they ac-
138. "If there exists a minimum housing code applicable to the premises,
the landlord's maximum duty under this section shall be determined
by subdivision (1) (a) of this section." NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
Compare the URLTA section. "If the duty imposed by paragraph
(1) of the subsection (a) is greater than any duty imposed by any
other paragraph of that subsection, the landlord's duty shall be deter-
mined by reference to paragraph (1) of subsection (a)." URLTA §
2.104 (b).
139. The landlord shall:
(c) Keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and
safe condition;(d) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition
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curately reflect the legitimate expectations of landlords and ten-
ants.
The last sentence of section 76-1419(1) is perhaps the most diffi-
cult one in the section to interpret. It is not found in the URLTA
counterpart. It asserts that: "The obligations imposed by this sec-
tion are not intended to change existing tort law in the state." The
apparent purpose of this amendment seems intuitively obvious;
however, its origins are unclear, and, it therefore, introduces a num-
ber of difficult interpretation problems.
Does "not . . . to change" mean that tort law in the landlord-
tenant area is frozen in Nebraska? This would imply that regardless
of what developments there might be, there may be no judicial ex-
tension of the present rule. This interpretation is unlikely in that
the sentence only provides that "the obligations imposed" are not
intended to change existing tort law, not that tort doctrine can
never change. But even if limited in this way, what is meant by
saying that the "obligations imposed" are not intended to change
the law is uncertain. Apparently, it suggests that a judge must
ignore the NRLTA in deciding a tort case. This will be difficult,
if not impossible to do. The NRLTA will dramatically influence
all of residential landlord-tenant law. Duties and rights will
change because of it. To ask a judge to decide a tort case without
considering "the obligations imposed" will require super-human re-
straint and self-imposed myopia. But it is logically possible. For
example, the Nebraska law has been that a landlord is not liable
for accidents resulting from latent defects of which he did not have
actual knowledge. 140 A court today might hold a landlord liable for
accidents resulting from latent defects of which he should have
known. If the court chooses to accept this second rule, the judge
must apparently make his decision as if section 76-1419 did not exist.
all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air con-
ditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including ele-
vators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;(e) Provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and con-
veniences for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other
waste incidental to the occupancy of the dwelling unit and ar-
range for their removal from the appropriate receptacle; and
(f) Supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot
water at all times and reasonable heat except where the build-
ing that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to
be equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so con-
structed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation
within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a
direct public utility connection.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (1) (c)-(f) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
140. Rankin v. Elizabeth Kountze Real Estate Co., 101 Neb. 174, 162 N.W.
531 (1917); Davis v. Manning, 98 Neb. 707, 154 N.W. 239 (1915).
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It is also not clear what "tort" means. If a tenant is injured
as a result of a landlord's failure to comply with 76-1419 (1) (b), are
his personal injuries a tort claim? It might be viewed as a suit
for damages pursuant to noncompliance with a statutory obligation.
If articulated in the second fashion, there has been no change in
existing tort law. The argument is an unlikely one, but it is not
totally far-fetched. Under existing law, if a landlord should agree
to an express covenant to repair, and if he should breach the agree-
ment, the tenant can sue and recover personal injuries caused by
the breach. 141 Is this a contract suit, analogous to the suit for
damages based on noncompliance with a statute, or is it a tort suit?
Although the Nebraska court has tentatively answered that it is
a tort, this is hardly definitive.1 42
Finally, even if "tort" can be defined, what tort "law" means is
unclear. Existing tort law provides that if a landlord violates a
mandatory maintenance code relating to health and safety, and if
such violation is the proximate cause of an injury, the tenant can
sue for damages.'4 3 The landlord's noncompliance is negligence per
se. It is arguable that the existing tort law can, therefore, be stated
as follows: If the landlord does not comply with a mandatory code
related to safety, he is liable to persons injured as a result of his
failure. The particular mandatory rule is not the tort law, it is
only an element of it, such as the landlord's act would be. New
legislation, such as the NRLTA, does not change the tort law, it
simply changes an element of it, namely the particular mandatory
rule. Therefore, the adoption of the NRLTA does not change the
"law."
In sum, section 76-1419(1) is only a very rough facsimile of its
URLTA counterpart. Almost all the Nebraska changes are undesir-
able, for not only do they cause confusion and discourage uni-
formity, but they also impede enlightened reform in the residential
landlord-tenant area.
As discussed above,14 4 section 76-1419 (2) permits a landlord and
a tenant of a single family residence to agree to have the tenant
perform the landlord's duties provided in subsections (e) and (f).
These include the landlord's obligations to provide for garbage dis-
posal and to supply water and heat. Presumably, this latter obli-
gation does not refer to situations where the "heat and hot water
is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the
tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection" because
141. Fried v. Buhrmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935).
142. Id.
143. See note 38 supra.
144. See notes 61-73 and accompanying text supra.
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the landlord has no obligations to supply heat and water under
these circumstances.' 4 5 In addition, the tenant may agree to per-
form certain specified maintenance work.14,6  This is reason-
able in context, for a tenant of a single family residence
closely resembles an owner. Since he will have sole responsibility
for the property, there will be no confusion as to which tenant will
be responsible for the work. He also will probably be-on a more
equal footing in bargaining and will, therefore, be better equipped
to protect his own position. Moreover, as further assurance that
his position will be protected, the contracting-out must be in writ-
ing, it must be for consideration and it must not be for the purpose
of evading the landlord's obligations. 47 This latter phrase may
prove troublesome, for any shift in obligation will be made for the
purpose of evading the obligation. The word "evading" connotes,
however, the shift of obligation unfairly or in bad faith, and the
statute ought to be construed in this way.
Section 76-1419(3) permits a landlord and tenant in a multiple
dwelling unit also to make separate contracting-out agreements.
The tenant may agree to perform the same specified repairs, main-
tenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling as the tenant of a single
family residence. The section also provides that the agreement is
valid only if entered into in good faith, for purposes other than
evading the obligations of the landlord, and for adequate considera-
tion. In addition to following the section 76-1419(2) requirements,
the contracting-out to a tenant of a multiple unit must be in a sepa-
rate writing.148 This is designed to impress on the tenant most em-
phatically what he is agreeing to do. Nevertheless, this contracting-
out clause is troublesome, for the situation of a tenant in a multiple
apartment is not analogous to that of the owner. He probably will
not have the bargaining power of the single family residence tenant,
and if more than one tenant agrees to do the work, confusion is
almost certain.
The URLTA counterpart of this section was sensitive to these
problems and explicitly prohibited the tenant from agreeing to
remedy a landlord's noncompliance with the housing code. 49 That
145. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419(1) (f) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
146. This work may include "specified repairs, maintenance tasks, altera-
tions and remodeling." NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419(2) (Cum. Supp.
1974).
147. See notes 61-70 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 64-70 and accompanying text supra.
149. (d) The landlord and tenant of any dwelling unit other
than a single family residence may agree that the tenant is to
perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or re-
modeling only if
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very important obligation was to stay where the statute put it.
However, this prohibition on what can be contracted-out is not
in the NRLTA. Regardless of this, the landlord may not be too
cavalier in contracting-out important obligations, for such an agree-
ment cannot affect his obligations to other tenants. If a landlord,
for example, contracted-out his obligation to keep the common areas
safe to each of his tenants in an effort to relieve himself completely
of this obligation, the courts would certainly find that his purpose
was to evade his obligations. 150
Section 76-1419(4) provides that a landlord may employ a tenant
to perform the obligations of the landlord. This should only occur
as specified in sections 76-1419(2) and 76-1419(3). If the tenant did
not have to comply with the limitations of these sections and could
agree orally, or for inadequate consideration, the restrictions of
those sections would be easily circumvented. The design of the
statute is to allow only "regulated" shifts of duty.
The tenant's remedies for a landlord's breach of the rental agree-
ment or noncompliance with section 76-1419 are set forth in sections
76-1425 and 76-1427.151 They build on a confusing Nebraska com-
(.2) the work is not necessary to cure noncompliance with
subsection (a) (1) of this section;
URLTA § 2.104(d) (2).
150. NEB. REXv. STAT. § 76-1419,(3) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
151. Section 4.103 of the URLTA provided that in certain narrow circum-
stances, the tenant could repair the premises and deduct the cost of
such repairs from his rent.(a) If the landlord fails to comply with the rental agree-
ment or Section 2.104, and the reasonable cost of compliance
is less than [$100], or an amount equal to [one-half] the pe-
riodic rent, whichever amount is greater, the tenant may re-
cover damages for the breach under Section 4.101 (b) or may
notify the landlord of his intention to correct the condition at
the landlord's expense. If the landlord fails to comply within[14] days after being notified by the tenant in writing or as
promptly as conditions require in case of emergency, the ten-
ant may cause the work to be done in a workmanlike manner
and, after submitting to the landlord an itemized statement,
deduct from his rent the actual and reasonable cost or the fair
and reasonable value of the work, not exceeding the amount
specified in this subsection.
(b) A tenant may not repair at the landlord's expense if
the condition was caused by the deliberate or negligent act or
omission of the tenant, a member of his family, or other person
on the premises with his consent.
URLTA § 4.103.
This would have been an important tenant remedy for if the tenant
took advantage of it, and was later sued for possession based on non-
payment of rent, he would have a defense. Whether or not he could
make up his rent payment after such a suit if it was found that he
were wrong is uncertain.
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mon law pattern in which lease covenants were apparently con-
sidered to be independent. The doctrine of independent covenants
is an historical legacy of property law and it is premised on a view
of a lease as a conveyance. 152 According to the doctrine, if the land-
lord were to breach his agreement, the tenant's remedy was to sue
for damages, and not to terminate the lease. Normal damages were
the difference between the value of the leasehold with and without
the breach;15 moreover, special damages could be recovered if
specific and provable. 54 The only clearly dependent covenant was
the express or implied warranty of quiet enjoyment.155 If the land-
lord were to interfere substantially with the tenant's quiet enjoy-
ment, the tenant could vacate within a reasonable time and termi-
nate the tenancy.' 56 The tenant could, of course, sue for additional
damages from this breach. Nebraska did not adopt the common
law doctrine of partial constructive eviction which permitted the
tenant to stay and not to pay rent. If there were a partial inter-
ference with the tenant's right of quiet enjoyment, his only remedy
was to sue for damages.' 57
Section 76-1425(1) provides that if there is a material noncompli-
ance with the rental agreement or a noncompliance with section
76-1419, the tenant may terminate the tenancy. 58 This is an artic-
ulation of the doctrine of dependent covenants. It is premised
on the view of a lease as a contract, a position certainly held by
all parties today. In the event that there are such noncompliances,
As quid pro quo for the deletion of this important clause, the Ne-
braska Legislature also deleted section 4.202 of the URLTA, which pro-
vided for the landlord to make certain tenant-obligated repairs and to
bill the tenant for them as rent.
And number eight is the landlord side of the repair and de-
duct section. We struck the tenant's side of the repair and de-
duct and we are agreeing to go ahead and strike the landlord's
side.
UNCAMtAL TRANScaPTS, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. 5321 (February 11, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. Goodrich).
152. One purported purpose of the URLTA was to rid landlord-tenant law
of this anachronism. See URLTA § 1.102, Comment. See also notes
19-27 and accompanying text supra.
153. If the tenant was out of possession, the measure of damages was the
rental value of the property for the unexpired term less the amount
of rent reserved. Dinkel v. Hagedorn, 156 Neb. 419, 56 NW.2d 464
(1953); Cannon v. Wilbur, 30 Neb. 777, 47 N.W. 85 (1890).
154. Schneider v. Reeves, 98 Neb. 629, 154 N.W. 210 (1915).
155. Herpolsheirner v. Funke, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 471, 95 N.W. 688 (1901).
156. Kimball v. Lincoln Theatre Corp., 125 Neb. 677, 251 N.W. 290 (1933).
157. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co. v. Philbin, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 340, 96 N.W. 487
(1902).
158. Of course, if the tenant caused the condition, he may not terminate.
N s. Rv. STAT. § 76-1425(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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the tenant must deliver a written notice to the landlord specifying
these acts or omissions and stating that in not less than thirty days
the tenancy will terminate unless the landlord remedies the defects
within fourteen days. If the problems are remedied within the
specified time, there may be no termination. If substantially the
same act or omission reoccurs within six months, the tenant may
terminate on a simple fourteen days' notice.
This section raises at least two unique problems.159 First, the
ambiguities inherent in section 76-1419, such as those raised by the
word "substantially", will not precisely delineate when the tenant
can exercise his rights pursuant to section 76-1425(1). In such un-
certain situations, both landlord and tenant must fumble along, not
knowing with certainty what their rights are. Second, sections
76-1419(1) and (2) are only operative if the landlord has actual
notice of the defect. Can the tenant's notice pursuant to section
76-1425 (1) also constitute the section 76-1419 notice to the landlord?
In other words, if the landlord fails to maintain screens on the win-
dows, as required by a housing code, can the tenant give him notice
of the defect, thus placing the landlord in noncompliance with sec-
tion 76-1419 (1) at the same time he elects to terminate thirty days
later? The answer should be yes. It would be unreasonable for
the tenant to send two notices to the landlord, one to inform him
of the noncompliance and of the violation of section 76-1419, and
a second one to serve as the catalyst for a section 76-1425 termina-
tion. Since the landlord will generally have at least fourteen days
to correct the problem, it is fair to require only that the tenant
send one notice.
Whereas section 76-1425(1) permits the right to terminate if
there is a material noncompliance with the rental agreement or a
noncompliance with section 76-1419 materially affecting health and
safety, section 76-1425(2) provides for damages and injunctive re-
lief, and reasonable attorney's fees if the landlord's noncompliance
is willful. 160 This should deter wrongful, and particularly heinous,
landlord noncompliance. With respect to damages, the URLTA
counterpart to this section is straight-forward.' 6 ' The NRLTA sec-
159. An additional problem may be raised by the meaning of "substantially
the same." This is discussed more fully in the text associated with
notes 213-14 infra.
160. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1425(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that these
remedies are cumulative with the termination remedy.
161. (b) Except as provided in this Act, the tenant may recover
actual damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompli-
ance by the landlord with the rental agreement or Section
2.104. If the landlord's noncompliance is willful the tenant
may recover reasonable attorney's fees.
URLTA § 4.101 (b).
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tion added the following sentence: "If the landlord's noncompli-
ance is caused by conditions or circumstances beyond his control,
the tenant may not recover consequential damages, but retains
remedies provided in section 76-1427." The thrust of this provision
is to permit a tenant to recover only the difference between the
rental value without the noncompliance and the rental value with
the noncompliance in those circumstances in which the noncompli-
ance was beyond the landlord's control. This serves as a limitation
on the landlord's liability. Any special damages, even if certain
and provable, would not be allowed.
To distinguish between damages and consequential damages is
undesirable. First, it is a difficult line to draw, and one that will
certainly lead to unfortunate disputes. Second, it seems fair to
compensate the tenant fully if he is injured as a result of the land-
lord's noncompliance, and not to compensate him only a little in
some circumstances. Third, the effort to relieve the landlord of
the consequences of certain acts of noncompliance when he is not
at fault, which would be the case when the cause of the condition
is beyond his control, is one way of allocating risk, but it is not
the URLTA way. The URLTA placed certain burdens on the land-
lord because he was the one best able to bear the loss. The NRLTA
shift is inconsistent with this position, and it will hinder uniformity
in the application of the law.
A final remedy for the tenant is to give injunctive relief. This
may prove to be an important remedy for him. In many circum-
stances, a direct judicial order that the landlord comply with his
obligations will be more costly to the landlord than a payment of
damages. In a tight housing market, there may be little difference
in rental value in the premises with and without the breach. If
this is the case, or if the breach is caused by circumstances beyond
the landlord's control, the tenant may recover nothing for a land-
lord's breach or noncompliance. Since money damages, in such
cases, will be inadequate, injunctive relief will be crucial.
Section 76-1427 introduces a new concept to Nebraska law.162 It
162. (1) If contrary to the rental agreement or section 76-1419
the landlord deliberately or negligently fails to supply running
water, hot water, or heat, or essential services, the tenant may
give written notice to the landlord specifying the breach and
may:(a) Procure reasonable amounts of hot water, running
water, heat and essential services during the period of the
landlord's noncompliance and deduct their actual and reason-
able cost from the rent;
(b) Recover damages based upon the diminution in the fair
rental value of the dwelling unit; or
(c) Procure reasonable substitute housing during the pe-
riod of the landlord's noncompliance, in which case the tenant
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provides a particular alternative battery of remedies to a tenant
denied essential services, such as heat and water.163 It is primarily
designed to get the essential services functioning when the land-
lord has deliberately or negigently failed to supply them.164  Since
it is hard to imagine a deliberate or negligent failure to supply
when the circumstances are not within the landlord's control, the
NRLTA addition to the URLTA, i.e., "This section is not intended
to cover circumstances beyond the landlord's control," is surplusage.
The section provides that the tenant give written notice to the
landlord of the noncompliance. There is no explicit grace period
in this section and the notice does not guarantee the landlord a
period of time to make repairs or to provide the service. The notice
assures the landlord that he will know what is happening and it
at least will give him a chance to remedy the situation. Once the
written notice has been given, the tenant has several remedies avail-
able to him. He may procure a reasonable amount of the essential
services and deduct the actual and reasonable costs of these
from the rent; he may recover damages based on the diminution
in the fair rental value of the dwelling; or he may procure reason-
able substitute housing during the period of the landlord's noncom-
pliance and he will be excused from paying rent during this period.
If the landlord's noncompliance is deliberate, the tenant may also
recover a limited amount of the rent spent for this substitute hous-
ing. In all events, the tenant can recover reasonable attorney's fees.
is excused from paying rent for the period of the landlord's
noncompliance.
In addition to the remedy provided in subdivisions (a) and(c), if the failure to supply is deliberate, the tenant may re-
cover the actual and reasonable cost or fair and reasonable
value of the substitute housing not in excess of an amount
equal to the periodic rent, and in any case under this subsec-
tion reasonable attorney's fees.(2) If the tenant proceeds under this section, he may not
proceed under section 76-1425 as to that breach.
(3) The rights under this section do not arise until the ten-
ant has given written notice to the landlord or if the condition
was caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of
the tenant, a member of his family, or other person on the
premises with his consent. This section is not intended to
cover circumstances beyond the landlord's control.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1427 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
163. See aLvo NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1430 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
164. Of course, the tenant may not take advantage of this section if he was
a cause of the problem. Moreover, he cannot take advantage of the
section unless the landlord is at fault. The NRLTA made this clear by
adding a last sentence to the URLTA. "[T]his section is not in-
tended to cover circumstances beyond the landlord's control." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1427 (3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Section 76-1427(1) (a) provides that the tenant may procure rea-
sonable amounts of the essential services and deduct the actual and
reasonable cost from the rent. This could lead to substantial costs
being assessed against the landlord. If a new furnace is needed, the
costs of supplying it will be high. It is submitted that this section be
interpreted reasonably. Certainly the tenant is entitled to heat,
and if the landlord deliberately or negligently fails to provide it,
the tenant should be compensated. But to force a landlord to ac-
cept a new furnace which a tenant has purchased, and then to re-
lieve a tenant of a rent obligation equal to the cost of the furnace, is
oppressive. The concept of procuring reasonable amounts of essen-
tial services would seem to connote a more temporary arrangement.
If a new furnace is needed, this is not a temporary accommodation.
In such cases, the tenant should be limited to his section 76-1425
remedies or to his other section 76-1427 remedies.
Section 76-1427(1) (c) provides that the tenant may procure sub-
stitute housing and that he is excused from paying rent during the
period of the landlord's noncompliance. If the rental house is un-
heated, the tenant should be able to leave and not be obligated
to pay rent while there is no heat. A troublesome situation will
arise if the tenant must sign another lease in order to get hous-
ing, and the first landlord then supplies heat. In this case, the
tenant may wind up obligated to both landlords. Only when the
landlord's action is deliberate, not merely negligent, will he have
to pay for the substitute housing, and even then it is unclear if
the landlord must pay for a period after he begins to.supply ser-
vices. The general thrust of this section is clear, but the details
of interpretation are complicated. It is submitted that the courts
should interpret this provision with an eye to its central purpose,
that of assuring the tenant of these crucial services and of allowing
him, if necessary, to take care of the problems himself, while at
the same time assuring the landlord that he will not be improved
out of his estate.
IV. TENANT OBLIGATIONS AND LANDLORD
REMEDIES
This section examines tenant obligations and landlord reme-
dies. 65  Since tenant obligations pursuant to a rental agreement
have been alluded to in Section II, the tenant's statutory duties
are herein examined. The landlord's remedies for tenant noncom-
pliance with either the rental agreement or the statutory obliga-
165. Certain tenant remedies are also discussed where appropriate; for ex-
ample, the tenant's remedies for abusive landlord remedial action are
highlighted.
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tions are analyzed, and the section concludes with an explication
of how the NRLTA has vitiated whatever self-help remedies the
landlord might previously have had.
A. Duty to Maintain
At common law, Nebraska tenants could neither commit active
nor permissive waste; they were responsible for "any act or omission
of duty . . . which results in permanent injury . . ."16 This was
the general rule. Notwithstanding this rule, Nebraska tenants were
not responsible for changes which improved the premises.167 Fur-
thermore, they were not liable for substantial damage caused by
an extraordinary or sudden event beyond their control. 168
The Nebraska tenants' duty to repair demised premises rested
on an obligation to avoid waste. Those courts which discussed this
duty did so in cases in which the tenant expressly covenanted to
repair the premises. 16 9 Because of this, it is uncertain what the
scope of the tenant's obligation was in the absence of such an ex-
press agreement. For example, did the tenant have an obligation
to repair damage caused by ordinary wear and tear? In Sky
Harbor Air Service v. Airport Authority of the City of Omaha, 70
the court gave an ambiguous answer. The tenant had leased cer-
tain buildings and ramps. Repairs became necessary as a result
of the normal exposure of the property to the weather. The
Nebraska Supreme Court asked if "the lessor [had] assumed the
duty that otherwise rested upon the lessee"'17 and held that the
landlord had not. It was unclear as to whether the duty "other-
wise rested" upon the tenant because that was the law and the
law implied a tenant obligation to repair ordinary wear, or because
the tenant had expressly agreed to keep the premises "in a present-
able condition" and "in good repair." Regardless, it is clear that
whatever tenant duties there were, they were only directed to re-
turning the premises to the landlord in a particular physical state.
Section 76-1421 changes the prior law by relieving the tenant
166. Hayman v. Rownd, 82 Neb. 598, 601, 118 N.W. 328, 329 (1908). See
also Bayse v. Tri-County Feed, Inc., 189 Neb. 458, 203 N.W.2d 171
(1973); Sears v. Mid City Motors, Inc., 179 Neb. 100, 136 N.W.2d 428(1965); Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75
(1918).
167. Bee Bldg. Co. v. Peters Trust Co., 106 Neb. 294, 183 N.W. 302 (1921).
168. Turner v. Townsend, 42 Neb. 376, 60 N.W. 587 (1894). See also Wattles
v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897).
169. See Bartholomew v. Skelly Oil Co., 144 Neb. 51, 12 N.W.2d 122 (1943);
Blotcky v. Gabm, 108 Neb. 275, 187 N.W. 640 (1922).
170. 174 Neb. 243, 117 N.W.2d 383 (1962).
171. Id. at 245, 117 N.W.2d at 383.
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of some of his common law repair obligations and substituting for
them other housekeeping duties. 172 Section 76-1421 (1) imposes cer-
tain public obligations on the tenant; section 76-1421(6) modifies
the law of waste. There arises a minimal duty to repair from both
these obligations. Sections 76-1421(2) to (5) impose the housekeep-
ing duties mentioned previously; they do not mandate a duty to
repair. The tenant cannot agree to do more unless such agreements
are made in the manner prescribed in section 76-1419.173 This allo-
cation of the responsibility for repairs and housekeeping is in accord
with the respective capabilities and probable expectations of all par-
ties. The modern residential tenant has neither the money, skill,
nor interest to make repairs; he legitimately expects the place in
which he lives to be maintained. The modern landlord has the
money, skill and interest that the tenant lacks. Furthermore, it
is his property, and it is appropriate that he have the duty to spend
money to repair it.
Section 76-1421 (1) provides that the tenant shall "comply with
all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable mini-
mum standards of building and housing codes materially affecting
health or safety." The language of this section is almost identical
to that of the URLTA. 174 The only important change is that the
tenant need only comply with "applicable minimum" standards
rather than with applicable provisions of the code sections. This
section imposes upon the tenant no duty to maintain or repair ex-
cept to the extent that such obligations can be inferred from the
tenant's responsibility to comply with the relevant public regula-
tions. In most instances, these sorts of duties would be minimal
since most codes impose the substantial repair obligations on the
landlord.
The official URLTA Comment to this section indicates that the
section was meant to be the converse of section 76-1419(1),175 which
172. Much of the preliminary work in the URLTA was completed in the
Model Residential Landlord Tenant Code (Tent. Draft 1969). This will
be helpful in interpreting the URLTA and the NRLTA.
The tenant is required by this section to perform and observe
enumerated obligations. Taken together, the tenant should be-
have as a reasonable owner of the dwelling unit would, except
that when deterioration of the property necessitates repair, the
landlord retains liability. The change in existing law is not
great, but it is significant.
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT CODE § 2-304, Comment.
173. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text upra.
174. "A tenant shall comply with all obligations primarily imposed upon
tenants by applicable provisions of building and housing codes mate-
rially affecting health and safety. . . ." URLTA § 3.101 (1).
175. See notes 128-38 and accompanying text supra.
654 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 4 (1975)
prescribes parallel landlord obligations. 176 By treating both land-
lord and tenant equally with respect to their public obligations, the
URLTA struck a fair balance. The NRLTA, as introduced to the
legislature, paralleled the URLTA in this balance. Major amend-
ments to section 76-1419, however, altered the parallelism dramati-
cally. As indicated previously,1 77 the landlord must only "substan-
tially" comply with public regulations, and he must comply only
after he has "notice" of the need to do so. These code-imposed ob-
ligations establish the landlord's maximum duties pursuant to sec-
tion 76-1419, but the tenant may, under certain circumstances, be
held to a higher duty under section 76-1421. For example, although
the housing code may not require the tenant to maintain the plumb-
ing fixtures, section 76-1421(4) will at least require that he keep
them clean.
Such tinkering as this with a balanced uniform act and the re-
sulting apparent advantage to landlords will cause tenant resent-
ment. Landlord-tenant relations will be better if all parties
believe that their rights and duties are fairly allocated. Vindictive
individual tenant activity is common in circumstances in which the
tenant believes that a landlord is overreaching; this same sentiment
will be aggravated among tenants as a whole when they recognize
the distortions in the NRLTA.
It would be better to have both sections similar. In comparing
the two, the tenant's section is the better drafted one. It has the
virtue of clarity and precision; the tenant who knows the law knows
what he must do. If he does not conform, he knows that he will
be subject to government and/or private sanctions. The landlord
will also be more likely to know his rights. What tenant noncom-
pliance is will be clearer to him because of the statute. This should
result in the avoidance of unnecessary litigation over whether there
has been noncompliance in a particular instance.
Section 76-1421(6) reduces the Nebraska tenant's duty not to
commit waste and his concomitant duty to repair. This section only
obligates the tenant not to "deliberately or negligently destroy, de-
face, damage, impair, or remove any part of the premises .. .,178
The connotation attached to these verbs is that the tenant must
not actively injure the property. What has traditionally been
176. "This section, the converse of Section 2.104, establishes minimum du-
ties of tenants consistent with public standards of health and safety."
URLTA § 3.101, Comment.
177. See notes 126-36 and accompanying text supra.
178. It also prohibits the tenant from "knowingly permit[ing] any person
to do so." This additional prohibition does not change the analysis of
this section.
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termed permissive waste is not prohibited. In other words, a tenant
under the NRLTA would not be responsible if he negligently over-
looked a problem, and a situation developed which injured the prop-
erty. 7 9 This is, of course, an important change. The landlord must
now be more vigilant in protecting his investment. Appropriately,
the NRLTA gives himn the capacity to be more vigilant' 80 The
change is a salutary one, for, as noted, it is the landlord who has
the means to repair; and it is no longer true, if ever it was, that
the tenant on-the-scene is better-equipped to inhibit gradual waste.
Sections 76-1421(2) to 76-1421(5) further define the tenant's
housekeeping obligations.' 81 Existing Nebraska law did not require
a tenant to keep the premises in any particular way during the
term. Now he must keep house properly. This shift in emphasis
is apparent from the language of the statute. Section 76-1421(2)
requires the tenant to place the dwelling unit in clean condition
at the end of the term. Section 76-1421 (3) requires him to dispose
of garbage in a clean and safe manner. Section 76-1421 (4) requires
him to keep plumbing fixtures as clean as possible. Section 76-
1421 (5) requires him to use certain facilities in a reasonable manner.
In none of these situations is there an implication that the tenant
repair. The duty to repair is left to the landlord; the tenant must
only act reasonably to keep the premises clean.
1 82
179. Of course, the situation described could be interpreted as negligent de-
struction. If this were the case the NRLTA would less substantially
change the prior law.
180. NED. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1423-24; 76-1432 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
181. (2) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and
uses as clean and safe as the condition of the premises permit,
and upon termination of the tenancy place the dwelling unit
in as clean condition, excepting ordinary wear and tear, as
when the tenancy commenced;
(3) Dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, rubbish, gar-
bage, and other waste in a clean and safe manner;
(4) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used
by the tenant as clean as their condition permits;
(5) Use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing,
sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and other facili-
ties and appliances including elevators in the premises.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1421(2)- (5) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
182. Subsection (1) requires that the tenant keep the area he
occupies clean and sanitary. This was not a duty recognized
at common law, except in the unlikely event that a lack of
cleanliness harmed the landlord's reversion.
Subsection (2) requires that the tenant dispose of garbage.
This requirement goes a step beyond the common law duty to
eschew waste. A common law landlord would be unable to
enforce his rights with regard to the property until the damage
was actual or imminent. This section allows landlord action
when the possible damage is still quite speculative, to insure
that protection of the landlord and other tenants-including
future tenants-is given proper consideration by the courts.
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If there is an exception to this analysis, it is section 76-1421 (2)
which additionally requires that the tenant keep the premises which
he uses in as clean and safe condition as the premises permit.183
Precisely what is meant by "safe" is unclear. 8 4 It seems appro-
priate, however, to limit its meaning so that the tenant's repair
obligations remain minimal and related to the sanitation and clean-
liness of the dwelling. This interpretation is consistent with the
history of the URLTA, which obligated the tenant to keep the
premises in a clean condition, but did not mention returning them
in this condition. 85 Additionally, this interpretation is consistent
with the policy of the NRLTA, which places special emphasis on
cleanliness and shifts major repair obligations to the landlord.
Finally, this interpretation reduces the ambiguities inherent in the
NRLTA. 8s If ambiguity were permitted to exist, it would be
unclear who was responsible for certain safety-related repairs. The
result might be that both landlord and tenant would believe that
Subsection (3) continues the cleanliness obligations, ex-
tending them to plumbing fixtures.
Subsection (4) requires the tenant to use plumbing and
electrical fixtures "properly." The tenant's rights in an urban
environment cannot be absolute, even as to the premises which
he occupies, in theory, exclusively. Since improper operation
of important fixtures tends to damage them, it is not allowed.
MODEL RFSIDENTrAL LANDLORD TENANT CODE § 2-303, Comment.
183. (2) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and
uses as clean and safe as the condition of the premises permit,
and upon termination of the tenancy place the dwelling unit
in as clean condition, excepting ordinary wear and tear, as
when the tenancy commenced.
NEE. REv. STAT. § 76-1421(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
184. Section 2-303 of the Model Residential Landlord Tenant Code required
only that the tenant "keep that part of the premises which he occupies
and uses as clean and sanitary as the conditions of the premises per-
mit."
185. "A tenant shall (2) keep that part of the premises that he occupies
and uses as clean and safe as the condition of the premises permit;..
URLTA § 3.101 (2).
186. If the tenant's obligation to keep the premises safe entailed substantial
repairs, this obligation would contradict the landlord's obligation to
keep the premises fit and habitable. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419(1) (b)
(Cum. Supp. 1974). The tenant's obligation applies to that part of the
premises that he occupies and uses. Section 76-1410 (9) provides that
"premises" include dwelling units, which are obviously a part of the
premises which the tenant occupies. Since the landlord's obligation to
keep the premises fit and habitable implies keeping them safe, his obli-
gation would overlap the tenant's responsibility for keeping what he
uses and occupies safe. A still more obvious redundancy is that the
tenant uses common areas; if he were obligated, pursuant to this sec-
tion, to keep them in repair in order to keep them safe, his duty would
overlap the landlord's duty to keep the common areas safe. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 76-1419(1) (c) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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the other were responsible, and each would, therefore, leave the
job to the other. It is preferable to avoid the ambiguity and to
be certain that the parties know where the responsibility for safety-
related repairs rests.
Section 76-1421 (7) provides that the tenant conduct himself, and
require other persons who are on the premises with his consent
to conduct themselves, in a manner that will not disturb his neigh-
bors. This has always been the existing rule, and a person who
was disturbed could always sue his neighbor who was disturbing
him.18 7 At most, this section extends the enforcement right to the
landlord.' 8 It does not directly confront the truly controversial
issue: whether a tenant who was disturbed can legitimately vacate
if his peaceful enjoyment were upset by a tenant who was disturb-
ing him? The Nebraska courts have held that the tenant who was
disturbed could not vacate, on a theory of constructive eviction,
unless the landlord directly controlled the offending tenant. 89
Does section 76-1421 (7) change this rule? Certainly it does not
do so directly. The section merely states what the tenant shall not
do; other sections give the landlord remedial power to do something
about the disturbance if he so chooses. There is no mandate that
he must do anything. Since he need not act to control an offending
tenant, he is not at fault when this tenant disturbs another. It
is, therefore, clear that the tenant who is disturbed has no explicit
claim against the landlord in these circumstances. It arguably
follows that this tenant will not be able to vacate legitimately.
It is preferable, however, to give the tenant who is disturbed
the right to terminate or to sue the landlord if the landlord fails
to control an offending tenant within a reasonable time. There
is justification for this. Prior to the NRLTA, there was an implied
warranty of quiet enjoyment, which in Nebraska did not impose
an obligation on a landlord to control a tenant who was disturbing
another tenant. First, it is submitted that this implied obligation
187. McCrory Corp. v. Durwood American, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb.
1972); Miller v. FitzGerald Dry Goods Co., 62 Neb. 270, 86 N.W. 1078
(1901).
188. A tenant who is disturbed can sue the tenant who is disturbing him
-in law or in equity-under the NRLTA. NE. REv. STAT. § 76-1405
(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
189. There will be a constructive eviction if there is a
disturbance of the tenant's possession by the landlord or by
someone under his authority, whereby the premises are ren-
dered unfit for occupancy for the purpose for which they were
demised or the tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyment
of the premises, amounts to a constructive eviction, if the ten-
ant abandons the premises within a reasonable time.
Kimball v. Lincoln Theatre Corp., 125 Neb. 677, 678, 251 N.W. 290, 291
(1933) (emphasis added).
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remains after the NRLTA's operative date, thus, potentially ex-
panding the landlord's duties beyond those outlined in the NRLTA.
Second, it is submitted that the implied warranty now requires a
landlord to control offending tenants. 190 The policy for this is
clear. The landlord is in the better position to sue, if necessary,
and he probably has more experience in dealing with offensive
tenants. The disturbing tenant is probably more willing to listen
to his landlord than to just a neighbor. Therefore, the tenant who
is disturbed by another tenant should be able, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, to exercise his section 76-1425 remedies (e.g., termina-
tion).
Section 76-1421(8) is not the counterpart to any URLTA see-
tion.191 This section provides that a tenant must comply with the
rules of any applicable condominium housing regime, cooperative
housing agreement or neighborhood association, if such rules are
not inconsistent with the landlord's rights or duties. What relation-
ship this section refers to is uncertain. It is possible that it refers
to the tenant-condominium/cooperative/association relationship.
In other words, the tenant will stand in the shoes of his landlord
vis-a-vis the condominium/cooperative/association. This interpre-
tation is unlikely, for occupancy by the owner of a condominium
or cooperative is excluded from the NRLTA's coverage, 1 92 and there
is no reason to obligate the tenant to do something when his land-
lord would not be similarly obligated. It is more probable that
the section refers to the owner-tenant relationship. From this per-
spective, the section gives the landlord a battery of remedies if the
tenant should fail to comply with the condominium/cooperative/as-
sociation rules. Its purpose is to give the landlord the means to
protect his investment. 93 It is unclear what "not inconsistent with
the landlord's rights and duties" means. Apparently, it means that
some obligations, such as an owner's duty to pay a share of the
real estate taxes, will not run to his tenant, and will, therefore, not
be enforceable by the landlord against the tenant. But what these
obligations specifically are is uncertain.
B. Duty to Comply with Rules and Regulations
A Nebraska lease under existing law could incorporate by refer-
190. See Davis, supra note 108, at 411.
191. The tenant shall abide by all by-laws, covenants, rules or reg-
ulations of any applicable condominium regime, cooperative
housing agreement, or neighborhood association not inconsist-
ent with landlord's rights or duties.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1421(8) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
192. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1408 (6) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
193. See Lonnquist & Healey, supra note 50, at 374.
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ence existing rules and regulations.194 In other words, a landlord
could bind a tenant to the "rules and regulations" of the apartment
house. There was no explicit requirement that these rules and
regulations be reasonable. This situation resulted in cases in which
the tenant was obligated to comply with a rule that he knew
nothing about. It aggravated the problem inherent in adhesion
clauses, for not only were the rules in small-print, but they were
also hidden from sight.
After the lease had been signed, the landlord could change the
rules and regulations; he did not need further consideration from
the tenant.195 However, in Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 96 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that subsequently adopted rules and
regulations, at least if they were substantial, must be consented
to by the tenant before they were binding. This was true even
though the tenant had given prior consent to the adoption of new
rules and regulations in the lease. 97
Sections 76-1410 (11) and 76-1422 permit the rental agreement to
incorporate rules and regulations by reference. Section 76-1422
limits the substance of the rules, thus avoiding the more serious
adhesion problem. It would have been of little advantage to the
tenant only to require the landlord to include the rules and regula-
tions in the lease proper. Often there would be many trivial and
technical rules, and to include them in a lease would make it even
more difficult to understand.
The rules and regulations must be for appropriate purposes,
must be reasonably related to those purposes, must be applied in
a fair manner and must be clear. Further, they must not be for
the purpose of evading the Act, and the tenant must have notice
of the rule at the time he enters the rental agreement.198  Appar-
194. Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d 280 (1970).
195. But see Lonnquist & Healey, supra note 50, at 373.
196. 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d 280 (1970). The modification would have
required the tenant to pay assessment charges after vacating but before
re-renting; clearly this was a substantial modification.
197. In the Westbrook case, the lease provided that the tenant would be sub-ject to "rules and regulations which will be adopted to govern the
manor." Id. at 661, 178 N.W.2d at 281.
198. A landlord, from time to time, may adopt rules or regula-
tions, however described, concerning the tenant's use and occu-
pancy of the premises. It is enforceable as provided in section
76-1431 against the tenant only if:
(1) Its purpose is to promote the appearance, convenience,
safety, or welfare of the tenants in the premises, preserve the
landlord's property from abusive use, or make a fair distribu-
tion of services and facilities held out for the tenants generally;(2) It is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is
adopted;
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ently, this last clause refers to notice of a particular rule or regula-
tion and not simply to notice of the existence of apartment by-
laws. The tenant is, however, deemed to have notice of a rule and
a regulation if he has reason to know that it exists.199 Thus, it
should be sufficient notice to the tenant of a "dog-on-leash" rule
if he has reason to know that there are rules in existence related
to pets. This interpretation should obviate the problems associated
with the landlord's "secreting" rules and regulations in the corpo-
rate office, while still allowing him the convenience of incorporation
by reference.
With respect to new rules and regulations adopted after the
tenant enters into the rental agreement, section 76-1422 provides
that they are only enforceable against the tenant if reasonable
notice of the adoption is given to the tenant and the new rules
or regulations do not work a substantial modification of his bargain.
These two statutory provisions are joined conjunctively. An
arguable negative inference is that only non-substantial modifica-
tions can be adopted, and even those can be adopted only if the
tenant has reasonable notice of their adoption.20 0  The NRLTA
differs from its URLTA counterpart in that the URLTA provided
that a substantial modification could be adopted if, and only if, the
tenant consented to it. 2O1 This was consistent with the Westbrook
case. A possible purpose behind the NRLTA change was to permit
certain landlord modifications without tenant consent. If this were
the purpose, it was not articulated. Rules which incorporate major
(3) It applies to all tenants in the premises in a fair man-
ner;(4) It is sufficiently explicit in its prohibition, direction, or
limitation of the tenant's conduct to fairly inform him of what
he must or must not do to comply;
(5) It is not for the purpose of evading the obligations of
the landlord; and
(6) The tenant has notice of it at the time he enters into
the rental agreement.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1422 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
199. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1413 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
200. Even with a non-substantial change, the tenant must have reasonable
notice of it. It is uncertain what "reasonable" adds to the definition
of notice, which is that from all facts and circumstances known to the
tenant at the time in question, he has reason to know something exists.
NEB. Rirv. STAT. § 76-1413 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
201. A rule or regulation adopted after the tenant enters into the
rental agreement is enforceable against the tenant if reason-
able notice of its adoption is given to the tenant and it does
not work a substantial modification of his bargain.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1422 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
URLTA section 3.102(b) provides that "if a rule or regulation is
adopted after the tenant enters into the rental agreement that works a
substantial modification of his bargain it is not valid unless the tenant
consents to it in writing."
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changes are arguably unenforceable, with or without tenant con-
sent. Apparently, the landlord must give new consideration before
the tenant will be bound by the new rule.
The NRLTA language is confusing, and it will invite unnecessary
litigation. No one will know whether a particular change is a sub-
stantial or a non-substantial modification, and both landlords and
tenants will have to guess whether a particular rule is or is not
enforceable. A preferable interpretation of section 76-1422 would
be premised on the fact that the section does not explicitly
state that a substantial rule modification will not be enforceable
under any circumstances. Such a reading would allow section 76-
1422 to be interpreted consistently with the URLTA and with prior
Nebraska law and would permit the adoption of rules and regula-
tions that bring about substantial changes, provided the tenant
has notice of the adoption of these rules and gives written consent.
This interpretation would enhance uniformity and add salutary
flexibility to the relationship between landlord and tenant. More-
over, since any rules must meet certain criteria of reasonableness
before passage, there is little danger in such an interpretation.202
C. Duty to Comply
At common law, covenants, including the tenant's obligation to
pay rent, were independent. A tenant's breach or failure to pay
rent did not mean that the landlord could terminate the tenancy
or legitimately refuse to comply with his obligations. He could do
neither. His only recourse was to sue, and, in some circumstances,
to apply self-help remedies, such as distress. Obviously, such a con-
ceptualization of the relationship, premised on the view of the lease
as a conveyance, 20 3 presented hardships to the landlord interested
in protecting his investment. The tenant could be in noncompli-
ance, and there would be nothing the landlord could do about it.
As a result of this law, it has been common practice in leases,
and often in statutory provisions, to provide that certain sorts of
tenant noncompliance will result in an automatic termination of
the lease.20 4 These lease clauses are usually viewed as forfeiture
clauses, and often they merit this perjorative classification. If a
tenant should have a two year lease containing the proviso that
if he should fail to pay his rent on the first of each month, the
estate shall terminate, then he may lose his entire estate if he is
one day late on an early month's payment. It is an unfair penalty
for such a pecadillo; and there is certainly no necessary relationship
202. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1422(1)-(6) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
203. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
204. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-569 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that tenant non-
payment may result in a termination of the leasehold.
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between the damage caused by the breach and the tenant's return
of the estate. For these reasons, Nebraska courts have been reluc-
tant to enforce forfeiture clauses and have construed such clauses
narrowly against the landlord.20 5 Unless forfeiture is expressly pro-
vided for and dearly stated, courts will not terminate the lease.20 6
Moreover, equity often dictates that the tenant be given a chance
to make the landlord whole. In line with this reasoning, Nebraska
courts have long refused to permit a forfeiture for nonpayment of
rent without a clear landlord demand for the rent,20 7 and a late
payment will often be acceptable.20 8
Section 76-1431 is the general landlord remedial section, al-
though it must be read in juxtaposition with section 76-1405 which
provides, inter alia, for landlords to receive appropriate damages
Section 76-1431 provides for termination of the tenancy, as well as
damages and injunctive relief. In many ways the section parallels
section 76-1425. The provisions relating to damages and injunctive
relief will be discussed first.
Section 76-1431(3) provides that the landlord may recover
damages and injunctive relief for a tenant's noncompliance with
either the rental agreement 20 9 or with the provisions of section 76-
1421.210 The landlord may recover regardless of the fact that the
noncompliance may not be material and may not affect health and
safety. If the tenant's noncompliance is willful, the landlord may
recover reasonable attorney's fees. This serves as a penalty to
tenants who act willfully and it encourages landlord enforcement
of tenant agreements or statutory obligations even in small cases.
The section does not expressly make these remedies cumulative
with the termination remedy. This is probably an oversight, for
in section 76-1425 (3), the tenant's parallel general remedial section,
such a remedy is expressly made cumulative.
Section 76-1431 (2) provides that if the tenant should fail to pay
rent within three days after written notice of nonpayment is given,
205. Hawthorne v. Cassidy, 179 Neb. 245, 137 N.W.2d 818 (1965); Hague v.
Sterns, 175 Neb. 1, 120 N.W.2d 287 (1963).
206. Chestnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947).
207. Farner v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W. 95 (1922). The statutory three
day notice to quit, jurisdictionally required in the existing summary
repossession statute, could serve as the demand. Haynes v. Union Inv.
Co., 35 Neb. 76, 53 N.W. 979 (1892).
208. In House v. Lewis, 108 Neb. 257, 187 N.W. 784 (1922), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that where the lease is silent as to place of pay-
ment, rent is payable on the leased premises. There can be no forfei-
ture if the payment is late because the tenant could not find the land-
lord.
209. See Section IT, A, supra.
210. See Section IV, A, supra.
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the landlord may elect to terminate the estate.211 Thus it is not
211. The landlord may waive his right to terminate a lease. He, of course,
will retain his right to sue for damages. Since the Nebraska courts
were generally reluctant to impose a forfeiture on the tenant, landlord
waivers were not uncommon. If the landlord customarily accepted rent
at a time different than that provided for in the lease, he waived his
right to strict performance. Goetz Brewing Co. v. Robinson Outdoor
Advertising Co., 156 Neb. 604, 57 N.W.2d 169 (1953). If the landlord
accepted a rent payment after rent payment default, he waived his
right to terminate. Snyder v. Hill, 153 Neb. 721, 45 N.W.2d 757 (1951).
This was true even if eviction proceedings had been initiated. Snyder
v. Hill, 153 Neb. 721, 45 N.W.2d 757 (1951); Stover v. Hazelbaker, 42
Neb. 393, 60 N.W. 597 (1894). If he accepted a rent payment, or a
nonconforming tenant performance, after a covenant breach, he also
waived his right to terminate. Chestnut v. Master Laboratories, 148
Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947); Platner Lumber Co. v. Krug Park
Amusement Co., 131 Neb. 831, 270 N.W. 473 (1936). However, if he
accepted performance of a continuing obligation, such as the monthly
duty to pay, the original acceptance would not constitute a waiver of
a subsequent breach.
The waiver mechanism provides a needed flexibility in landlord-
tenant law. The relationship is a continuing one, and a landlord may
want to give the tenant a second chance. However, he may also want
to preserve his rights if the tenant should prove recalcitrant. The sim-
ple waiver allows him to do this without the paraphernalia of writings.
Section 76-1433 codifies the law; however, it presents four potential
problems. First, section 76-1433 provides that either acceptance of rent
with knowledge of default by a tenant or acceptance of performance
by the tenant that varies from the terms of the rental agreement or
rules or regulations constitute a waiver. Does this mean the acceptance
of rent after a breach "in performance" will not be a waiver? Ne-
braska law would have found such rent acceptance a waiver. This is
desirable for if the landlord is willing to take the rent, he apparently
is willing to live with the lease. The tenant should be assured of his
right to possession if he has paid, and if the payment is accepted. It
is suggested that the language "default by tenant" refers not only to
a nonpayment of rent, but also to a default in performance. Thus, ac-
ceptance of rent will be considered a waiver. Second, section 76-1433
does not state whether an acceptance of rent after initiation of an evic-
tion suit will constitute a waiver. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
held that it would. Snyder v. Hill, 153 Neb. 721, 45 N.W.2d 757 (1951).
It is submitted that the NRLTA be interpreted to change this prior law.
Section 4.204 of the URLTA, Comment, provides that "acceptance of
unpaid rent paid after expiration of a termination notice does not con-
stitute a waiver of the termination." Admittedly, there seems little rea-
son for this interpretation, but then too there is little reasonable argu-
ment against it. In such a case, it is preferable to interpret the section
consistently with the URLTA so as to encourage uniformity. Third,
does the acceptance of a late rent payment imply a waiver of the right
to terminate for future late payments? The answer should be no. To
hold otherwise would discourage landlords from being lenient even in
a single instance. URLTA § 4.204, Comment. Of course, constant ac-
ceptance of late payments could establish a practice on which the ten-
ant would rely, and thus would be a waiver. Finally, section 76-1433
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the tenant's failure to pay rent on the due date that gives the land-
lord the right to terminate, but it is the failure to pay after this
three day grace period.212  If the tenant should make payment
within this time, the landlord may not terminate the tenancy.
Admittedly this provision will allow a tenant to delay on his rent
payment, but this should not be an undue burden on the landlord.
He will know of this contingency ahead of time, and he will be
able to cover it in his rent structure. On those occasions in which
the rent delay causes serious damages, the landlord will be able
to sue for damages pursuant to section 76-1431 (3).
Section 76-1431 (1) also provides that in addition to nonpayment
situations the landlord may terminate (1) if the tenant does not
comply with those parts of section 76-1421 materially affecting
health and safety and (2) if the tenant does not comply materially
with the rental agreement or any separate agreement. 213 In both
provides that acceptance of rent or of performance need not be a
waiver if that is agreed to after the breach has occurred. This does
not mean that the landlord cannot reassert his rights to terminate for
a "new" breach without the written consent of the tenant. See ABA
Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on
Leases, supra note 67, at 121. Instead, the troublesome language---"un-
less otherwise agreed after the breach has occurred"-only implies that
the parties cannot agree, before the waiver-constituting act, that such
an act will not be a waiver.
212. Section 4.201(b) of the URLTA provided for a fourteen day grace pe-
riod. Nebraska's three day period makes the NRLTA consistent with
prior Nebraska law, for although the landlord could terminate the ten-
ancy on the due date, NEB. Ruv. STAT. § 24-569 (Cum. Supp. 1974), he
could not repossess the property without a three day notice to quit.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-571 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
213. Section 76-1435 clarifies a problem that has haunted termination situ-
ations. In Nebraska, rent was not apportionable and, unless agreed
otherwise, it was not due until the end of the term. If the tenancy
was terminated before its normal expiration date, the landlord could
not collect for rent or for damages until the term had expired or until
rent was due under the lease. First Nat'l Bank v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,
191 Neb. 249, 214 N.W.2d 483 (1974); Bishop Cafeteria Co. v. Ford, 177
Neb. 600, 129 N.W.2d 581 (1964). This subjected the landlord to an
inordinate risk if faced with a disappearing or potentially insolvent
tenant. To avoid these problems, acceleration clauses were included in
leases. They provided that upon default, or early termination, al the
tenant's rent obligation was due immediately. Often these clauses
were unenforceable, for they were construed as penalties. The mere
sin of a delay in a single rent payment could mean that the tenant
could be immediately obligated for a term's worth of rent payments.
Section 76-1435 changes the judicial rule; it allows the landlord to
sue for rent and for damages on termination. In other words, the land-
lord can bring an immediate suit for anticipatory breach. This is con-
sistent with the NRLTA position that rent is apportionable, NzB. Rsv.
STAT. § 76-1414(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974), and that the landlord has a
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instances, the landlord must provide the tenant with a thirty day
notice of his intent to terminate and he must delineate the acts
or omissions which serve as justification for the termination. If
the tenant remedies the situation or pays damages within fourteen
days, there will be no termination. This statutory grace period is
new to Nebraska though it is not a surprising development. It
parallels the common law demand requirement in nonpayment situ-
ations and reflects the judicial reluctance to enforce forfeitures.
The purpose of the statute is to assure that the noncompliance is
remedied and that the landlord is compensated; it is not to penalize
the tenant for error.
If substantially the same breach occurs within six months of
the former breach, the landlord need not provide such a grace
period. In this case, the landlord must give the tenant at least
fourteen days' written notice, again specifying the breach, in order
to terminate the tenancy. What "substantially the same" means
may be difficult to determine. This point is best illustrated by two
hypothetical situations. In one case, the tenant fails to dispose of
garbage; in the second case, the same tenant fails to keep his apart-
ment safe. Has the tenant again committed substantially the same
noncompliance? The answer would probably be no. Section 76-
1431 (1) requires written notice of the breach, specifying the acts
or omissions. The purport of this is not only to let the tenant use
his own judgment about whether he should remedy the problem
or risk termination (if he believes he is not in noncompliance), but
it is also to put him on guard that the landlord will not necessarily
tolerate the same act or omission again. With this second purpose
in view, the question of whether the tenant's second act or omission
is substantially the same as the first should be answered by asking
and answering the question: Would a reasonable tenant know that
the landlord would not tolerate a non-safe apartment from his read-
ing of a notice which complained of not properly disposing of the
garbage? Although the point is debatable, it is submitted that the
answer is no.
A further troublesome aspect of this section is that the landlord
may terminate the tenancy for a material noncompliance with a
separate agreement. The problems inherent in this section have
been discussed above.
duty to mitigate. The damages to which the landlord would usually be
entitled are the difference between the rent specified in the lease and
the fair rental value over the remainder of the term. Finally, if the ten-
ant's noncompliance which resulted in the termination was willful, the
landlord may recover attorney's fees.
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If the tenant had acted willfully in any of the circumstances
enumerated above, the landlord may be entitled to attorney's fees.
This provision is new to Nebraska law. Again, it serves to penalize
tenants who act in a willfully wrong manner and it encourages
landlords to sue to enforce their rights.
D. Duty to Grant Access
In Nebraska, a tenant's home was his castle. The tenant was
entitled to maximum privacy; he could exclude anyone, including
the landlord, from the premises for whatever reason he chose,
reasonable or not.214 Inter alia, the tenant could bring an action
for trespass,215 or an injunction action for a continuing trespass. 21 6
In a few instances, the common law implied a right in the landlord
to enter on the premises to claim rent, to levy a distress or to
comply with certain police regulations. 21 7 Moreover, if the land-
lord had expressly agreed to provide particular services to the
tenant, the courts might imply a right of entry to permit him to
provide the services. As a practical matter and to avoid risk
and ambiguity, landlords often reserved in the lease a right to enter.
Section 76-1423 and its corresponding remedial section 76-1438 (1)
reverse the existing rule.21 8 The landlord is given reasonable
access rights, but he is explicitly enjoined from harassing the tenant
in the exercise of these rights. Section 76-1423 (1) provides that
the tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to his landlord's
request to enter if the landlord wishes to enter for what are con-
sidered valid reasons.21 9 This change is appropriate in the 1970's.
214. Peterson v. Vak, 169 Neb. 441, 100 N.W.2d 44 (1959); Vance v. Hender-
son, 141 Neb. 766, 4 N.W.2d 833 (1942).
215. Maas v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 167 Neb. 124, 91
N.W.2d 409 (1958); Peterson v. Vak, 160 Neb. 450, 70 N.W.2d 436(1955).
216. Fenster v. Isley, 143 Neb. 888, 11 N.W.2d 822 (1943).
217. 1 AM ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.38 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
218. This section substantially changes the common law where the
tenant's right to exclusive possession, even as against the land-
lord, was absolute. Many cases have found an implied right
to access when the landlord covenants in a lease agreement
or separately to perform some service on the premises, but the
very fact that the tenant seriously raises the issue [of wrong-
ful access] attests to the heartiness of the strict rule.
MODEL REsIDmENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT CODE § 2-404, Comment.
219. These reasons are
to inspect the premises, make necessary or agreed repairs, dec-
orations, alterations, or improvements, supply necessary or
agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or
actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contrac-
tors.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1423 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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The tenant's home is not his castle; the notion that he can keep
everyone away (for whatever reason) does not take into account
the complexity and interrelatedness of urban dwellings. It is un-
likely that any tenant truly thinks of his dwelling unit as a castle.
It is not unduly burdensome to require that any refusal to allow
t'he landlord to enter be based on reasonable grounds. Moreover,
since the landlord has increased obligations imposed on him under
the statute, it is sensible to give him access in order to comply with
these obligations. This rationale is akin to that used by earlier
courts to imply a right to enter in circumstances in which the land-
lord had agreed, in the lease, to provide specified services. For
example, if he must repair, he must have the right to enter in order
to repair.
The landlord shall give the tenant at least one day's notice of
his intent to enter and he must enter only at reasonable times and
for specified reasons. One day is short notice; the URLTA counter-
part section provided for two.220 Notwithstanding the above notice
requirements, the landlord may enter immediately in the following
situations: if there is an emergency; if the tenant has abandoned
the premises; 221 or if entry is "reasonably necessary" during a
tenant's absence which exceeds seven days.2 22 Finally, the landlord
need not give the one day notice if it is impracticable to do so.
As to when it is "impracticable" to give notice, the courts should
be strict in making such a determination. There would be great
potential for harassment if landlords could enter, even for legiti-
mate reasons, without notice. For example, if the landlord operates
a large number of units, it may be inconvenient for him to give
a notice before each entry. Nevertheless, the tenant is entitled to
privacy and to fair warning of reasonable entry; therefore, such
an inconvenience should not constitute impracticability. 223
The other exceptions to the general notice rule raise the ques-
tions of what is "an emergency," what is "reasonably necessary,"
and what is "an abandonment" under the NRLTA. An "emer-
gency" and a "reasonably necessary" case should be interpreted as
a situation in which a landlord has to enter so as to avoid perma-
220. URLTA § 3.103 (c).
221. The landlord may also enter if the tenant surrenders. It is unfortunate
that this archaic property language was introduced. It is analyzed as
being the rough equivalent of an abandonment. The landlord may also
enter pursuant to court order. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1423 (4) (Cum.
Supp. 1974).
222. NEs. REv. STAT. § 76-1432(2) (Cure. Supp. 1974).
223. See Note, supra note 42, at 123.
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nent damage to the unit.2 2 4 The landlord must, of course, act in
good faith in such a situation. The NRLTA policy is to encourage
a landlord to take care of his property. To subject him to liability
if he enters in good faith would defeat this policy. This is particu-
larly true in those situations that are thought to be emergencies,
for a landlord might never know for sure if there were a true
emergency until he entered. For example, the landlord may
honestly believe that the sound of dripping water may imply some-
thing seriously wrong with the plumbing; if he entered and he were
wrong, he should not be held to have violated section 76-1423.
In order to interpret "abandonment" under the NRLTA, it is
necessary to look at its traditional interpretation. The question of
abandonment depended on the subjective intent of the tenant.2 2 5
Nebraska accepted this articulation of the concept, but the Ne-
braska Supreme Court relied heavily on objective facts in order
to infer the intent.22 6 Section 76-1423 does not define abandon-
ment. However, section 76-1432(3) provides that abandonment
means a total absence from the premises, without notice, for thirty
days or for a rental period, whichever is less. 227 Presumably, an
absence of a lesser period could also be an abandonment, provided
there was the requisite intent. Contrary to the interpretation of
"emergency" and "reasonably necessary" used above, it is submit-
ted that if the landlord in good faith misjudges the facts as to
abandonment, he should still be held responsible for his improper
entry. This would reverse the Nebraska rule.228
This suggested interpretation supports the tenant's interest in
privacy and is not unfair to the landlord. He can still enter without
notice if he believes there is an emergency and his entry is per-
missible as being reasonably necessary if the tenant is absent for
more than seven days. These provisions should furnish him with
the means of protecting his investment. If the tenant should refuse
lawful access, section 1438 (1) provides that the landlord may obtain
injunctive relief to compel access, or he may terminate the agree-
ment.22 9 The landlord's right to terminate may lead to unduly
224. Hearings on Nebraska Residential Landlord Tenant Act Before the Ju-
diciary Committee, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. 43 (February 13, 1973).
225. In Mathiesen v. Bloomfield, 184 Neb. 873, 173 N.W.2d 29 (1969), the
trial court held that there had been no intent to abandon, and, there-
fore, no abandonment. The supreme court reversed, however, primar-
ily relying on the tenant's removal to Lincoln.
226. Langemeier, Inc. v. Pendgraft, 178 Neb. 250, 132 N.W.2d 880 (1965).
227. The URLTA did not define "abandonment" in any way.
228. 178 Neb. 250, 132 N.W.2d 880 (1965).
229. The obverse of this section is section 76-1438 (2), which assures that
the landlord will respect the tenant's privacy. If the landlord enters
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harsh results, and it should be permitted cautiously. The courts
should be vigilant to avoid forfeitures. For example, if the tenant
does not know that the landlord could enter to decorate the apart-
ment, after he gives appropriate notice, it would be harsh to allow
the landlord to terminate the estate because of the tenant's refusal
to grant him entry. Such a consequence would not necessarily
relate to the true damages. Finally, the landlord is entitled to
damages and to attorney's fees. This last is to encourage landlords
to sue for the particularly important rights related to possession
and access.
E. Duty to Use Properly
In Nebraska, the tenant could use leased premises for any lawful
purpose not inconsistent with the lease terms; and, since courts
were reluctant to limit the tenant's use, restrictive clauses in the
lease were construed narrowly.230 Of course, if the clause was
valid, the landlord had a remedy for breach. 231  Section 76-1424
changes this rule by restricting it. Unless it is agreed to the con-
trary, the tenant shall occupy his dwelling unit only as a dwelling
unit. This is consistent with the normal expectations of the parties
in the modern residential environment, and is, therefore, a desirable
shift in emphasis.
What if the tenant elects to operate a small business, such as
a beauty parlor, in the basement? Section 76-1424 provides that
the tenant shall use the unit "only" as a dwelling unit. Section
76-1410(3) defines a dwelling unit as a structure that is used as
a home, residence or sleeping place. The statutory language does
not answer the posed question, for to require use only as a residence
could include the operation of an incidental business. Since it is
likely that a tenant who could operate such a business legally (i.e.,
unlawfully, or harasses the tenant by repeated demands, the tenant can
obtain injunctive relief or terminate the agreement. He can also re-
cover actual damages. In no event will the actual damages awarded
be less than one month's rent. In addition, reasonable attorney's fees
may be given. The liquidated damages provision is to assure that the
landlord is not tempted to interfere with the tenant's privacy because
he believes there will be no damages, or because he believes the tenant
will not be able to prove them. The provision for attorney's fees is
to encourage the tenant to protect important privacy rights even when
there is not much money at stake.
230. Bee Bldg. Co. v. Peters Trust Co., 106 Neb. 294, 183 N.W. 302 (1921);
Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co. v. Philbin, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 340, 96 N.W. 487
(1902); Herpolsheimer v. Funke, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 471, 95 N.W. 688
(1901); Miller v. FitzGerald Dry Goods Co., 62 Neb. 270, 86 N.W. 1078
(1901).
231. See Hayward Bros. v. Ramge, 33 Neb. 836, 51 N.W. 229 (1892).
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under the zoning law) would anticipate no problem with his land-
lord, it is appropriate for the courts to construe this provision liber-
ally, and to allow legal incidental business uses by the tenant.
No explicit remedy is provided for a tenant's misuse of the
premises. The landlord can certainly sue for damages or injunctive
relief;23 2 however, presumably he cannot terminate the tenancy.
This extreme remedy is provided only for a noncompliance with
section 76-1421 or for a noncompliance with the rental agreement.23
It is arguable that this result is unfortunate, for misuse of the
premises can be as serious as a breach of the rental agreement.
Nevertheless, it is desirable to keep the remedy of termination with-
in some boundaries, and the remedy of injunction should protect
the landlord's interest.
In regard to the tenant's continued use of the premises, section
76-1424 provides that the rental agreement may require that the
tenant notify the landlord of any anticipated extended absence in
excess of seven days. This is not a truly new provision, for even
before the NRLTA, parties could agree to such a clause. What the
clause may suggest is that the tenant cannot bind himself to notify
the landlord of absences of less than seven days. Such an interpre-
tation is appropriate. First, there would be little reason for this
section unless it had such a negative inference. Second, since the
consequences for failure to notify may be severe, they should not
be available for a landlord to use in situations in which the tenant
merely leaves for the weekend.
In addition to this negative inference, the section seems to be
a legislative invitation to use this type clause in the rental agree-
ment. It will serve several purposes. First, it will clarify for the
landlord the significance of an absence; from the landlord's point of
view, he will not have to guess if there has been an abandonment.
Second, since the landlord has the right to enter when reasonably
necessary during such an extended absence even when he does not
have notice, the notice provision will tip him off as to the appro-
priate times to exercise these rights. Although many vacations are
for more than a week, the problems presented to the tenant by
complying with a notice requirement are minimal.2 34 Moreover,
the notice requirement is operative only if it is in the rental agree-
ment, and the tenant will hopefully know what he is committing
himself to do.
232. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1431(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
233. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1431 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
234. Davis, supra note 190, at 404 criticized this seven day provision in an
era of two week vacations.
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If the tenant should willfully fail to give the necessary notice,
section 76-1432(1) provides that the landlord may recover actual
damages. The negative inference may be that if the tenant non-
willfully fails to send the notice, the landlord will have no remedy.
This is arguably consistent with section 76-1405(2), which provides
that all rights will be enforceable by action "unless the provision
declaring it specifies a different and limited effect. '2
35
It is submitted that this interpretation be adopted. If this were
not the proper interpretation, there would be an irresolvable con-
flict between the general remedial section and this one. Section
76-1431(3) provides that the landlord is entitled to damages if there
is a breach of the rental agreement, and the notice clause would
be part of the agreement. If landlords were to be entitled to
damages for a nonwillful breach, they certainly would be liable
for a willful breach and section 76-1432(1) would be superfluous.
This point is particularly clear because if section 76-1431(3) dam-
ages were allowed, the landlord would be entitled to attorney's fees
if the breach were willful; section 76-1432(1) does not provide for
attorney's fees in these cases. It thus seems apparent that damages
for a tenant's noncompliance with the notice requirement are
covered by 76-1432 (1) only.
Since the concept of such a notice is novel, and giving such notice
may easily be overlooked in the era of two week-or-more vacations,
this limitation on the remedy is a good result. Admittedly, this
may result in uncompensated damage to the landlord, but such
damage can be minimized. If the tenant is in fact absent for the
requisite time, the landlord can enter to protect his interests when
reasonably necessary.2 36 All the suggested interpretation does is
to force him to keep an eye on his property, and not rely on the
tenant's notice. Moreover, in case of emergency, the landlord can
enter to prevent harm to his property; and if he enters in good
faith, he will not be liable should there not be an emergency.
235. See note 10.
236. As has been noted, in notes 214-29 and accompanying text, section 76-
1432 (2) changes the Nebraska rule by permitting the landlord to enter
the premises at times reasonably necessary during any tenant absence
of more than seven days. This means that if the tenant is gone for
more than seven days, the landlord can enter, if it is reasonably neces-
sary, on the second day. One purpose of the suggested notice provision
is to let the landlord know when this can be done. This change assures
that the landlord will be able to take care of the apartment in the ab-
sence of the tenant. Also, as noted, when it is "reasonably necessary"
to enter should be interpreted as necessary to prevent permanent in-jury to the premises. The landlord's good faith should excuse a mis-
take if permanent injury to the property is at stake. Good faith
should not be an excuse if mere abandonment--and therefore only
temporary monetary loss-is the reason for the landlord's entry.
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A final problem for the landlord is whether to enter when there
appears to be an abandonment. Before 1969, in Nebraska, if the
tenant abandoned during the term, the landlord was under no duty
to attempt to re-let. He could sit back, wait for the end of the
term and collect the rent due.237 However, as has been noted, rent
was not apportionable 238 and was due at the end of the term.239
This could mean that a landlord who did wait to re-let might risk
either not finding the tenant or finding him insolvent. In some
jurisdictions, 240 this situation was aggravated by the rule that if
the landlord tried to re-let abandoned premises he was deemed to
accept the surrender, and he was precluded from even a late
recovery. In Nebraska, re-letting after an abandonment was not
considered the acceptance of the surrender, but the rent collected
from the new tenant was on behalf of the abandoning tenant.241
In the 1969 case of Bernstein v. Seglin,242 the Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed this rule. The court held that when a tenant
abandoned leased premises, the landlord had a duty to mitigate
damages and must enter and attempt to re-let. The broad language
of the case justifies this broad statement of the rule.243 Section
76-1432(3) restates the Bernstein position. The first sentence
237. [T]he landlord may in such case, at his election, relet the premises
upon the abandonment thereof by the tenant, in which case the meas-
ure of his damage will be the agreed rental less the amount realized on
account of such reletting; or he may permit the premises to remain va-
cant until the end of the term, and recover his rent in accordance with
the terms of the lease. Merrill v. Willis, 51 Neb. 162, 164, 70 N.W. 914,
(1897), citing Hayward Bros. v. Ramge, 33 Neb. 836, 51 N.W. 229
(1892). See also Johnston v. Jackson, 129 Neb. 545, 262 N.W. 19
(1935); Prucha v. Coufal, 91 Neb. 724, 136 N.W. 1019 (1912); Hayward
Bros. v. Ramge, 33 Neb. 836, 51 N.W. 229 (1892).
238. First Nat'l Bank v. Omaha Nat'1 Bank, 191 Neb. 249, 214 N.W.2d 483
(1974); Bishop Cafeteria Co. v. Ford, 177 Neb. 600, 129 N.W.2d 581
(1964). See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
239. 191 Neb. 249, 214 N.W.2d 483 (1974).
240. See generally AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.99 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
241. Merrill v. Willis, 51 Neb. 162, 70 N.W. 914 (1897). It should also be
noted, that if the landlord entered the premises, in good faith, after
what he believed was an abandonment, he would only be responsible
for a technical violation. Langemeier v. Pendgraft, 178 Neb. 250, 132
N.W.2d 880 (1965).
242. 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969).
243. Arguments for a more narrow interpretation would be based on the
following facts of this particular case. It was in a commercial setting;
the court relied on Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119
(1965), which could be interpreted as a contracts case and not
a lease abandonment case. And finally, in Waite Lumber Co. v.
Nasid Bros., Inc., 189 Neb. 10, 200 N.W.2d 119 (1972), the court cited
Bernstein for the more limited proposition that a landlord only had the
duty to accept a profferred new tenant.
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clearly provides that if the tenant abandons, the landlord shall take
immediate possession and shall make reasonable efforts to rent it
at a fair rental.244 This is consistent with the landlord's section
76-1405 obligation to mitigate damages.
There is no explicit section 76-1432(3) penalty for a landlord's
failure to mitigate. The URLTA counterpart section provided that
if the landlord did not use reasonable efforts to re-let, the tenancy
was deemed terminated from the date the landlord had notice of
the abandonment. 245 The importance of the fact that section 76-
1432(3) does not include such an explicit termination date may be
dramatic. 246 The landlord might sue for the rent and the tenant
would have to defend. Several problems would arise. First, from
what date would the tenant be relieved of a rent obligation. The
NELTA offers no guidance. Second, who should have the burden
of proving reasonable or unreasonable efforts to mitigate. The
URLTA language suggests that the landlord has the burden,
247
while prior Nebraska law was that the tenant had this burden.
248
Does the NRLTA deletion of this clause imply that the prior
Nebraska rule remains the law? It is submitted that the deletion
should not be construed as implying this. The landlord is in the
best position to know if he has adequately tried to re-let; the tenant
will have no certain way of knowing. The landlord should, there-
fore, have the burden of proving that he did what he was supposed
to do. Moreover, such an interpretation would tend to make the
law uniform.
This section creates other problems. If the landlord should re-
let, but for less rent than in the prior tenancy, it is unclear whether
244. Section 4.203 (c) of the URLTA provides that "if the tenant abandons
the dwelling unit, the landlord shall make reasonable efforts to rent
it at a fair rental ..... " In NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1432(3) (Cum. Supp.
1974), it is provided that "if the tenant abandons the dwelling unit,
the landlord shall take immediate possession and shall make reasonable
efforts to rent it at a fair rental .... "
There is no apparent significance to the language difference in this
first sentence. The NRLTA should not be read to endorse landlord
entry beyond the rights afforded him in other sections of the NRLTA.
245. If the landlord fails to use reasonable efforts to rent the
dwelling unit at a fair rental or if the landlord accepts the
abandonment as a surrender, the rental agreement is deemed
to be terminated by the landlord as of the date the landlord
has notice of the abandonment.
URLTA § 4.203 (c).
246. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1432(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides only that "if
the landlord rents the dwelling unit for a term beginning prior to the
expiration of the rental agreement, it is deemed to be terminated as of
the date the new tenancy begins."
247. This conclusion is inferred from the language of section 4.203 (c) of
the URLTA. See note 245 supra.
248. 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969).
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he can collect the difference from the prior tenant. Since rent is
apportionable, and since the tenancy is deemed to terminate on the
date the new tenancy begins, it is arguable that he is not entitled
to the difference. However, section 76-1405 provides that the land-
lord is to be awarded appropriate damages. This should be the dif-
ference between the rent due and the rent collected. The landlord
should not suffer injury because he mitigates. Any other rule
would discourage him from trying to rent the premises in a declin-
ing market.
The NRLTA improves its URLTA counterpart by offering a safe-
harbor interpretation of abandonment in section 76-1432(3). The
definition of abandonment was not included in the URLTA. It has
always been a confusing issue because its resolution turns on the
tenant's intent.249 Since this intent could at best be inferred by
the landlord, he would never know for sure if there had been an
abandonment. In section 76-1432(3), an absence without notice for
one full rental period or thirty days, whichever is less, shall
automatically constitute an abandonment.250 This adds some salu-
tary certainty to the law both for landlords and for tenants. As
indicated, this is a safe-harbor, and there is always the possibility
of showing a common law, tenant-intent abandonment.251 Further-
more, as has been noted,252 the NRLTA provides the landlord with
additional protection by allowing him to enter, when reasonably
necessary, when the tenant is gone for an extended period of time.
The landlord can at least enter to protect his property from
permanent injury; and if he acts in good faith, he will be immune
from suit.
F. Remedy for Hold-Over
A periodic tenancy is one which runs for set periods of time
(e.g., month-to-month or week-to-week) and requires a notice to
terminate.25 3 A six month notice was required to terminate a year-
249. 178 Neb. 250, 132 N.W.2d 880 (1965).
250. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 1432(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that "total ab-
sence from the premises without notice to landlord for one full rental
period or thirty days, whichever is less, shall constitute abandon-
ment."
251. But see Lonnquist & Healey, supra note 50, at 384.
252. See notes 218-29 and accompanying text supra.
253. A tenancy for an indefinite period is a tenancy at will, and it requires
no timed notice to terminate. Sage v. Shaul, 159 Neb. 543, 67 N.W.2d
921 (1953). However, if rent payments were due at specified times,
the tenancy was periodic, the period being the time between rent pay-
ments. See Farley v. McKeegan, 48 Neb. 237, 67 N.W. 161 (1896).
Oral leases are, of course, binding in Nebraska for periods up to one
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to-year tenancy in Nebraska.2 5 4 For a periodic tenancy, a notice
(which could be oral) equivalent to the length of the rental period
was required.25 5  Section 76-1437(1) and 76-1437(2) codify these
general rules, providing for termination after written notice. 2 56 As
before, the landlord, or the tenant, may terminate these periodic
tenancies for whatever legitimate reason he chooses. 257
In the event a tenant stayed beyond the termination date, he
was a hold-over tenant. The landlord had the option of treat-
ing him as a trespasser, suing him for damages or restitution, or
holding him to another term.25 8  A tenancy created in this way
was considered new, although it was subject to the terms of the
original agreement.2 59 Such a tenancy was a periodic tenancy, its
period being equal to the term of the prior lease.260 This new term
necessitated the giving of the requisite notice to terminate it. 26 1 In
no event could the new period be for more than a year.
The theory behind affording this option to the landlord was that
the tenant, by holding over, was presumed to want to stay for an
additional term. If the landlord consented to his staying, it was
presumed that both intended a new term. The presumption was
rebuttable, but it was difficult to do so. 262 The tenant's good faith
was not relevant, and only objective facts were considered ma-
terial.263 In an agrarian period, it made sense to have a hold-over
tenant stay through a complete planting cycle; otherwise, the new
tenant, who would get occupancy late, would not have the time
to go through the complete cycle. This severe consequence for
holding-over tenants, i.e., requiring them to stay a full term, en-
couraged all to leave on time, and this was to the ultimate advan-
tage of all tenants and landlords. In more modem times, to require
year. NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-105 (Reissue 1974). Schickedantz v.
Rincker, 75 Neb. 312, 106 N.W. 441 (1905).
254. Fenster v. Isley, 143 Neb. 888, 11 N.W.2d 822 (1943).
255. Alloway v. Aiken, 146 Neb. 714, 21 N.W.2d 495 (1946).
256. The time periods required are seven days in the week-to-week case,
and thirty days for a month-to-month. Sections 4.301 (a) and (b) of
the URLTA suggested ten and sixty days respectively.
257. Note, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Facilitation
of or Impediment to Reform Favorable to the Tenant?, 15 Wm. & MAnY
L. REV. 845, 891-94 (1974).
258. Bradley v. Slater, 50 Neb. 682, 70 N.W. 258 (1897).
259. See Wright v. Barclay, 151 Neb. 94, 36 N.W.2d 645 (1949); Krull v.
Rose, 88 Neb. 655, 130 N.W. 272 (1911).
260. Montgomery v. Willis, 45 Neb. 434, 63 N.W. 794 (1895); But see Lonn-
quist & Healey, supra note 50, at 385 n.311.
261. Barnes v. Davitt, 160 Neb. 595, 71 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Critchfield v.
Remley, 21 Neb. 178, 31 N.W. 687 (1887).
262. West v. Landgren, 74 Neb. 105, 103 N.W. 1057 (1905).
263. Z0 Neb. 682, 70 N.W. 258 (1897).
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a tenant to stay for an entire new term (e.g., a year) simply be-
cause he held-over for a period as short as a day would too severely
and too arbitrarily penalize the hold-over tenant.
Section 76-1437 (3) greatly reduces the punitive potential of the
prior law. If the tenant holds over, the landlord may bring an
action for restitution and damages, or the landlord may hold the
tenant to a new month-to-month tenancy at a maximum.26 4 This
reduces the punitive impact of the prior law and is consistent with
the probable beliefs of all parties. On the other hand, if the
tenant's hold-over is willful and not in good faith, the landlord is
entitled to three months' periodic rent or three times the actual
damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees.265
In some ways, this is more severe than prior law, for the tenant
wrongfully holding-over does not even get an unwanted tenancy
for his money. If constitutional, this section should furnish an ef-
fective mechanism for encouraging prompt tenant action in vacat-
ing. This would be to the benefit of all.
G. Remedy of Self-Help
The common law provided landlords with certain self-help reme-
dies for a tenant's breach. Nebraska has rejected them. Sections
76-1434, 76-1436, and 76-1430, with the minor modifications, codify
existing Nebraska law.
At common law the landlord had a right of distraint. On a ten-
ant's rent default, the landlord could seize all movable chattel on
the demised property. Traditionally, the landlord had no right to
sell the property; he could only hold it until he was paid. Later
he was afforded the right to sell the chattel to cover his losses.
This common law remedy has not been popular in this country,
and it has not been adopted in Nebraska. 2 6
264. If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord's con-
sent after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or
its termination, the landlord may bring an action for posses-
sion.... If the landlord consents to the tenant's continued
occupancy, subsection (4) of section 76-1414 applies.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1437(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974). NEB. REv. STAT. §
76-1414(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) then provides that "the tenancy shall
be week-to-week in case of a roomer who pays weekly rent, and in
all other cases month-to-month."
265. [A]nd if the tenant's holdover is willful and not in good
faith the landlord, in addition, may recover an amount not
more than three months' periodic rent or threefold the actual
damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and reason-
able attorney's fees.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1437(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
266. In many instances tenants have agreed in the lease to a lien (analagous
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Although the common law distraint was not adopted, often the
tenant would agree in the lease to a landlord's lien against his prop-
erty, and to the landlord's right to enter to enforce the lien. More-
over, Nebraska did incorporate the underlying policies of distraint
in a statute which provided the landlord with a lien against the
tenant's property for rent due and a right to detain the tenant's
property.26 7 In 1972, in Deilan v. Levine,26 8 a federal court sum-
marily held that the Nebraska landlord lien statute was unconstitu-
tional. The language was plenary, and on its face, the court ap-
peared to hold the entire statutory scheme invalid. However, the
gravamen of the decision was that the statutory scheme permitted a
taking without due process of law. In other words, there was no
hearing as to the legitimacy of the landlord's claims before the land-
lord's taking. If the holding were limited in this way, the Nebraska
landlord could still constitutionally have a lien against the tenant's
property for rent due even though he could not personally detain
the property to enforce it.
At common law, landlords, with a legal right to possession, could
retake possession if they acted with no more force than was
necessary. If they acted forcibly, their actions might be criminal.
In many jurisdictions,269 such forcible entry would constitute a tort.
In 1974, in Bass v. Boetel & Co., 270 the Nebraska Supreme Court
denied landlords this right. Even if the retaking could be done
peaceably, the opportunities for violence and abuse were substan-
tial, and the Nebraska Supreme Court believed it desirable to
avoid the risk. Moreover, the court observed that there was a
speedy and efficient summary repossession statute available to pro-
tect the landlord's rights. The channeling of landlord-tenant dis-
putes through the judicial process was an additional goal of the
decision. The fact that the landlord relied on a lease clause for
his permission to re-enter, rather than on a common law right, was
irrelevant.
Thus, the state of Nebraska law was surprisingly modern. All
forms of self-help were denied; the fact that the landlord could
act peaceably was not an excuse for his re-entry; and the fact that
the tenant might have agreed to the landlord's using self-help was
to the distraint right) against their property. The courts have con-
strued these clauses narrowly. Thorstensen v. Coxsee, 78 Neb. 40, 110
N.W. 567 (1907); Webster v. Bates Mach. Co., 64 Neb. 306, 89 N.W. 789(1902); Brown v. Nielson, 61 Neb. 675, 86 N.W. 498 (1901).
267. NEi. REv. STAT. §§ 41-124-26 (Reissue 1974).
268. 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972).
269. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961).
270. 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974).
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no defense for the landlord. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently
stated this position in the following manner:
Self-help, relating to the repossession of real estate, has long been
contrary to the public policy of Nebraska and is not to be condoned.
The lockout herein was unlawful. The right of a landlord legally
entitled to possession to dispossess a tenant without legal process
is the subject of an annotation .... "An increasing number of jur-
isdictions uphold what seems to be the modern doctrine that a land-
lord otherwise entitled to possession must, on the refusal of the
tenant to surrender the leased premises, resort to the remedy given
by law to secure it; otherwise he would be liable in damages for
using force or deception to regain possession."'271
Prior to passage of the NRLTA, all forms of landlord self-help
were impermissible, and whether a landlord lien could legitimately
give a creditor priority was uncertain.
Following existing law, section 76-1434(2) abolishes distraint.
Section 76-1434(1) clarifies the issue of a landlord's lien by pro-
viding that a lien or security interest on behalf of the landlord is
unenforceable. This probably means unenforceable by a court in
a proper lien foreclosure proceeding, as well as unenforceable by
the landlord before a hearing. Nebraska law is, therefore, extended
a little. As. noted previously,272 it was arguable that the Deizan
case simply condemned the method of lien enforcement, and not
the existence of the lien. Several arguments support the position
that Nebraska law has been extended to condemn the existence of
the lien. First, the language of the statute is not self-limiting; it
clearly states the lien is "not enforceable," and this apparently
means by anyone. Second, the NRLTA is different from its URLTA
counterpart. Section 4.205(2) of the URLTA provided that a lien
would still be enforceable if perfected before the effective date of
the URLTA.2 7 3  The apparent intent of this section was to allow
at least some liens to be enforceable. Nebraska's deletion of this
can be interpreted as a refusal to draw such fine distinctions. No
lien can be effective in any way. A third argument is that there
is no good reason for giving a landlord a statutory priority. Like
any businessman, he provides services and he is promised payment.
Whatever historical reasons there might have been affording him
such a priority are indefensible today. He should take his chances
with all the other businessmen who provide services to the tenant.
271. Id. at 737-38, 217 N.W.2d at 807.
272. See note 268 and accompanying text supra.
273. Section 4.205 (a) of the URLTA provides that "[a] lien or security in-
terest on behalf of the landlord in the tenant's household goods is not
enforceable unless perfected before the effective date of this Act."
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Section 76-1436 extends the Bass case in a manner consistent
with the rationale on which the decision was based. Landlords are
not to take the law into their own hands under any circumstances.
Among the self-help methods which the landlord is prohibited from
using are the termination or interruption of important utility ser-
vices.274  The tenants in Bass were permitted to prove actual
damages; the NRLTA would assure the tenant these same reme-
dies.2 75 Moreover, section 76-1430 would assure the tenant of ad-
ditional rights. If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the
tenant from the premises or willfully and wrongfully diminishes
services, the tenant may recover possession, as he could before, or
terminate the rental agreement, as he could before. In either case,
he can recover an amount equal to three months' periodic rent as
liquidated damages and reasonable attorney's fees. This NRLTA
section differs from its URLTA counterpart, for the latter section
allowed as alternative damages threefold the actual damages, if
such a figure were greater than the three months' periodic rent.2
76
It is possible that the URLTA provision would not be permissible
in Nebraska because it might be a penalty. If that were the case,
the liquidated damage clause might be the only way to assure the
tenant of compensation. But it does have its disadvantages. As
a liquidated damages clause, it might set both the maximum and
minimum recovery. If this were the case, the tenant would be pre-
cluded from recovering actual damages in excess of the liquidated
amount. However, this conclusion is not necessarily mandated. It
would be preferable to allow the tenant appropriate actual damages
if he could prove them, and if not, the liquidated damages clause
would prevail. This would assure the tenant that he would at least
be compensated, and it would make the NRLTA more consistent
with the URLTA.
274. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1427 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides remedies for the
tenant if there should be utility interruption.
275. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1438 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides the remedies
of injunction, termination or damages in the amount of a minimum of
one month's rent if the landlord abuses the right of entry.
276. If a landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from
the premises or willfully diminishes services to the tenant by
interrupting or causing the interruption of heat, running water,
hot water, electric, gas, or other essential service, the tenant
may recover possession or terminate the rental agreement and,
in either case, recover an amount not more than (3) months'
periodic rent or (threefold) the actual damages sustained by
him, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's fees. If
the rental agreement is terminated the landlord shall return
all security recoverable under Section 2.101 and all prepaid
rent.
URLTA § 4.107 (emphasis added).
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In such a situation, the tenant's case will be a difficult one, since
he will have the burden of proving the willful and wrongful act.
Pursuant to the URLTA, the landlord in some cases would have
had the burden of proof and would have had to prove that the
interruption in service was not willful and wrongful. The reason
for this is found in section 5.101 of the URLTA, the retaliatory evic-
tion section, which set forth a positive presumption. If the landlord
diminished services within one year after the tenant engaged in cer-
tain protected activities, such as a complaint to the landlord or a
government agency, the landlord's act was presumed to be retalia-
tory and, therefore, willful and wrongful. This presumption was
a relevant factor in a tenant's suit for damages. 2 77  It is deleted
from the NRLTA. The unfortunate consequence of this may be
that tenants will consistently be unable to prove their case, and
landlords will be tempted to engage in illegitimate activities.
V. JURISDICTION AND SUMMARY REPOSSESSION
There is nothing unusual about landlord-tenant litigation.
Much of it is handled like other kinds of litigation. However, the
summary action for restitution, commonly called a forcible entry
and detainer action ("FED") or a summary repossession action, is
a type of suit unique to this area of the law. In Nebraska it has
been a statutory remedy.2 78 The remedy was designed to provide
a person entitled to possession of realty (regardless of who had
title) a quick and simple way to: (1) regain his property;279
(2) discourage self-help in property repossession; 28 0 (3) prevent
even rightful owners from taking the law into their own hands and
inviting violence; 28 ' and (4) assure a landlord of a constant cash
flow from his rental property.282 Sections 76-1440 and 24-568 pro-
277. If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (a), the ten-
ant is entitled to the remedies provided in Section 4.107 and
has a defense in any retaliatory action against him for posses-
sion. In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a com-
plaint within [1] year before the alleged act of retaliation cre-
ates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retalia-
tion.
URLTA § 5.101 (b).
278. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 24-568-84 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Law of January
12, 1860, ch. X, §§ 1019-32, [1860] 1866 REV. STAT. Ttns NEB. 75, 6th
Leg. Sess.
279. Sporer v. Herlik, 158 Neb. 644, 64 N.W.2d 342 (1954) stated that the
normal rules of procedure do not apply.
280. Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974).
281. Myers v. Koenig, 5 Neb. 419 (1877).
282. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). Consistent with this purpose,
a tenant is deemed to be a holdover tenant when he fails to pay due
rent. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-569 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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vide that the existing FED statutes will continue in force, but all
actions for possession of premises covered in the NRLTA will be
exclusively controlled by sections 76-1440 to 76-1447. Before exam-
ining the intricacies of the new summary repossession action, the
issues of jurisdiction and retaliatory eviction must be examined.
A. Jurisdiction
The municipal, county or district courts have jurisdiction with
respect to any conduct governed by the NRLTA or with respect
to any claim arising from a transaction subject to the NRLTA. 283
These courts apparently have concurrent jurisdiction in a claim for
property restitution.28 4  The question arises as to whether the
county and municipal courts will also have concurrent jurisdiction
in all damage claims arising from a transaction subject to the
NRLTA when such action is either joined to a property restitution
suit or is brought separately. For example, what if the landlord
claimed $6,000 damages? Could he bring this suit in a county or
municipal court? While section 76-1409 provides that a county or
municipal court has jurisdiction in claims arising under the NRLTA,
sections 24-517285 and 26-116286 state that these courts will
not have jurisdiction for amounts greater than $5,000. Which
set of rules should prevail? The general jurisdictional statutes
should. The purport of the NRLTA was apparently to give con-
current jurisdiction to the municipal, county or district court in
suits for restitution of property. Although a municipal court could
hear such a suit for the return of a valuable piece of property, there
is no evidence that section 76-1409 was designed to allow a munici-
pal court to hear a suit for $6,000 just because it arose out of a
283. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1409 (Cum. Supp. 1974). This restates pre-exist-
ing Nebraska law. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-568 (Cum. Supp. 1974) gavejurisdiction of forcible entry and of forcible detainer suits to county
and municipal courts. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 24-302 (Reissue 1964) gave
the district court jurisdiction over both civil and criminal actions,
"except where otherwise provided." Forcible entry and forcible de-
tainer are quasi-criminal. Since section 24-568 does not provide that
the county and municipal courts' jurisdiction is exclusive, it is pre-
sumed that the district court has concurrent jurisdiction.
284. The small claims court will not have jurisdiction over real property
restitution cases, although it may have jurisdiction over other ordinary
landlord and tenant litigation. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-522 (Cum. Supp.
1974) provides that the small claims court shall have jurisdiction
when "the personal property claimed does not exceed five hundred dol-
lars. . . ." The inference is that the court does not have jurisdiction
over any claims for real property. But see Simon v. Lieberman, 193
Neb. 321, 322, - N.W.2d- (1975).
285. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-517 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
286. NEB. REv. STAT. § 26-116 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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landlord-tenant dispute. The jurisdictional divisions which have
been already established should, therefore, be left intact, because
the practical reasons for giving a district court exclusive jurisdic-
tion over a $10,000 automobile accident claim also apply to a $10,000
landlord-tenant claim.
Personal jurisdiction over landlords and tenants is acquired as
in other civil cases.2s7 Jurisdiction may also be acquired over a
non-resident landlord or a landlord corporation not authorized to
do business in Nebraska by substitute service on the Secretary of
State.2 8 8  There is no comparable provision for substitute service
on the tenant; the NRLTA draftsmen apparently believed it was
unnecessary.28 9  This procedure, as applied to landlords, is analo-
gous to the substitute service provisions of the motor vehicle stat-
ute.290  It is questionable as to whether there is a need for such
287. The district, county, or municipal court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction over any landlord or tenant with respect
to any conduct in this state governed by sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449 or with respect to any claim arising from a
transaction subject to sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449
for a dwelling unit located within its jurisdictional bound-
aries. In addition to any other method provided by rule or
by statute, personal jurisdiction over a landlord may be
acquired in a civil action or proceeding instituted in the dis-
trict, county, or municipal court by the service of process in
manner provided by this section.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1409 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
The Nebraska long-arm statute would also be applicable. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-536 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
288. If a landlord is not a resident of this state or is a corpora-
tion not authorized to do business in this state and engages in
any conduct in this state governed by sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449, or engages in a transaction subject to sec-
tions 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, he may designate an agent
upon whom service of process may be made in this state. The
agent shall be a resident of this state or a corporation au-
thorized to do business in this state. The designation shall be
in writing and filed with the Secretary of State. If no desig-
nation is made and filed or if process cannot be served in this
state upon the designated agent, process may be served upon
the Secretary of State, but service upon him is not effective
unless the Plaintiff or petitioner forthwith mails a copy of the
process and pleading by registered or certified mail to the de-
fendant or respondent at his last reasonably ascertainable ad-
dress. An affidavit of compliance with this section shall be
filed with the clerk of the court on or before the return day
of the process, if any, or within any further time the court
allows.
NEB. Rv. STAT. § 76-1409 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
289. "This section as drawn does not provide for substitute service and
jurisdiction in an action brought against a tenant. In the view of the
Commissioners authorization for such procedure, if deemed appropriate,
should be made by general legislation applying to all debtors, naturally
including tenants." URLTA § 1.203, Comment.
290. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-530 (Curn. Supp. 1974). This statute has been
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special jurisdictional rules in landlord-tenant cases. Certainly
there is not the same need as in motor vehicle cases, since tenants
often know who the landlord is, and usually the landlord will have
some property in Nebraska which the tenant can reach, thus ob-
viating the need for personal jurisdiction. Despite this, the pro-
vision for substitute service furnishes additional assurance that no
Nebraska landlord can hide beyond the Nebraska courts' area of
jurisdiction. This should be an incentive to all landlords to comply
with the NRLTA, for tenants will always have a convenient
Nebraska court in which to enforce their rights. This substitute
service may result in the courts' acquiring jurisdiction over a land-
lord without his knowledge, since service may be made on the Sec-
retary of State and the notice required by this method of service
may not in fact reach the landlord.291 However, the risks inherent
in this method of service can easily be avoided by the lanidlord's
appointing an agent upon whom service of process must be made.
If he does this and if his designated agent can be served, then there
may be no substitute service.
B. Retaliatory Conduct
Under existing law, the landlord's motive for raising rent, de-
creasing services or instituting a FED action was irrelevant, and,
therefore, could not be used by a tenant as a basis for an affirma-
tive suit nor as a basis for a defense in a FED suit. This rule has
been particularly odious to the tenant Who seeks to assert his rights
against a landlord. He might complain to a housing code adminis-
trator of violations in the demised premises and the next day find
a thirty day notice to terminate the tenancy in his mailbox. He
would have had no cause of action against the landlord, and in a
subsequent FED suit for possession, he would have been unable to
raise as a defense that the landlord's motive was to retaliate for the
tenant's complaint. Recently, however, several courts have per-
mitted the tenant to raise the defense of the landlord's retaliatory
motive in a summary repossession suit.292 Nebraska has not.
Therefore, the adoption of section 76-1439 appears to change the
Nebraska situation dramatically. Whether it does so, as a matter of
practice, is problematical.
The landlord may not retaliate by raising the rent, decreasing
the services, or by instituting a summary repossession suit after
narrowly construed. Gatlliff v. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F.
Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
291. The court will require strict compliance with the requirements of this
statute. Wilson v. Smith, 193 Neb. 433, - N.W.2d - (1975).
292. See Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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a tenant has complained about conditions to a government agency
or joined a tenant's union. If the landlord does any of these,
he is liable for damages and the tenant can raise the landlord's
action as a defense in a summary repossession suit.29 3 These provi-
sions do not answer the question of whether the landlord can re-
taliate if the tenant complains to him. If he could, it might vitiate
the entire statute. Since many of the landlord's duties become op-
erative only after he has notice of the problem, if the tenant could
be penalized for giving him notice, he would be reluctant to do so.
The URLTA counterpart provided that a landlord could not re-
taliate if the tenant complained to him." 4 The NRLTA has no such
provision. This at least raises the argument that the landlord's mo-
tives are an irrelevant consideration when he institutes a restitu-
tion suit after a tenant has complained of a defect to him. Never-
theless, it seems most unfair to encourage a tenant to complain to
the landlord, and then to put his tenant status in jeopardy because
of such a complaint. If this were the rule, well-advised tenants
would complain to the landlord through government officials, a
clearly circuitous route. It would be preferable to extend the pro-
tections afforded by section 76-1439 (1) at least to those activities
which the NRLTA encourages the tenant to perform in order to
activate his rights under the NRLTA.
A second major problem area is the question of proof: Who
should bear the burden of proving that the landlord's actions are
based on retaliation? As a practical matter, the tenant will have
a difficult time if he must carry the burden. He will not know
the landlord's true motive, and the circumstantial evidence needed
to prove this may not be convincing. The URLTA counterpart to
293. (1) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not
retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services or by
bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession
after:
(a) The tenant has complained to a government agency
charged with responsibility for enforcement of a minimum
building or housing code of a violation applicable to the prem-
ises materially affecting health and safety; or
(b) The tenant has organized or become a member of a
tenants' union or similar organization.
(2) If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (1), the
tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in section 76-1430
and has a defense in action against him for possession.
NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 76-1439 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
294. (a) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not
retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services or by bring-
ing or threatening to bring an action for possession after:
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a viola-
tion under Section 2.104. ...
URLTA § 5.101 (a) (2).
LANDLORD TENANT
section 76-1439 provided that if the landlord raised rent, decreased
services or instituted suit after the tenant had complained, his mo-
tive was presumed to be retaliatory.295 The burden thus shifted
to the landlord to prove his motive was not retaliatory. The
NRLTA does not have this provision. In its place the NRLTA
states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting
reasonable rent increases or changes in services notwithstanding the
occurrence of acts specified in subsection (1).-1296 The clear infer-
ence is that the tenant will have the burden of proving retaliation.
This may emasculate the statute.
Finally, it should be noted that despite'the protections afforded
the tenant, section 76-1439(3) (b) provides that the landlord may
bring an action for restitution if the tenant is in default in rent.
This should not be interpreted as precluding the tenant's ordinary
defenses permitted by the NRLTA. All it does is permit the land-
lord to sue for restitution based on nonpayment without running
the risk that this action will be considered retaliatory.
C. Summary Repossession
To initiate a suit for possession, the aggrieved party must file
a petition for restitution in the appropriate court of his choice. 297
The petition shall contain (1) the facts, stated with particularity,
on which the plaintiff seeks to recover, (2) a reasonably accurate
description of the property, and (3) a showing of the requisite com-
pliance with the notice provisions of the NRLTA.2 s These changes
in prior law are designed to provide the tenant-defendant with ade-
quate notice of what is at issue299 and are important for several
295. If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (a), the ten-
ant is entitled to the remedies provided in Section 4.107 and
has a defense in any retaliatory action against him for posses-
sion. In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a com-
plaint within [1] year before the alleged act of retaliation cre-
ates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retalia-
tion. The presumption does not arise if 'the tenant made the
complaint after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminu-
tion of services. "Presumption" means that the trier of fact
must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until
evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its
nonexistence.
URLTA § 5.101 (b).
296. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 76-1439 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
297. A prospective tenant, as well as a landlord, could bring an FED action
against a wrongful possessor. Gregory v. Pribbeno, 14a Neb. 379, 9
N.W.2d 485 (1943); Kouma v. Murphy, 129 Neb. 892, 263 N.W. 211
(1935). This is also true under the NRLTA. The discussion in the
text will presume that the landlord is the plaintiff.
298. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1441 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
299. NEs. REV. STAT. § 24-572 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that the corn-
686 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 4 (1975)
reasons. First, under prior law, the FED charge could be restated
in the broad language of the statute.30 0 This would effectively con-
ceal from the defendant the alleged facts and would make it more
difficult to defend. Section 76-1441 remedies this by requiring that
the facts be stated with particularity. Second, although the plain-
tiff had to serve notice and demand under the prior law, he did not
have to allege compliance with them in his complaint. If the de-
fendant defaulted, trial was held as if he were there.30 1 The plain-
tiff did not have to prove compliance with facts which did not have
to be alleged in his complaint. However, if the tenant pleaded not
guilty, the plaintiff had the burden of proof with respect to all the
issues, and demand and notice were necessary elements of a FED
action.30 2
Section 76-1441 protects the defendant who is not present. At
the trial which will be held as if he were present,30 3 the landlord
must now prove compliance with the notice provisions. This is par-
ticularly important in landlord-tenant law for several reasons. No-
tices to quit, or notices of the opportunity to redeem, are often re-
lied on by private parties in conducting their affairs. Also, there
is a lot at stake. A court must be certain that a defendant, such
as a defaulting tenant, was given notice of an opportunity to re-
deem, or else the result would be tantamount to declaring a for-
feiture.
The petition may contain other causes of action relating to the
tenancy.30 4 Prior law would have limited the landlord to join only
actions for accrued rent and damages to the premises with his res-
titution claim.30 5 The apparent theory of the NRLTA, particularly
plaint "shall particularly describe the premises." This had been inter-
preted to mean a reasonably accurate description. Sporer v. Herlik,
158 Neb. 644, 64 N.W.2d 342 (1954); Dimmett v. Appleton, 20 Neb. 208,
29 N.W. 474 (1886). Thus, NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1441 (Cum. Supp.
1974) does not change this.
300. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds v. Gillett, 158 Neb. 558, 64 N.W.2d 105
(1954); Blaco v. Haller, 9 Neb. 149, 1 N.W. 978 (1879). However, the
three day notice-to-quit had to state, at least in a general way, the
grounds of the claim. Connell v. Chambers, 22 Neb. 302, 34 N.W. 636
(1887).
301. NEB. 11Ev. STAT. § 24-574 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
302. Boehler v. Kraay, 130 Neb. 233, 264 N.W. 745 (1936).
303. NEB. 1REv. STAT. § 76-1444 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
304. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1441 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
305. Existing law was not perfectly clear on this point. Prior to 1965, the
rule was that the action could be for possession only. Stover v. Hazel-
baker, 42 Neb. 393, 60 N.W. 597 (1894). In 1965, the FED statute was
amended to permit the court "to inquire into the matters between the
two litigants such as the amount of rent owing the plaintiff and the
amount of damage caused by the defendant to the premises. . ." NEB.
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section 76-1441, Which provides that "said causes of action shall be
answered and tried separately, if requested by either party" is that
additional causes of action can be separated from the suit for resti-
tution by a written request by either party. However, this is not
completely clear. Section 76-1442 provides that the summons Shall
contain the "answer date for other causes of action" and that the
trial of the action "for possession" shall be at a given time and
place within specified time parameters. This section seems to imply
that the suit for restitution and the other actions brought will be
tried separately even if the defendant makes no written request.
Despite this implication, it is practical and expedient to try all the
causes together unless one party has an objection. 306 With this pur-
REv. STAT. § 24-568 (Cum. Supp. 1974). At the least, this infers that
the action need not be for possession only. How far to extend "the
matters between the two litigants" and whether to extend it at all be-
yond the specific examples of "rent owing" and "damage caused by
the defendant to the premises" is uncertain. Moreover, even after 1965,
there was no explicit statement that a judgment in a FED could be
for more than restitution and costs. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-576 (Cum.
Supp. 1974). The inference of this last section is that the FED suit
remained an action for possession only, in spite of the broad language
permitting inquiry into the matters between the litigants.
306. It is arguable that the plaintiff must join an action for rent with an
action for possession, and if he does not, he will be later barred from
bringing this action. The theory would be that an action for rent and
an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent are truly the
same cause of action. Causes of action can not be split, Boomer v.
Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 582, 10 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1943), for if they could
it would cause judicial inefficiency and possibly undue harassment.
Particular support for this theory is that the prior FED statute explic-
itly provided that a "judgment . . . shall not be a bar to any future
action." NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 24-570 (Cum. Supp. 1974). This provision
is not in the NRLTA, possibly raising the inference that a judgment
may be a bar. Furthermore, the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JUDG-
mmiss provides the following:
Where the plaintiff may in one action claim two or more
remedies cumulatively rather than alternatively, all arising
from the same transaction, but seeks fewer than all of these
remedies, and a judgment is entered that extinguishes the
claim under the rules of merger or bar, he is precluded from
maintaining another action for the other remedies. Thus if the
plaintiff in an action against another in wrongful possession
of his land may claim judgment not only for repossession but
for damages for the wrongful detention, but seeks and recovers
a judgment for repossession only, he may not maintain another
action for damages for the detention. In the older law, when
several cumulative remedies might have to be sued for in
successive separate actions (in the case supposed, an action of
ejectment followed by an action for trespass for mesne prof-
its), judgment in an action for one remedy would not preclude
a second action for another remedy; but today a plaintiff may
generally cumulate his remedies in a single action, with the
preclusionary results mentioned.
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pose in view, the summons should contain the answer date for the
other causes if the defendant has made a written request for
separate trials. Otherwise, the answer date will be the appearance
date of the restitution suit. In order to avoid confusion and apprise
defendants of their rights in this complicated procedure, it would
be desirable for the summons to state the defendant's options
clearly.
The summons shall be issued as in other cases.30 7 In addition
to stating the time and place of the trial for possession and the
answer day for the other causes, it shall contain the cause of the
complaint and the assertion that if the defendant does not appear,
judgment will be entered against him. In addition, the petition
must be attached. This should provide the defendant with ade-
quate facts to prepare a defense.30 8
The summons may be served by any person, apparently even
the plaintiff. Existing law required that it be served as in other
cases, and this did not permit a party to the action to serve it.30 9
Admittedly, the new method expedites the possessory action, for
one will not be delayed by the sheriff; however, it is unlikely
that the requirement that the person file an affidavit stating with
particularity the manner in which it was served will vitiate the
problems of sewer service.310  Since other related claims can be
joined with the claim for restitution, and since they all may be
tried together, with or without the defendant, at the time set for
the trial of possession, the temptation to "sewer" serve will be great.
In this situation, not only will the plaintiff receive a judgment for
damages, but he will also receive it quickly.
Under existing Nebraska law, in normal circumstances, trial in
the county or municipal courts, where these actions were usually
brought, on all the triable issues, would be no later than twenty-
seven days after the filing of the complaint. The summons had
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDG MENTs § 61.1 (j) (Tent. Draft No. 1
1973). In spite of this, it is appropriate to leave the plaintiff with the
option of not joining all related causes and not barring a later action.
Summary repossession suits have historically been unique, and the ex-
plicit policy of the NRLTA is to give the parties a choice of whether
to litigate more than the action for possession. See generally Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) for further policy analysis.
307. The applicable statute of limitations is one year after the cause of ac-
tion accrues. NFB. REV. STAT. § 25-203 (Reissue 1964). Under existing
law, it was tolled when the three day notice-to-quit was served. Fed-
eral Trust Co. v. Overlander, 118 Neb. 167, 223 N.W. 797 (1929).
308. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1442 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
309. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-573 (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-507
(Reissue 1964).
310. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1442 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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to be served and returned within ten days of filing, the tenant had
ten days to respond,31 1 the answer date was the same as the trial
date, and the tenant could be granted a seven day continuance.312
Any additional continuance could only be granted for "extra-
ordinary causes," and only if the tenant gave an appropriate under-
taking for rent and damages. 13 The result of this procedure was
that not only would the tenant have to try the issue of possession
within a short time, but he would also have to try a related rent
issue in a shorter period of time than would normally be given a
defendant sued for rent alone.
The NRLTA provides the parties with a fair compromise. The
landlord can regain his property quickly, but the tenant has the
option of having a normal period of time elapse before trial of the
related issues. Under the NRLTA procedure, the summons shall
be returned as in other cases; in the county and municipal courts
this is not more than ten days after filing. The trial date for posses-
sion shall not be less than seven nor more than ten days from the
date of service.3 14 This may result in a trial seven to ten days
after filing, if the summons is served on the date of issuance. The
purpose of the minimum time period is to assure the defendant of
some time to prepare a defense. The purpose of providing for the
maximum time period is less clear. Perhaps it is a directive to the
courts to try these matters quickly.31 5 Perhaps it is to assure the
defendant-tenant that the matter will be resolved in a finite
amount of time, and that he will not have the problem of guess-
ing when it will be brought. This should help him in making
arrangements for new quarters if he should think this necessary.
Despite this, providing for the maximum of ten days may present
problems. For example, if the summons is issued with a January
15 trial date, and if it is served on January 3, the summons has
been served too early and the defendant may have to be served
again.
Section 76-1443 provides that no continuance shall be granted
311. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-535 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
312. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-575 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
313. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-575 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
314. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1442 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
315. Number nine.. I have to read my own writing here. Oh
yeah, on the eviction. . number nine deals with the eviction
of a tenant non payment of rent or something like that. You
must . . we are trying to get the court to set the trial, if there
is a court dispute on the eviction, somewhere between seven
and ten days. We are saying in essence, not less than seven
nor more than ten days the case shall be heard.
UNIcmAERAL TRANScR.PTS, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. 5321 (February 11, 1974)
(remarks of Sen. Goodrich).
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unless there are extraordinary causes, and then only if the tenant
pays accrued rent to the court or posts an undertaking for it. He
must also deposit with the court additional rent as it becomes
due.3 16 Thus, in normal cases, the trial date for possession may
be as early as seven and no later than twenty days from filing.
The most striking feature of existing Nebraska FED law was
the limited nature of the issues which could be tried in an action
for possession. In the interests of speed and efficiency, counter-
claims were excluded, as were most defenses.3 17 If a landlord
claimed his property because rent was due, there was only one im-
portant triable issue-was rent due? In Stover v. Hazelbaker, the
court stated the general rule:
The only finding of fact that can be lawfully made in the trial
of a forcible detainer case is whether or not the defendant therein
is guilty of forcibly detaining the premises, and the only judgment
that can be pronounced in such case is that the plaintiff have resti-
tution of the premises sued for, or that the plaintiff's action be dis-
missed and that the defendant go hence without day. [The right
to recover rent . . .] or the right of Mrs. Stover to set-off against
said rent the note she held against Hazelbaker, were not in issue.
This was not a suit by Hazelbaker to recover rent for the prem-
ises.318
316. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 24-575 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provided for an "auto-
matic" continuance of seven days. NE. REv. STAT. § 76-1428 (Curn.
Supp. 1974) provides that in the event of a counterclaim, the court
may require a tenant to pay accrued and accruing rent to the court,
but since NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1443 (Cum. Supp. 1974) mandates such
payments if a continuance is granted, it is difficult to imagine any
significant time period during which judicial discretion could be
exercised. See Bell v. Tsintolas, 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
317. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
318. 42 Neb. 393, 395, 60 N.W. 597, 598 (1894). However, the Nebraska rule
was not free from doubt. FQr example, in McJunkin v. Waldo, 95 Neb.
235, 145 N.W. 337 (1914) the landlord had brought a suit for rent owing,
and the tenant counterclaimed for services rendered. The court had
held for the tenant, thus establishing that no rent was owing. The
landlord then brought the FED action because of the tenant's nonpay-
ment of rent. The tenant was permitted to defend by establishing that
it had been decided, in the prior case, that no rent was due. The court
thought this was obvious, and explicitly did not determine what other
claims the tenant might raise by way of offset. In distinguishing a
prior case, however, the court noted that the general setoff statute
seemed to apply to FED cases based on nonpayment of rent in the same
way that it applied in other actions.
Moreover, there may be a constitutional argument that if an action
for rent is attached to the suit for restitution, other issues can be raised,
at least in defense. The Supreme Court justified the Oregon summary
repossession suit by emphasizing the importance of the fact that it was
for restitution only. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The fairness of the summary
trial rested on the importance of the possession issue. If normal rent
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The common exception to this general rule was that certain
equitable defenses could be raised, since the purpose of the FED
statute was to secure rent payment and not to exact a lease for-
feiture. Thus, it has been held that the statutory failure to pay
rent must have been a wrongful failure;3 19 if the tenant paid his
rent within three days of receipt of the notice to quit, he could
not be evicted;3 20 if the tenant's failure to pay was in good faith
and he was prepared to pay, this too was an appropriate defense.321
The scope of the equity defense has not been explored beyond these
"confused rent" cases, and its parameters have never been clearly
articulated. 322
The NRLTA changes the existing approach dramatically. Sec-
tion 76-1445 provides that on or before the day fixed for trial, the
defendant may appear and assert legal or equitable defenses, setoffs
or counterclaims. More specifically, however, section 76-1428 pro-
vides that the defendant may counterclaim for any amount which
he may recover under the rental agreement or the NRLTA in a re-
possession suit based on nonpayment.3 23 The juxtaposition of these
two sections raises two problems. First, the negative inference of
section 76-1428 is that a defendant in possession may not counter-
claim if a plaintiff's possession suit is premised on other than non-
payment of rent. However, it is preferable to interpret section 76-
1428 as a subclass of section 76-1445, and to allow a defendant to
counterclaim in any suit for possession. This interpretation will
promote judicial efficiency, and if a plaintiff is harmed, he can move
to have the counterclaim tried separately. Second, what is the scope
of the permissible counterclaim? If section 76-1445 is controlling,
apparently the scope is governed by the general counterclaim stat-
ute which permits counterclaims arising out of the contract or
or damage claims are attached to the possession claim-as has been
permitted in Nebraska since 1965-it may be constitutionally unfair to
preclude any legitimate defenses. See NEB. Rav. STAT. § 24-568 (Cum.
Supp. 1974).
319. House v. Lewis, 108"Neb. 257, 187 N.W. 784 (1922).
320. Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W. 95 (1922); Osterberg v. Scotts-
bluff Invest. Co., 106 Neb. 143, 183 N.W. 95 (1921).
321. Marine Equip. & Supply Co. v. Welsh, 188 Neb. 385, 196 N.W.2d 911
(1972).
322. But see King v. Wilson, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 93, 95 N.W. 494 (1901), which
held that the claim that the landlord leased the premises for an im-
moral purpose was no defense in a FED suit.
323. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1428(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that "[iln
an action for possession based upon nonpayment of the rent or in an
action for rent where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may coun-
terclaim for any amount which he may recover under the rental agree-
ment or sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449."
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transaction, or the subject matter of the plaintiff's action.324 Sec-
tion 76-1428 is broader than this, for it seems to provide that if
a landlord-plaintiff should sue for possession based on non-payment,
the tenant-defendant could counterclaim for a tort premised on a
landlord's unrelated noncompliance with the NRLTA. It is sub-
mitted that section 76-1428 be interpreted as repeating the scope
of the general counterclaim statute. The apparent purpose of the
NRLTA was to permit counterclaims in summary repossession ac-
tions, but not necessarily to expand the parameters of the counter-
claim.
A problem arises if the landlord has assigned his right to rent
to a third party. Can the tenant assert any legal or equitable de-
fense, setoff or counterclaim against this third-party in a suit by
this third-party? Under the URLTA, the tenant clearly could as-
sert defenses based on the landlord's noncompliance with his main-
tenance obligations. Section 1.404 of the URLTA prevented any
assignments of rent which would be free of the obligations imposed
by section 2.104(a) of the URLTA, the counterpart of section 76-
1419 (1).325
Section 1.404 of the URLTA and section 4.105 of the URLTA, the
counterpart of section 76-1428, were to be read together, for they
make the tenant's covenant to pay rent dependent on the landlord's
compliance with building and housing codes. The URLTA drafts-
men believed that if rent assignments free of this obligation
were allowed, the landlord could thwart the thrust of the
URLTA 3 20  The assignee could bring an action for rent or posses-
sion, and the tenant could not counterclaim or defend charging the
landlord's noncompliance with the applicable codes. A rent assign-
ment could thus neutralize one of the tenant's most effective
remedial weapons. On the other hand, commentators criticized this
prohibition of free rent assignments. 327 They feared that a lender
might be discouraged from advancing construction money if it
324. NEB. Rgv. STAT. § 25-813 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that a counter-
claim must arise "out of the contract or transaction set forth in
the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or [be] con-
nected with the subject of the action."
325. "A rental agreement, assignment, conveyance, trust deed, or security
instrument may not permit the receipt of rent free of the obligation to
comply with Section 2.104(a)." URLTA § 1.404.
326. "The obligation of the landlord to maintain fit premises in accordance
with Section 2.104(a) and the rights and remedies of the tenant under
Article II and IV cannot be defeated or thwarted by the assignment
of rents." URLTA § 1.404, Comment 1.
327. ABA Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee
on Leases, supra note 67, at 109; Comment, supra note 107, at 555.
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feared that it would be saddled with the responsibility of code com-
pliance. The NRLTA did not include this provision against assign-
ments. The inference is that assignments of rent are to be per-
mitted, and that the assignee will be free of any section 76-1419(1)
obligation. This would apparently reverse existing law which held
that the assignee of rent stood in the shoes of the landlord-as-
signor.328 The brief reported legislative history indicates a clear
concern about lenders who might be reluctant to advance money
for housing.329 In spite of this, it would be preferable to permit
the tenant to raise the issue of the landlord's noncompliance with
a maintenance obligation in a suit by an assignee. The NlRLTA
does not explicitly prevent this result, the legislature's reasons for
deleting the URLTA provision were confused, and an interpretation
of the NRLTA permitting the tenant to raise this defense would
promote uniformity among the states.
This broad power given the tenant to raise defenses and counter-
claims presents several problems. The first is whether the defend-
ant must raise particular counterclaims. In a sense, this is the ob-
verse of the question of whether a plaintiff could split a cause of
action. Since the NRLTA does not answer the question directly,
it would seem that general Nebraska law would prevail and coun-
terclaims would not be compulsory.330 Another problem posed by
the potential for counterclaim occurs when the landlord-plaintiff
sues for restitution based on non-payment of rent of $150, and the
tenant-defendant believes he has a claim against the landlord-plain-
tiff for $600, but may need more time to develop this counterclaim.
Can he plead it as a defense only, thus proving that no rent was
due? If he could, and he lost, he might not be estopped from bring-
ing his claim for damages later. On the other hand, if he would be
estopped, then he must choose between trying his claim at the early
restitution trial, or perhaps forfeiting his tenancy. Although the
NRLTA does not answer this directly, it is probable that the defend-
ant-tenant would be estopped from raising the exact same claim in
two different suits. To allow him to do this would be totally ineffi-
cient, and it would go beyond the policy purposes which permits
plaintiffs to split causes of action and allows defendants not to raise
counterclaims.
328. See Iowa Say. Bank v. Frink, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 14, 92 N.W. 916 (1901).
329. Hearings on Nebraska Residential Landlord Tenant Act Before the Ju-
diciary Committee, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. 62-63 (February 7, 1973) (re-
marks of Mr. Wayne).
330. Ns. REv. STAT. § 25-814 (Reissue 1964) provides a penalty for not rais-
ing a counterclaim or a setoff, but does not bar a party from raising
the claims later. See Rogers v. Buettenbach, 114 Neb. 834, 211 N.W.
168 (1926).
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Before leaving the examination of the summary repossession
trial, one final area must be explored. Can either party demand
a jury trial? Prior law explicitly mandated that either party
could.331 The NRLTA does not have such a provision. Neverthe-
less, either party should have the right of a jury trial for several
reasons.33 2  First, the general procedural statutes provide that in
a civil suit brought in the county or municipal court, a jury trial
must be granted to any party on demand.3 3 3 It must also be granted
to any party on demand in any action brought in the district court
for the recovery of money or of specific real or personal property.3 34
An action for repossession is an action for the recovery of real prop-
erty, and, therefore, a jury would seem to be required. It is argua-
ble, however, that summary repossession actions are sui generis and
that the normal rules of procedure are not applicable to them.3 3 5
Nevertheless, the Nebraska Constitution requires a right to jury
trial in such an action, by providing in Article I, section 6 that
the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The relevant is-
sue, therefore, becomes whether a party would have had such a
right in a summary repossession action when the constitution was
adopted.3 38  At that time, the FED statute provided for a
jury. 3 7 Assuming all this is true, it could still be argued that the
NRLTA summary repossession action is not a FED action; however,
this argument has little merit. Section 24-568, the FED statute,
does provide that it will not apply to actions subject to the
NRLTA,338 but the reason for this is that the NRLTA repossession
action is an outgrowth of the normal FED action and is properly
seen as an extension of it. As such, the Nebraska Constitution
would require each party to have a right to a jury. Finally, it
is difficult to understand what the summary repossession action is
if it is not an extension of the FED. If it is a completely new
action, there is little reason for believing its procedure to be sui
generis, and, therefore, the general statutes referred to would seem
to require a right to jury. And if it is conceptualized as being an
extension of ejectment, the constitution would again require a
jury.339
331. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-576 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
332. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
333. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-536 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
334. N E. REv. STAT. § 25-1104 (Reissue 1964).
335. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Sporer v. Herlik, 158 Neb.
644, 64 N.W.2d 342 (1954).
336. State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939); Bell v. State, 104
Neb. 203, 176 N.W. 544 (1920).
337. 1866 REv. STAT. TEnR. NEB. 1028, 11th Leg. Sess.
338. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-568 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
339. Foltz v. Brakhage, 151 Neb. 216, 36 N.W.2d 768 (1949).
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Once judgment for restitution has been rendered against the
defendant, the court, on the request of the plaintiff, shall direct
the constable or sheriff to evict the defendant within seven days.
Under prior law, the officer would have had ten days after receiv-
ing the writ to do this. 40
Under what conditions should restitution be awarded to the
plaintiff? If the landlord-plaintiff claims restitution because $150
rent is owed (which, we can assume, the tenant knowingly withheld
because he believed he had a section 76-1419 suit against the land-
lord for at least $150), and the tenant-defendant counterclaims for
damages based on the landlord's noncompliance with section
76-1419, and if the court determined that the landlord is entitled to
$80, is the landlord entitled to restitution? To hold that the tenant
loses in this situation might penalize him for the innocent mistake of
believing that his claim was worth $150. To permit the tenant to
stay, if he pays the $80, might penalize the landlord. He has not
received rent, and he believes that he is entitled to receive his prop-
erty back. Tenants might be tempted to delay or to withhold rent
payments, knowing they will be given a second chance to pay after
a trial.
It is arguable that under section 76-1428 if the tenant should
owe any rent, the landlord will be entitled to restitution because
it provides that only if no rent is owing, shall judgment be entered
for the tenant. The inference is that if any rent is owing, judgment
will be for the landlord.341  Such an interpretation would deter
tenants from withholding rent, for they would do so at great risk.
If they did not estimate correctly the amount they might owe, they
would be evicted. Further support for this position is provided by
the Nebraska Legislature's deleting section 4.103 of the URLTA,
which would have provided the tenant with a limited, but legiti-
mate, right to use the rent to make minor repairs. The inference
of this deletion is that the legislature's intent was to discourage ten-
340. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-581 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
341. In an action for possession based upon nonpayment of the
rent or in an action for rent when the tenant is in possession,
the tenant may "counterclaim" for any amount he may recover
under the rental agreement or sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to
76-1449. In that event the court from time to time may order
the tenant to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued and
thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due to
each party. The party to whom a net amount is owed shall
be paid first from the money paid into court, and the balance
by the other party. If no rent remains due after application
of this section, judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the
action for possession. If the defense or counterclaim by the
tenant is without merit and is not raised in good faith, the
landlord may recover reasonable attorney's fees.
NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 76-1428 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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ants from making independent decisions with respect to the rent
payments.
A perferable interpretation of section 76-1428 supports the con-
clusion that if the tenant makes the landlord whole, he may keep
the property. The section provides that if the tenant pays rent
to the court, the party to whom a net amount is owed will be paid
first from this amount, and the balance owed will be paid by the
other party. This means that the landlord will not get his rent
money until after judgment, and it supports the conclusion that
if the tenant pays what he owes immediately after trial (even if
he had made no payments to court), the landlord should not be
awarded restitution. Section 76-1428 further provides that if rent
remains due after the application of the statute, the court will
award restitution. What "application of the statute" means is un-
certain. One interpretation is that it means after the balance of
the money owed is paid by the other party. This gives the tenant
a chance to pay the rent and damages and not be evicted from the
property. Finally, section 76-1428 provides that if the tenant de-
fends or counterclaims and his action is without merit and not done
in good faith, the landlord is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
This should prove a reasonable deterrent to ignoble tenant action,
and, therefore, there is no need to penalize the tenant additionally
for a mistake in the withholding of the rent. In other words, the
tenant should be able to withhold some rent if he believes that
the landlord is in noncompliance with section 76-1419, and if he does
so in good faith but is wrong, he should still be able to redeem
his tenancy.3 42
VI. CONCLUSION
Certainly the NRLTA is an improvement over existing law.
Conceptually, the law is modernized. A lease-rental agreement
clearly is a contract. Functionally, it is rationalized. Duties and
responsibilities are generally placed on the party most capable of
fulfilling them. Practically, it is sensible. The normal expectations
of parties will usually be found in the law, and the parties will
not be able to shift obligations around by adhesion leases.
342. Under existing law, either party could appeal, but if there was a judg-
ment in the absence of a party, which was a default (see NEB. REV.
STAT. § 24-582 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Sporer v. Herlik, 158 Neb. 644, 64
N.W.2d 352 (1954)), there could be no appeal by this party. Section
76-1447 provides that an aggrieved party may appeal as in other ac-
tion, even if he should have lost by default; an appeal by the defend-
ant shall stay execution so long as the tenant-defendant deposits or
posts a bond for judgment and costs, and pays into court the agreed
rent every month.
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Nevertheless, the law is far from perfect. It would have been
better to have adopted the URLTA in toto, not because it is impos-
sible to have legitimate policy differences with the URLTA drafts-
men, but rather because piece-meal tinkering with a coherent piece
of legislation invites confusion and litigation. This article has
focused on these changes made by the Nebraska legislators in the
URLTA. It is hoped that the next state which adopts the URLTA
will not change it at all, or if it must, that it will keep clearly
in mind that the URLTA is a coherent, unified act, and to tamper
with one part of it will certainly have ramifications on another part.
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Appendix
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
76-1401. Act, how cited. Sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 shall
be known and may be cited as the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act.
76-1402. Purposes; rules of construction. (1) Sections 24-568 and 76-1401
to 76-1449 shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to
76-1449 are:(a) To simplify, clarify, modernize and revise the law governing the
rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlord and ten-
ant;
(b) To encourage landlord and tenant to maintain and improve the
quality of housing; and
(c) To make uniform the law among those state which enact it.
76-1403. Supplementary principals of law applicable. Unless displaced by
the provisions of sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, the principals of
law and equity, including the law relating to capacity to contract, mutuality
of obligations, principal and agent, real property, public health, safety and
fire prevention, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mis-
take, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause supplement its
provisions.
76-1404. Construction against implicit repeal. Sections 24-568 and 76-1401
to 76-1449 being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject
matter, no part of it is to be construed as impliedly repealed by subsequent
legislation if that construction can reasonably be avoided.
76-1405. Administration of remedies; enforcement. (1) The remedies pro-
vided by sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 shall be so administered
that the aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages. The ag-
grieved party has a duty to mitigate damages.
(2) Any right or obligation declared by sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to
76-1449 is enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it specifies
a different and limited effect.
76-1406. Settlement of claim or right. A claim or right arising under
sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 or on a rental agreement may be set-
tled by agreement.
76-1407. Jurisdiction; territorial application. Sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to
76-1449 apply to, regulate, and determine rights, obligations and remedies
under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located
within this state.
76-1408. Exclusions from application of act. Unless created to avoid the
application of sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, the following arrange-
ments are not governed by sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449:(1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to deten-
tion or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious,
or similar service.
(2) Occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the prop-
erty of which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who
succeeds to his interest.
LANDLORD TENANT
(3) Occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the
portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization.
(4) Transient occupancy in a hotel or motel.
(5) Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy
is conditional upon employment in and about the premises.
(6) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a
proprietary lease in a cooperative.
(7) Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the
occupant primarily for agricultural purposes.
(8) A lease of improved or unimproved residential land for a term of
five years or more.
76-1409. Jurisdiction and service of process. (1) The district, county, or
municipal court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any landlord or
tenant with respect to any conduct in this state governed by sections 24-
568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 or with respect to any claim arising from a trans-
action subject to sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 for a dwelling unit
located within its jurisdictional boundaries. In addition to any other method
provided by rule or by statute, personal jurisdiction over a landlord may
be acquired in a civil action or proceeding instituted in the district, county,
or municipal court by the service of process in the manner provided by this
section.
(2) If a landlord is not a resident of thil state or is a corporation not
authorized to do business in this state and engages in any conduct in this
state governed by sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, or engages in a
transaction subject to sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, he may desig-
nate an agent upon whom service of process may be made in this state. The
agent shall be a resident of this state or a corporation authorized to do busi-
ness in this state. The designation shall be in writing and filed with the
Secretary of State. If no designation is made and filed or if process cannot
be served in this state upon the designated agent, process may be served
upon the Secretary of State, but service upon him is not effective unless the
plaintiff or petitioner forthwith mails a copy of the process and pleading
by registered or certified mail to the defendant or respondent at his last rea-
sonably ascertainable address. An affidavit of compliance with this section
shall be filed with the clerk of the court on or before the return day of the
process, if any, or within any further time the court allows.
76-1410. Terms, defined. Subject to additional definitions contained in
sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, and unless the context otherwise re-
quires:
(1) Action includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity, and
any other proceeding in which rights are determined, including an action
for possession.
(2) Building and housing codes include any law, ordinance, or govern-
mental regulation concerning fitness for habitation, or the construction,
maintenance, operation, occupancy, use, or appearance of any premises, or
dwelling unit. Minimum housing code shall be limited to those laws, resolu-
tions, or ordinances or regulations, or portions thereof, dealing specifically
with health and minimum standards of fitness for habitation.
(3) Dwelling unit means a structure or the part of a structure that is
used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains
a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household.
(4) Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction
concerned.
(5) Landlord means the owner, lessor, or sublessor of the dwelling unit
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or the building of which it is a part, and it also means a manager of the
premises who fails to disclose as required by section 76-1417.
(6) Organization includes a corporation, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association,
two or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal
or commercial entity.
(7) Owner means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom
is vested (a) all or part of the legal title to property, or (b) all or part
of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the
premises; and the term includes a mortgagee in possession.
(8) Person includes an individual or organization.
(9) Premises means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a
part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas and facili-
ties held out for the use of tenants generally or whose use is promised to
the tenant.
(10) Rent means all payments to be made to the landlord under the
rental agreement.
(11) Rental agreement means all agreements, written or oral, between
a landlord and tenant, and valid rules and regulations adopted under section
76-1422 embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occu-
pancy of a dwelling unit and premises.
(12) Roomer means a person occupying a dwelling unit that lacks a
major bathroom or kitchen facility, in a structure where one or more major
facilities are used in common by occupants of the dwelling units. Major
facility in the case of a bathroom means toilet, or either a bath or shower,
and in the case of a kitchen means refrigerator, stove or sink.
(13) Single family residence means a structure maintained and used as
a single dwelling unit. Notwithstanding that a dwelling unit shares one or
more walls with another dwelling unit, it is a single family residence if it
has direct access to a street or thoroughfare and shares neither heating
facilities, hot water equipment, nor any other essential facility or service
with any other dwelling unit.
(14) Tenant means a person entitled under a rental agreement to oc-
cupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others.
76-1411. Obligation of good faith. Every duty under sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449 and every act which must be performed as a condition
precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449 imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance
or enforcement.
76-1412. Unconscionability. (1) If the court, as a matter of law, finds
that a rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when
made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder
of the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the applica-
tion of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result.
(2) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon
its own motion the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement
or settlement to aid the court in making the determination.
76-1413. Notice. (1) A person has notice of a fact if (a) he has actual
knowledge of it, (b) he has received a notice or notification of it, or (c)
from all facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he
has reason to know that it exists. A person knows or has knowledge of a
fact if he has actual knowledge of it.
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(2) A person notifies or gives a notice or notification to another by
taking steps reasonably calculated to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not the other actually comes to know of it. A person receives
a notice or notification when (a) it comes to his attention, (b) in the case
of the landlord, it is delivered at the place of business of the landlord
through which the rental agreement was made or at any place held out by
him as the place for receipt of the communication, or (c) in the case of the
tenant, it is delivered in hand to the tenant or mailed to him at the place
held out by him as the place for receipt of the communication, or in the
absence of such designation, to his last-known place of residence.
(3) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received oy an or-
ganization is effective for a particular transaction from the time it is brought
to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any
event from the time it would have been brought to his attention if the or-
ganization had exercised reasonable diligence.
76-1414. Terms and conditions of rental agreement. (1) The landlord and
tenant may include in a rental agreement terms and conditions not pro-
hibited by sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 or other rule of law in-
cluding rent, term of the agreement, and other provisions governing the
rights and obligations of the parties.
(2) In absence of agreement, the tenant shall pay as rent the fair rental
value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit.
(3) Rent shall be payable without demand or notice at the time and
place agreed upon by the parties. Unless otherwise agreed, rent is payable
at the dwelling unit and periodic rent is payable at the beginning of any
term of one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly installments at
the beginning of each month. Unless otherwise agreed, rent shall be uni-
formly apportionable from day-to-day.
(4) Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the tenancy shall
be week-to-week in case of a roomer who pays weekly rent, and in all other
cases month-to-month.
76-1415. Prohibited provisions in rental agreements. (1) No rental agree-
ment may provide that the tenant:
(a) Agrees to waive or to forego rights or remedies under sections 24-
568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449;
(b) Authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out
of the rental agreement;
(c) Agrees to pay the landlord's or tenant's attorney's fees; or
(d) Agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the land-
lord arising due to active and actionable negligence of the landlord or to
indemnify the landlord for that liability arising due to active and actionable
negligence or the costs connected therewith.
(2) A provision prohibited by subsection (1) included in a rental agree-
ment is unenforceable. If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement
containing provisions known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may recover
actual damages sustained by him and reasonable attorney's fees.
76-1416. Security deposits; prepaid rent. (1) A landlord may not de-
mand or receive security, however denominated, in an amount or value in
excess of one month's periodic rent, except that a pet deposit not in excess
of one-fourth of one month's periodic rent may be demanded or received
when appropriate, but this subsection shall not be applicable to housing au-
thorities organized or existing under sections 71-1518 to 71-1554.
(2) Upon termination of the tenancy property or money held by the
landlord as prepaid rent and security may be applied to the payment of rent
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and the amount of damages which the landlord has suffered by reason of
the tenant's noncompliance with the rental agreement or section 76-1421.
The balance, if any, and a written itemization shall be delivered or mailed
to the tenant within fourteen days after demand and designation of the lo-
cation where payment may be made or mailed.
(3) If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (2) the tenant may
recover the property and money due him and reasonable attorney's fees.
(4) This section does not preclude the landlord or tenant from recover-
ing other damages to which he may be entitled under sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449.
(5) The holder of the landlord's interest in the premisea at the time of
the termination of the tenancy is bound by this section.
76-1417. Disclosure. (1) The landlord or any person authorized to
enter into a rental agreement on his behalf shall disclose to the tenant in
writing at or before the commencement of the tenancy the name and address
of:
(a) The person authorized to manage the premises; and
(b) An owner of the premises or a person authorized to act for and on
behalf of the owner for the purpose of service of process and for the purpose
of receiving and receipting for notices and demands.
(2) The information required to be furnished by this section shall be
kept current and this section extends to and is enforceable against any suc-
cessor landlord, owner, or manager.
(3) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) becomes an agent
of each person who is a landlord for the purpose of:
(a) Service of process and receiving and receipting for notices and de-
mands; and
(b) Performing the obligations of the landlord under sections 24-568
and 76-1401 to 76-1449 under the rental agreement and expending or making
available for the purpose all rent collected from the premises.
76-1418. Landlord to supply possession' of dwelling unit. At the com-
mencement of the term the landlord shall deliver possession of the premises
to the tenant in compliance with the rental agreement and section 76-1419.
The landlord may bring an action for possession against any person wrong-
fully in possession and may recover the damages provided in subsection (3)
of section 76-1437. If the landlord makes reasonable efforts to obtain posses-
sion of the premises, he shall not be liable for an action under this section.
76-1419. Landlord to maintain fit premises. (1) The landlord shall:
(a) Substantially comply, after written or actual notice, with the re-
quirements of the applicable minimum housing codes materially affecting
health and safety;
(b) Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary, after written or ac-
tual notice, to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(c) Keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condi-
tion;
(d) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electri-
cal, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and other facil-
ities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied
by him;
(e) Provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for
the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the
occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal from the ap-
propriate receptacle; and
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(f) Supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all
times and reasonable heat except where the building that includes the dwell-
ing unit is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose, or the dwell-
ing unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installa-
tion within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a direct
public utility connection.
If there exists a minimum housing code applicable to the premises, the
landlord's maximum duty under this section shall be determined by subdi-
vision (1) (a) of this section. The obligations imposed by this section are
not intended to change existing tort law in the state.
(2) The landlord and tenant of a single family residence may agree that
the tenant perform the landlord's duties specified in subdivisions (e) and
(f) of subsection (1) and also specified repairs, maintenance tasks, altera-
tions, and remodeling, but only if the transaction is in writing, for good con-
sideration, entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the
obligations of the landlord.
(3) The landlord and tenant of a dwelling unit other than a single fam-
ily residence may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, main-
tenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling only if:
(a) The agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith and not
for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord and is set forth
in a separate writing signed by the parties and supported by adequate con-
sideration; and
(b) The agreement does not diminish or affect the obligation of the
landlord to other tenants in the premises.
(4) Notwithstanding any provision of sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-
1449, a landlord may employ a tenant to perform the obligations of the land-
lord.
76-1420. Limitation of liability. (1) Unless otherwise agreed, a land-
lord, who conveys premises that include a dwelling unit subject to a rental
agreement in a good faith sale to a bona fide purchaser, is relieved of liabil-
ity under the rental agreement and sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449
as to events occurring subsequent to written notice to the tenant of the con-
veyance, but he remains liable to the tenant for any property and money
to which the tenant is entitled under section 76-1416, except that assignment
of any security deposits or prepaid rents to a bona fide purchaser with writ-
ten notice to the tenant shall serve to relieve the conveying landlord of any
further liability under section 76-1416.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a manager of premises that include a
dwelling unit is relieved of liability under the rental agreement and sections
24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 as to events occurring after written notice to
the tenant of the termination of his management.
76-1421. Tenant to maintain dwelling unit. The tenant shall:
(1) Comply with all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by ap-
plicable minimum standards of building and housing codes materially affect-
ing health or safety;
(2) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean
and safe as the condition of the premises permit, and upon termination of
the tenancy place the dwelling unit in as clean condition, excepting ordinary
wear and tear, as when the tenancy commenced;
(3) Dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, rubbish, garbage, and
other waste in a clean and safe manner;
(4) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the ten-
ant as clean as their condition permits;
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(5) Use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heat-
ing, ventilating, air conditioning and other facilities and appliances including
elevators in the premises;
(6) Not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or
remove any part of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do so;
(7) Conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his
consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neigh-
bors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises; and
(8) Abide by all by-laws, covenants, rules or regulations of any appli-
cable condominium regime, cooperative housing agreement, or neighborhood
association not inconsistent with landlord's rights or duties.
76-1422. Rules and regulations. A landlord, from time to time, may
adopt rules or regulations, however described, concerning the tenant's use
and occupancy of the premises. It is enforceable as provided in section 76-
1431 against the tenant only if:
(1) Its purpose is to promote the appearance, convenience, safety, or
welfare of the tenants in the premises, preserve the landlord's property from
abusive use, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities held out
for the tenants generally;(2) It is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted;
(3) It applies to all tenants in the premises in a fair manner;
(4) It is sufficiently explicit in its prohibition, direction, or limitation
of the tenant's conduct to fairly inform him of what he must or must not
do to comply;(5) It is not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord;
and
(6) The tenant has notice of it at the time he enters into the rental
agreement.
A rule or regulation adopted after the tenant enters into the rental
agreement is enforceable against thb tenant if reasonable notice of its adop-
tion is given to the tenant and it does not work a substantial modification
of his bargain.
76-1423. Access. (1) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold con-
sent to the landlord to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the
premises, make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or im-
provements, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit
to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or con-
tractors.
(2) The landlord may enter the dwelling unit without consent of the
tenant in case of emergency.
(3) The landlord shall not abuse the right of access or use it to harass
the tenant. Except in case of emergency or if it iA impracticable to do so,
the landlord shall give the tenant at least one day's notice of his intent to
enter and enter only at reasonable times.
(4) The landlord has no other right of access except by court order, and
as permitted by subsection (2) of section 76-1432, or if the tenant has aban-
doned or surrendered the premises.
76-1424. Tenant to use and occupy. Unless otherwise agreed, the tenant
shall occupy his dwelling unit only as a dwelling unit. The rental agreement
may require that the tenant notify the landlord of any anticipated extended
absence from the premises in excess of seven days no later than the first
day of the extended absence.
76-1425. Noncompliance by landlord. (1) Except as provided in sec-
tions 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, if there is a material noncompliance by
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the landlord with the rental agreement or a noncompliance with section 76-
1419 materially affecting health and safety, the tenant may deliver a written
notice to the landlord specifying the acts and omissions constituting the
breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less
than thirty days after receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied in
fourteen days, and the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the
notice subject to the following. If the breach is remediable by repairs or
the payment of damages or otherwise and the landlord adequately remedies
the breach prior to the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement will
not terminate. If substantially the same act or omission which constituted
a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six months,
the tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen days'
written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental
agreement. The tenant may not terminate for a condition caused by the de-
liberate or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of his family,
or other person on the premises with his consent.
(2) Except as provided in sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, the
tenant may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompli-
ance by the landlord with the rental agreement or section 76-1419. If the
landlord's noncompliance is willful the tenant may recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees. If the landlord's noncompliance is caused by conditions or cir-
cumstances beyond his control, the tenant may not recover consequential
damages, but retains remedies provided in section 76-1427.
(3) The remedy provided in subsection (2) is in addition to any right
of the tenant arising under subsection (1) of section 76-1425.
(4) If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all
prepaid rent and security recoverable by the tenant under section 76-1416.
76-1426. Failure to deliver possession. If the landlord fails to deliver
possession of the dwelling unit to the tenant as provided in section 76-1418,
rent abates until possession is delivered and the tenant shall:(1) Upon at least five days' written notice to the landlord terminate the
rental agreement and upon termination the landlord shall return all prepaid
rent and security; or(2) Demand performance of the rental agreement by the landlord and,
if the tenant elects, maintain an action for possession of the dwelling unit
against any person wrongfully in possession or wrongfully withholding pos-
session and recover the damages sustained by him.
If a person's failure to deliver possession is willful and not in good faith,
an aggrieved person may recover from that person an amount not more than
three months' periodic rent or threefold the actual damages sustained by
him, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's fees.
76-1427. Wrongful failure to supply heat, water, hot water, or essential services.(1) If contrary to the rental agreement or section 76-1419 the landlord
deliberately or negligently fails to supply running water, hot water, or
heat, or essential services, the tenant may give written notice to the land-
lord specifying the breach and may:
(a) Procure reasonable amounts of hot water, running water, heat and
essential services during the period of the landlord's noncompliance and de-
duct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent;(b) Recover damages based upon the diminution in the fair rental value
of the dwelling unit; or(c) Procure reasonable substitute housing during the period of the land
lord's noncompliance, in which case the tenant is excused from paying rent
for the period of the landlord's noncompliance.
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In addition to the remedy provided in subdivisions (a) and (c), if the
failure to supply is deliberate, the tenant may recover the actual and reason-
able cost or fair and reasonable value of the substitute housing not in excess
of an amount equal to the periodic rent, and in any case under this subsec-
tion reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) If the tenant proceeds under this section, he may not proceed under
section 76-1425 as to that breach.
(3) The rights under this section do not arise until the tenant has given
written notice to the landlord or if the condition was caused by the delib-
erate or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of his family,
or other person on the premises with his consent. This section is not in-
tended to cover circumstances beyond the landlord's control.
76-1428. Landlords noncompliance as defense to action for possession. (1) In
an action for possession based upon nonpayment of the rent or in an
an action for rent where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may counter-
claim for any amount which he may recover under the rental agreement or
sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449. In that event the court from time
to time may order the tenant to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued
and thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due to each party.
The party to whom a net amount is owed shall be paid first from the money
paid into court, and the balance by the other party. If no rent remains due
after application of this section, judgment shall be entered for the tenant
in the action for possession. If the defense or counterclaim by the tenant
is without merit and is not raised in good faith the landlord may recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) In an action for rent where the tenant is not in possession, the ten-
ant may counterclaim as provided in subsection (1) but the tenant is not
required to pay any rent into court.
76-1429. Fire or casualty damage. (1) If the dwelling unit or premises
are damaged or destroyed by fire or casualty to an extent that enjoyment
of the dwelling unit is substantially impaired, the tenant may:
(a) Immediately vacate the premises and notify the landlord in writing
within fourteen days thereafter of his intention to terminate the rental
agreement, in which case the rental agreement terminates as of the date of
vacating; or
(b) If continued occupancy is lawful, vacate any part of the dwelling
unit rendered unusable by the fire or casualty, in which case the tenant's
liability for rent is reduced in proportion to the diminution in the fair rental
value of the dwelling unit.
(2) If the rental agreement is terminated the landlord shall return all
prepaid rent and security recoverable under section 76-1416. Accounting for
rent in the event of termination or apportionment is to occur as of the date
of the casualty. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the tenant
is responsible for damage caused by his negligence.
76-1430. Tenant's remedies for landlord's unlawful ouster, exclusion, or dimi-
nution of service. If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the
tenant from the premises or willfully and wrongfully diminishes services to
the tenant by interruting or causing the interruption of electric, gas, water
or other essential service to the tenant, the tenant may recover possession
or terminate the rental agreement and, in either case, recover an amount
equal to three months' periodic rent as liquidated damages, and a reasonable
attorney's fee. If the rental agreement is terminated the landlord shall re-
turn all prepaid rent and security recoverable under section 76-1416.
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76-1431. Noncompliance with rental agreement; failure to pay rent. (1) Ex-
cept as provided in sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, if there
is a noncompliance with section 76-1421 materially affecting health and
safety or a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement
or any separate agreement, the landlord may deliver a written notice to the
tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the
rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after
receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied in fourteen days, and the
rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice subject to the fol-
lowing. If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages
or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the breach prior to the date
specified in the notice, the rental agreement will not terminate. If substan-
tially the same act or omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of
which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may termi-
nate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen days' written notice
specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement.
(2) If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within
three days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and his inten-
tion to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that
period of time, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement.
(3) Except as provided in sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, the
landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncom-
pliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or section 76-1421. If the
tenant's noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees.
76-1432. Remedies for absence, nonuse, and abandonment. (1) If the rental
agreement requires the tenant to give notice to the landlord of an antici-
pated extended absence in excess of seven days as required in section
76-1424 and the tenant willfully fails to do so, the landlord may recover
actual damages from the tenant.
(2) During any absence of the tenant in excess of seven days, the land-
lord may enter the dwelling unit at times reasonably necessary.(3) If the tenant abandons the dwelling unit, the landlord shall take
immediate possession and shall make reasonable efforts to rent it at a fair
rental. If the landlord rents the dwelling unit for a term beginning prior
to the expiration of the rental agreement, it is deemed to be terminated as
of the date the new tenancy begins. Total absence from the premises with-
out notice to landlord for one full rental period of thirty days, whichever
is less, shall constitute abandonment.
76-1433. Waiver of landlord's right to terminate. Acceptance of rent with
knowledge of a default by tenant or acceptance of performance by tenant
that varies from the terms of the rental agreement or rules or regulations
subsequently adopted by the landlord constitutes a waiver of his right to
terminate the rental agreement for that breach, unless otherwise agreed
after the breach has occurred.
76-1434. Landlord liens; distress for rent. (1) A lien or security inter-
est on behalf of the landlord in the tenant's household goods is not enforce-
able.
(2) Distraint for rent is abolished.
76-1435. Remedy for termination. If the rental agreement is terminated,
the landlord is entitled to possession and may have a claim for rent and
a separate claim for actual damages for breach of the rental agreement and
reasonable attorney's fees as provided in subsection (3) of section 76-1431.
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76-1436. Recovery of possession limited. A landlord may not recover or
take possession of the dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including will-
ful diminution of services to the tenant by interrupting or causing the inter-
ruption of electric, gas, water or other essential service to the tenant, except
in case of abandonment, surrender, or as permitted in sections 24-568 and
76-1401 to 76-1449.
76-1437. Periodic tenancy; holdover remedies. (1) The landlord or the
tenant may terminate a week-to-week tenancy by a written notice given to
the other at least seven days prior to the termination date specified in the
notice.
(2) The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month ten-
ancy by a written notice given to the other at least thirty days prior to the
periodic rental date specified in the notice.
(3) If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord's consent
after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or its termination, the
landlord may bring an action for possession and if the tenant's holdover is
willful and not in good faith the landlord, in addition, may recover an
amount not more than three months' periodic rent or threefold the actual
damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's
fees. If the landlord consents to the tenant's continued occupancy, subsec-
tion (4) of section 76-1414 applies.
76-1438. Landlord and tenant remedies for abuse of access. (1) If the tenant
refuses to allow lawful access, the landlord may obtain injunctive relief
to compel access, or terminate the rental agreement. In either case, the
landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an
unreasonable manner or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful
but which have the effect of unreasonably harassing the tenant, the tenant
may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or ter-
minate the rental agreement. In either case, the tenant may recover actual
damages not less than an amount equal to one month's rent and reasonable
attorney's fees.
76-1439. Retaliatory conduct prohibited. (1) Except as provided in this sec-
tion, a landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services
or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession after:
(a) The tenant has complained to a government agency charged with
responsibility for enforcement of a minimum building or housing code of a
violation applicable to the premises materially affecting health and safety;
or
(b) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants' union
or similar organization.
(2) If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (1), the tenant is enti-
tled to the remedies provided in section 76-1430 and has a defense in action
against him for possession. Nothing in this section shall be construed as pro-
hibiting reasonable rent increases or changes in services notwithstanding the
occurrence of acts specified in subsection (1).
(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), a landlord may bring an
action for possession if:
(a) The violation of the applicable minimum building or housing code
was caused primarily by lack of reasonable care by the tenant or other per-
son in his household or upon the premises with his consent;
(b) The tenant is in default in rent; or
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(c) Compliance with the applicable minimum building or housing code
requires alteration, remodeling, or demolition which would effectively de-
prive the tenant of use of the dwelling unit.
The maintenance of the action does not release the landlord from liabil-
ility under subsection (2) of section 76-1425.
76-1440. Action for possession. An action for possession of any premises
subject to the provisions of sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to 76-1449 shall be
commenced in the manner described by sections 76-1440 to 76-1447.
76-1441. Petition for restitution; filing; contents. The person seeking posses-
sion shall file a petition for restitution with the clerk of the district,
county, or municipal court. The petition shall contain (a) the facts, with
particularity, on which he seeks to recover; (b) a reasonably accurate de-
scription of the premises; and (c) the requisite compliance with the notice
provisions of the act. The petition may also contain other causes of action
relating to the tenancy, but said causes of action shall be answered and tried
separately, if requested by either party in writing.
76-1442. Summons; issuance; service. The summons shall be issued and
directed, with a copy of the petition attached thereto, and shall state
the cause of the complaint, the time and place of trial of the action for pos-
session, answer day for other causes of action, and notice that if the defend-
ant fails to appear judgment shall be entered against him. The summons
may be served and returned as in other cases, or by any person. The person
making the service shall file with the court an affidavit stating with partic-
ularity the manner in which he made the service. Trial of the action for
possession shall be not less than seven nor more than ten days after the serv-
ice of summons.
76-1443. Continuance; when. No continuance shall be granted unless
extraordinary cause be shown to the court, and then not unless the defend-
ant applying therefor shall deposit with the clerk of the court payment of
any rents that have accrued, or give an undertaking with sufficient surety
therefor, and, in addition, deposit with the clerk such rental payments as
accrue during the pendency of the suit.
76-1444. Default of defendant. If the defendant shall not appear in re-
sponse to the summons, and it shall have been properly served, the court
shall try the cause as though he were present.
76-1445. Defendant may appear and answer. On or before the day fixed for
his appearance, the defendant may appear and answer and assert any legal
or equitable defense, setoff, or counterclaim.
76-1446. Trial; judgment; writ of restitution; issuance. Trial shall be had
on the date or dates set as in all other cases, and if judgment be rendered
against defendant for the restitution of the premises, the court shall declare
the forfeiture of the rental agreement, and shall, at the request of the plain-
tiff or his attorney, issue a writ of restitution, directing the constable or
sheriff to restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff on a specified
date not more than seven days after entry of judgment.
76-1447. Appeal; effect. If either party feels aggrieved by the judg-
ment, he may appeal as in other civil actions. An appeal by the defendant
shall stay the execution of any writ of restitution, so long as the defendant
deposits with the clerk of the district court the amount of judgment and
costs, or gives an appeal bond with surety therefor, and thereafter pays into
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court, on a monthly basis, an amount equal to the monthly rent called for
by the rental agreement at the time the complaint was filed.
76-1448. Operative date; act; application. Sections 24-568 and 76-1401 to
76-1449 shall become operative on July 1, 1975. It applies to rental agree-
ments entered into or extended or renewed after that date.
76-1449. Transactions entered into before effective date; effect. Transactions
entered into before July 12, 1974, and not extended or renewed after that
date, and the rights, duties, and interests flowing from them remain valid
and may be terminated, completed, consummated, or enforced as required
or permitted prior to July 12, 1974.
